State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 January 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Wal-18-440
• Citation: 225 A.3d 751
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Bradley WILLIAMS
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

225 A.3d 751

STATE of Maine

v.Bradley WILLIAMS

Docket: Wal-18-440

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: September 25, 2019

Decided: January 30, 2020

Revised: June 18, 2020

Ezra A. R. Willey, Esq. (orally), Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for appellant Bradley Williams

Natasha Irving, District Attorney, and Elizabeth Noble, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District VI, Belfast, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN,^* and HUMPHREY, JJ.^**

PER CURIAM

[¶1] Bradley Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of stalking (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(A)(1) (2018), and two counts of harassment (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 506-A(1)(A) (2018), entered by the trial court (Waldo County, Billings, J. ) after a jury trial. He challenges the fairness of the trial and argues¹ that the court made two erroneous evidentiary rulings and erred in denying his first motion for a judgment of acquittal, in amending the complaint sua sponte to conform to the evidence after his second motion for a judgment of acquittal, and in failing to give certain jury instructions. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Woodard , 2013 ME 36, ¶ 19, 68 A.3d 1250. Williams first met the victims—a married couple—shortly after they moved to Lincolnville in 2006, when he appeared at their home unsolicited and offered to clean their chimneys. The victims initially hired him, but his presence in their home made them uncomfortable, so they requested that he not return to complete the work. Williams showed up at the victims' home uninvited at least one other time and was told to leave. Other than periodic, incidental interactions, the victims had no further significant contact with Williams until August 2014, when he appeared uninvited at a private sale at the victims' store. The victims repeatedly asked him to leave them alone.

[¶3] In August or early September 2014, Williams sent a letter to the victims' home describing a "series of three visions" about one of the victims, including one in which he "witnessed [her] death" and another in which he "saw [her] after [her] death." The victims and others who read the letter found it disturbing and threatening. The victims sought and obtained cease harassment notices against Williams, and Williams was served with those notices on September 3, 2014.

[¶4] On September 4, 2014, Williams sent another letter to the victims, this time articulating his belief that the cease harassment notices were "fraudulent." The following day, Williams sent a third letter to the victims, in which he acknowledged that the victims wished to be left alone but nevertheless accused them of filing a false report against him.

[¶5] After receiving the third letter, the victims did not hear from Williams again until January 2016. Around this time, Williams sent an angry and threatening letter to the victims' attorney. Williams also began posting fliers around Belfast accusing one of the victims of being a dangerous unprosecuted criminal. The victims sought and obtained two new cease harassment notices, which were issued on January 9, 2016. On June 3, 2016, the victims received another letter from Williams that made various threats and demands. They brought this letter to the attention of law enforcement. Williams's behavior led the victims to take extensive safety precautions and caused one of the victims to seek treatment for anxiety.

[¶6] In August 2016, Williams was charged by criminal complaint with two counts of stalking (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(A)(1), and two counts of harassment (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 506-A(1)(A). At his arraignment, Williams entered a plea of not guilty on all four counts. Williams requested and was appointed counsel, but he filed a request to proceed pro se shortly before the original trial date.

[¶7] Prior to trial, the court met with Williams, his attorney, and the attorney for the State to discuss Williams's reasons for wanting to represent himself. Williams felt that his trial counsel was not sufficiently knowledgeable about the underlying facts of the case and the history between him and the victims. The court then conducted an extensive and careful colloquy with Williams, during which the court warned him of the many risks of representing himself at trial. The court periodically confirmed with Williams that he understood these risks, and he repeatedly stated that he did. At the end of this exchange, Williams said that he still wished to represent himself at trial, but he agreed to have his appointed attorney serve as standby counsel. Later, prior to jury selection, Williams also agreed that, during the trial, standby counsel would be permitted to make objections on his behalf and to conduct the direct examination of him.

[¶8] At trial, after the close of the State's evidence, Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal, M.R.U. Crim. P. 29, on one of the harassment counts on the ground that the State was required to prove two acts of harassment against the victims but had established only one—the June 3, 2016, letter. The court denied this motion, concluding that the jury could make a reasonable inference that the fliers Williams posted in January 2016 were intended to harass both victims and that posting the fliers could be found to constitute a second act of harassment.

[¶9] Williams then made a second motion for a judgment of acquittal on both harassment counts on the ground that the complaint alleged he had engaged in a course of conduct constituting harassment "beginning on or about January 9, 2016, and ending on or about June 6, 2016, in Lincolnville, Waldo County, Maine," but the evidence at trial showed that some of the acts forming the basis of the harassment charges occurred in Belfast, a different municipality in Waldo County. The State opposed the motion, arguing that a course of conduct can take place in multiple locations, and the complaint merely specifies the location where the course of conduct ended and does not list each municipality or jurisdiction where any part of the course of conduct occurred. The following exchange took place:

THE COURT: What about—Mr. Woodbury, what about the other issue that Mr. McLean is arguing, that is sort of by the nature of harassment charges that the course of conduct can be a broader—

MR. WOODBURY: It can. He should have said in Waldo County.

MR. MCLEAN: It does say Waldo, it says Lincolnville, Waldo County. But again, it could cross jurisdictional lines.

MR. WOODBURY: Well, Belfast and Lincolnville, I mean he should have been more specific I think. I hate to argue a technical point, but it's—it's there.

Although no formal motion, written or oral, was presented to the court, the court, over Williams's objection and based on the parties' arguments, permitted the amendment of Counts 2 and 4 of the complaint to allege "in Waldo County," and denied the second motion for a judgment of acquittal. M.R.U. Crim. P. 3(d) ; M.R.U. Crim. P. 29. The court stated that it did not perceive any prejudice to Williams because the discovery put him on notice that some of the acts alleged to form part of the course of conduct constituting harassment occurred in Belfast.

[¶10] The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all four counts. On the first stalking charge, the court sentenced Williams to 364 days in jail, all but ninety days suspended, and a one-year term of probation. The court imposed concurrent jail sentences of ninety days on the second stalking charge and forty-eight hours on each harassment charge.² Finally, the court imposed an additional concurrent sentence of thirty days for contempt based on Williams's conduct during the trial. Williams timely appealed, and the court stayed execution of the sentences pending appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Court's Conduct During the Trial

[¶11] Williams argues that the trial court created a "prejudicial trial environment" and thereby violated his right to a fair trial.³ The record, however, tells a different story.

[¶12] Williams chose to proceed without counsel and was a difficult and at times combative litigant who repeatedly disregarded the court's rulings and instructions, badgered witnesses, and asked inappropriate questions during his examination of them. Despite this, the court was patient with Williams and often paused to explain the legal basis of its rulings to him. During a chambers conference at the conclusion of the trial, Williams told the court that he felt it had been "amazingly fair." The court also instructed the jury that although it had occasionally been required to insert itself into the proceedings, the jury alone was required to decide the facts based on the evidence presented. We conclude that Williams received a fair trial. See Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219, 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941) ("[D]enial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.").

B. Evidentiary Rulings

[¶13] Williams raises two issues related to evidentiary rulings by the trial court. We address each in turn.

1. The Previous Protection from Harassment Hearing

[¶14] We reject Williams's argument that the judgment entered in his favor in the prior protection from harassment (PFH) matter was entitled to res judicata effect in this criminal prosecution.

[¶15] Williams argues that the court erred when it denied him the ability to present evidence related to the previous PFH matter involving him and one of the victims because that hearing resulted in a judgment in Williams's favor and was entitled to res judicata effect.

[¶16] Collateral estoppel, the prong of...