State v. Williams-Bey

• Decision Date: 23 August 2019
• Docket Number: SC 19954
• Citation: 333 Conn. 468,215 A.3d 711
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Tauren WILLIAMS-BEY

333 Conn. 468

215 A.3d 711

STATE of Connecticut

v.Tauren WILLIAMS-BEY

SC 19954

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 15, 2018

Officially released August 23, 2019^*

Heather Clark, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

George Jepsen, former attorney general, Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, and Leland J. Moore filed a brief for the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles as amicus curiae.

S. Max Simmons and Marsha L. Levick filed a brief for the Juvenile Law Center as amicus curiae.

Michael S. Taylor and James P. Sexton, Hartford, filed a brief for the Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

Under the federal constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, a juvenile offender cannot serve a sentence of imprisonment for life, or its functional equivalent, without the possibility of parole, unless his age and the hallmarks of adolescence have been considered as mitigating factors. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 476–77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) ; Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , 317 Conn. 52, 60–61, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016) ; State v. Riley , 315 Conn. 637, 641, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1361, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). The defendant, Tauren Williams-Bey, is presently serving a sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment, and, pursuant to No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), codified at General Statutes § 54-125a, has the possibility of parole after twenty-one years in prison. His original sentence of thirty-five years without parole was imposed without consideration of his age or the hallmarks of adolescence. The defendant does not claim that this sentence violates the federal constitution. Rather, he claims that it violates the Connecticut constitution and that he must be resentenced, even after P.A. 15-84 later made him parole eligible. On the basis of our decision in State v. McCleese , 333 Conn. 378, 215 A.3d 1154 (2019), which we also release today, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to resentencing.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. The defendant is currently imprisoned for murder. He was sixteen years old when he and two friends shot and killed the victim. The defendant pleaded guilty to murder as an accessory, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54a and General Statutes § 53a-8. The parties waived the presentence investigation report, and the record does not reveal that the court otherwise considered the defendant's age and the hallmarks of adolescence as mitigating factors at sentencing. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court imposed a sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment. At the time of sentencing, the crime of which the defendant was convicted made him ineligible for parole. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 54-125a(b)(1). If he serves the full term of imprisonment, the defendant will be fifty-two years old when he is released.

"Subsequently, decisions by the United States Supreme Court, decisions by this court, and enactments by our legislature resulted in changes to the sentencing scheme for juvenile offenders.... Specifically, the United States Supreme Court ... held that the eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is violated when a juvenile offender serves a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because it renders ‘youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence’ and ‘poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.’ Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Thus, an offender's age and the hallmarks of adolescence must be considered as mitigating factors before a juvenile can serve this particular sentence.¹ This court has interpreted Miller to apply not only to mandatory sentences for the literal life of the offender, but also to discretionary sentences and sentences that result in imprisonment for the ‘functional equivalent’ of an offender's life. State v. Riley , supra, 315 Conn. at 642, 654, 110 A.3d 1205 ; see also Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 317 Conn. at 72, 115 A.3d 1031. We also have ruled that Miller applies not only prospectively, but retroactively, and also to challenges to sentences on collateral review. Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, at 71, 115 A.3d 1031.

"To comport with federal constitutional requirements, the legislature passed [P.A. 15-84].² In relevant part, the act retroactively provided parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to more than ten years in prison. See P.A. 15-84, § 1." (Footnotes in original.) State v. McCleese , supra, 333 Conn. at 382–83, 215 A.3d 1154. As a result, the defendant is no longer serving a sentence without parole—he will be parole eligible after serving twenty-one years, or when he will be thirty-eight years old.

Following these developments, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting, among other claims, a Miller violation.³ The trial court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, and the defendant appealed from that decision to the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's claim and upheld his sentence.

State v. Williams-Bey , 167 Conn. App. 744, 749, 144 A.3d 467 (2016) ( Williams-Bey I ). It held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the defendant's Miller claim but that his parole eligibility under P.A. 15-84, § 1, cured any potential violation. Id., at 759, 767–69, 144 A.3d 467. The defendant thereafter petitioned this court for certification to appeal.

While the petition was pending, this court held that, under the federal constitution, resentencing was not required to cure a Miller violation if the offender became eligible for parole under P.A. 15-84, § 1; parole eligibility negated the violation. State v. Delgado , 323 Conn. 801, 810–12, 151 A.3d 345 (2016) ; see id., at 811, 151 A.3d 345 ("As a result [of P.A. 15-84, § 1], the defendant's sentence no longer falls within the purview of Miller , Riley and Casiano , which require consideration of youth related mitigating factors only if the sentencing court imposes a sentence of life without parole.... Miller simply does not apply when a juvenile's sentence provides an opportunity for parole." [Citations omitted.] ). Therefore, if a juvenile offender is parole eligible, a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a motion to correct an illegal sentence on the basis of an alleged violation of Miller . Id., at 812, 151 A.3d 345.

In accordance with Delgado , this court declined to rule on the defendant's petition for certification to appeal at that time and remanded his case to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court summarily affirmed the dismissal of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence on the alternative ground decided in Delgado . State v. Williams-Bey , 173 Conn. App. 64, 164 A.3d 31 (2017) ( Williams-Bey II ). The defendant then filed a second petition for certification to appeal, this time from the Appellate Court's decision in Williams-Bey II .

We granted both of the defendant's petitions at that time, limited to the following state constitutional issues: "1. Under the Connecticut constitution, article first, §§ 8 and 9, are all juveniles entitled to a sentencing proceeding at which the court expressly considers the youth related factors required by the United States constitution for cases involving juveniles who have been sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release? See Miller v. Alabama , [supra, 567 U.S. at 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455]. 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative and a sentencing court does not comply with the sentencing requirements under the Connecticut constitution, does parole eligibility under ... § 54-125a(f) adequately remedy any state constitutional violation?" State v. Williams-Bey , 326 Conn. 920, 921, 169 A.3d 793 (2017).

Even if we assume, without deciding, that our answer to the first certified question in the defendant's appeal is in the affirmative,⁴ and that the defendant was entitled to have a court consider the Miller factors, our reasoning in McCleese compels us to answer the second question in the affirmative.⁵ In McCleese , we decided, among other issues, "whether the parole eligibility afforded by P.A. 15-84 adequately remedies an unconstitutional sentence under the state constitution ...." State v. McCleese , supra, 333 Conn. at 386, 215 A.3d 1154. After analyzing the relevant factors enumerated in State v. Geisler , 222 Conn. 672, 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), that are to be considered in construing the state constitution and applying the two part framework for adjudicating claims of cruel and unusual punishment, we stated that neither contemporary standards of decency nor our independent judgment compelled us to adopt a rule under the state constitution that would require resentencing to remedy a Miller violation. State v. McCleese , supra, at 407–408, 215 A.3d 1154. Instead, consistent with Delgado and the federal constitution, we concluded that "parole eligibility afforded by P.A. 15-84, § 1, is an adequate remedy for a Miller violation under the Connecticut constitution." Id., at 409, 215 A.3d 1154.

Because the defendant is now eligible for parole under P.A. 15-84, § 1, the state constitution does not require a resentencing.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion PALMER, McDONALD, MULLINS and KAHN, Js., concurred.

ECKER, J., dissenting.

I respectfully diss...