State v. Williams

• Citation: 377 N.E.2d 1013,55 Ohio St.2d 82,9 O.O.3d 81
• Decision Date: 12 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1035,77-1035
• Parties: , 9 O.O.3d 81 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 82

55 Ohio St.2d 82

377 N.E.2d 1013, 9 O.O.3d 81

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 77-1035.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 12, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In order for evidence to be seized under the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement it must be shown that (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the seizing authorities.

2. Where a police officer, in the course of executing a search warrant, discovers automobile body parts not described in that warrant, and harbors no more than a generalized suspicion that such parts have been stolen, the incriminating nature of the parts cannot be said to be "immediately apparent," and the seizure of the parts will not be upheld under the plain view doctrine.

On October 5, 1976, appellee, James E. Williams, was indicted by the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury on the charge of receiving stolen property, in contravention of R.C. 2913.51. Appellee subsequently pleaded not guilty to this charge, and filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained by virtue of an allegedly illegal search. This motion came on for a hearing in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County on December 13, 1976.

Cleveland Police Detective William Tell, a veteran member of the auto theft unit, was the sole witness to testify at this hearing. Tell stated that on the afternoon of August 13, 1976, he and four other policemen drove to a garage located at 17524 Miles Avenue, in the city of Cleveland for the purpose of executing a search warrant. The warrant had been issued on the declaration of the owner of a hydraulic jack, a cutting torch and acetylene tank, who averred that he had observed his property at this particular address.

Upon arrival at the garage, Tell testified that he approached appellee, who was working on a yellow 1976 Oldsmobile, and served him with a copy of the warrant. As the other officers proceeded to search for the equipment described in the warrant, Tell made inquiries of appellee relative to the auto he was working on and a red 1976 Oldsmobile parked nearby. These inquiries were prompted by Tell's observations that the garage was being used as an auto body shop, that the car on which appellee was working was only semi-assembled, that numerous body parts with the same shade of paint as the semi-assembled vehicle were lying near that vehicle, and that no paint compressor was visible on the premises.

In response to Tell's queries, appellee stated that both Oldsmobiles were his property, having been recently purchased from a local auto salvage yard. Tell decided to phone the auto salvage yard, and by so doing learned that when the two Oldsmobiles were sold to appellee they were in a stripped condition, i. e., missing the front end, doors, and various other body parts which were now attached to the red Oldsmobile or lying next to the yellow Oldsmobile. During this time the officers accompanying Tell had discovered and seized the equipment listed in the search warrant. Based upon his observations and the information obtained by the telephone call, Tell ordered the seizure of the two Oldsmobiles, together with the miscellaneous Oldsmobile body parts. Appellee was arrested on the grounds that he was in possession of the items listed in the warrant. ^*

At the hearing on the motion to suppress the seized parts, Detective Tell further testified that while interrogating appellee inside the garage he observed a maintenance sticker attached to the front end of the car on which appellee was working. Tell stated that at the time of the search he could not determine from the sticker alone whether the seized parts were stolen. However, Tell testified that after a lengthy investigation he was able to trace the sticker to an Oldsmobile dealership, where a vehicle was serviced shortly before it was stolen. Tell testified that the former owner of the vehicle (which had been serviced, stolen and never recovered) identified the doors seized from appellee by opening the car door locks with his keys.

At the close of the hearing appellee's motion to suppress was granted by the trial court. The state appealed, and on August 11, 1977, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court below.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of the state's motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Mary A. Lentz, Richmond Heights, for appellant.

Charles B. Lazzaro, Cleveland, for appellee.

CELEBREZZE, Justice.

It is now well established that under the "plain view" doctrine, police officers may seize evidence, instrumentalities or fruits of a crime without the necessity of having first obtained a search warrant specifically naming such items. Ker v. California (1963), 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; Harris v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether Detective Tell's seizure of the Oldsmobile body parts can be justified under this exception to the warrant requirement.

In the course of analyzing the plain view doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, Mr. Justice Stewart stated the following at page 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, at page 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564:

"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges."

Hence, in order to qualify under the plain view exception, it must be shown that (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the authorities the plain view was lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent.

The first requirement, a lawful initial intrusion, was clearly met in the instant cause, since the investigating officers were acting pursuant to a legitimate search warrant describing the location where the car parts were seized. The second requirement, an inadvertent discovery, was also satisfied. The record indicates that Detective Tell did not know, prior to the search, that appellee was in possession of stolen property. Therefore, our attention must focus on the third requirement, viz., was the incriminating nature of the Oldsmobile body parts immediately apparent to Detective Tell.

Our review of the record fails to reveal a sufficient factual basis upon which Tell could have known, or had probable cause to believe, upon initial inspection of the automobile parts, that appellee was in possession of contraband. Quite to the contrary, the record discloses that it was necessary for Detective Tell to inquire as to where the two vehicles were purchased, and to place a telephone call to the auto salvage yard, before he became suspicious that the unattached body parts may have been stolen. Moreover it was not until he had seized the parts, and thereafter conducted a two-month-long investigation, that Detective Tell knew for certain that some of the auto parts in appellee's possession had been stolen. Nevertheless, a search or seizure, illegal at inception, cannot be...