State v. Williams, 2D99-2217.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 2D99-2217.,2D99-2217.
• Citation: 751 So.2d 170
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

751 So.2d 170

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. George WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 2D99-2217.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 9, 2000.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Judge.

The State appeals the trial court's order suppressing a crack pipe containing cocaine residue, a clean crack pipe, new and used steel wool pads, and George Williams' incriminating statements to police. We reverse.

In the early morning hours of September 3, 1998, two police officers patrolled the area of 34th Street in St. Petersburg. They noticed a known prostitute loitering in the area. The officers stopped to talk with the prostitute, and, upon inquiry, the prostitute indicated that she currently resided in Room 2 of the Palm Aire Motel. While one of the officers stayed with the prostitute, the second officer went to the motel and spoke with the desk clerk.

The desk clerk informed the officer that this known prostitute was listed as a guest of George Williams. The desk clerk told the officer that he wanted all the occupants out of the room. The officer went to Room 2 and knocked on the door. Williams answered the door, closed the door momentarily to clothe himself, and reopened the door to speak with the officer.

The officer informed Williams that the motel wanted all the occupants to vacate the motel room. The officer asked whether anyone else currently occupied the room. Williams said no, and invited the officer into the room to see for himself. The officer and Williams conversed while Williams packed his belongings and put them in his truck. Before Williams departed, the officer asked Williams whether he had left anything in the room. Williams said no, and went to the motel office to return his key. After Williams left the motel in his truck, the officer searched the motel room, found the contraband, and seized it. The trial court granted Williams' motion to suppress the contraband, and the State appeals.

"The courts have allowed the seizure of evidence `voluntarily abandoned' where no improper or unlawful act was committed by the law enforcement officers prior to such abandonment." State v. Nittolo, 317 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla.1975). Police do not conduct a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they "retrieve property which a defendant has voluntarily abandoned in an area where he has no reasonable expectation of privacy,... as where a person discards property... in a hotel room or shack which has been vacated." State v. Oliver, 368 So.2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960)); see also Patmore v. State, 383 So.2d 309, 310-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)

. We acknowledge, however, that where a defendant abandons property as a direct result of unlawful police conduct, he does not relinquish his reasonable expectation of privacy in his property, and retains standing to challenge the introduction of the abandoned items into evidence. See United States v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 619-20 (9th Cir.1982); State v. Anderson, 591 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla. 1992); Curry v. State, 576 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991),

approved, 621 So.2d 410 (Fla.1993). Williams argues that the trial court here correctly suppressed the contraband because he did not abandon it voluntarily. We disagree. We hold that the officer acted lawfully, and thus did not "force" Williams to abandon his property.

The officer told Williams the motel wanted him to leave. The motel lawfully ejected Williams pursuant to section 509.141, Florida Statutes (1999), which provides:

(1) The operator of any public lodging establishment ... may remove or cause to be removed from such establishment, in the manner hereinafter provided, any guest of the establishment who ... in the opinion of the operator, is a person the continued entertainment of whom would be detrimental to such establishment.

(2) The operator of any public lodging establishment ... shall notify such guest that the establishment no longer

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