State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 13 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 78655-5-I,78655-5-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ALFRED EUGENE WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUN, J. — Alfred Williams pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree assault with a firearm enhancement and to witness tampering. The trial court sentenced him to 51 months of confinement, with 15 months for each of the three charges, running concurrently, followed by a 36-month firearm enhancement. Williams's Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to Felony Non-Sex Offense (Plea Statement) indicates incorrectly that the standard sentencing range for the witness tampering charge is 12 months and a day to 16 months; but at sentencing, the State properly stated that the standard sentencing range is 9 to 12 months. Also, Williams's plea agreement states the correct range.
Williams argues that because his Plea Statement misstates the standard sentencing range for the witness tampering charge, he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. Williams also asserts he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court erred in denying his motion for a competency evaluation. Finally, Williams claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. dismiss the charges, filed on the ground that the State failed to present a prima facie case of guilt against him. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Williams invited Eric Brown and Sheila Williams to his home.1 Sheila is Williams's former partner. According to a police investigation, when Brown and Sheila arrived, Williams was waiting outside his home holding a shotgun. Williams fired the shotgun in Brown and Sheila's direction. The two fled unhurt.
The State charged Williams with two counts of first degree assault with firearm enhancements and, in the alternative, two counts of second degree assault with firearm enhancements. The assault charges involving Sheila carried domestic violence allegations.
Before trial, representing himself, Williams asserted to the trial court that he had suffered from mental illness for at least 15 years. Williams claimed that he had been off his medication "for a long time," was "very insane," and not competent to stand trial. Williams also submitted documentation from King County Correctional Facility, wherein he asserted that he had previously received benefits for a mental disability. Initially, it seemed unclear to the trial court whether Williams meant to assert a not guilty by reason of insanity defense or a right to a competency evaluation. Ultimately, the trial court treated Williams's presentation as a motion for a competency evaluation, and listened to recordingsof previous proceedings before a different judge.2 The trial court asked Williams what charges he faced, and how much time he faced for those charges; Williams purported to be unable to provide a response, but did indicate that he knew he would have a jury trial. The trial court also asked Williams to articulate the reasons why he would not be competent to stand trial. In response, Williams stated:
I have bad dreams. I wake up and think people are stalking me or trying to hurt me all the time. I just—I can't separate reality from fiction, you know what I'm saying? And sometimes it get the best of me. I think something is going to happen, it's not. I prejudge something I'm not supposed to judge. I think something['s] going to happen and it just—it just—I couldn't tell you sometimes from reality, sometimes I can't grasp it.
The trial court determined that, while Williams apparently suffered from sleep and anxiety issues, he was competent to stand trial and denied the motion.
After trial began, Williams made a call to Sheila from jail, wherein he encouraged her not to testify against him. The trial court declared a mistrial and the State filed a witness tampering charge against Williams.
Williams pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree assault, one with domestic violence allegations and a firearm enhancement. The Plea Statement indicates that the standard sentencing range for the assault charges is 13 to 17 months. Williams also pleaded guilty to witness tampering. The Plea Statementinaccurately indicates that the standard sentencing range for the witness tampering charge is 12 months and a day to 16 months. However, the plea agreement, by referencing the scoring form for the charge, properly lists the standard range as 9 to 12 months.
Furthermore, the agreed sentencing recommendation states that Williams would serve 15 months for each assault charge and 12 months for the witness tampering charge, all running concurrently. The agreed recommendation further states that Williams would then serve 36 months for the firearm enhancement, totaling 51 months of confinement.
At sentencing, the State properly stated that the standard sentencing range for the witness tampering charge is 9 to 12 months. The trial court sentenced Williams to 51 months; 15 months for his three offenses, running concurrently, followed by a 36-month firearm enhancement. Williams appeals.
Williams argues his guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because his Plea Statement misstates the standard sentencing range for his witness tampering charge. The State argues that Williams's plea is constitutionally valid because, notwithstanding the inaccuracy, the Plea Statement properly states the overall sentencing consequences of his plea. Additionally, the State argues that Williams cannot demonstrate prejudice. We conclude that Williams waived the right to withdraw his plea on this basis.
Williams raises this issue relating to his guilty plea for the first time on appeal. Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), a defendant may claim a manifest error affecting a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. "[A] claim that a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement was involuntary due to a misunderstanding about the standard range sentence is the kind of constitutional error that RAP 2.5(a)(3) encompasses." State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001). The State does not contest Williams's ability to assert this error for the first time on appeal.3 However, Williams waived his right to assert this claim.
In State v. Mendoza, the defendant's plea statement erroneously indicated that his third degree child molestation charge carried a 51 to 60 month standard sentencing range. 157 Wn.2d 582, 584, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). A sentencing report properly indicated that the charge carried a 41 to 54 month standardrange. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 584. At sentencing, the State explained that it had erroneously calculated the defendant's offender score, leading to the misstatement of the charge's standard sentencing range in the plea statement. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 584-85. The defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea on this ground at sentencing, but did seek to do so on appeal. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 592. The court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to challenge his plea on this basis, because the State informed him of the less onerous sentencing range before he was sentenced, and he had an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 591-92.
As in Mendoza, the State informed Williams of the less onerous sentencing range for the witness tampering charge at sentencing, and also in the scoring form attached to the plea agreement. Mendoza does not require the State to specifically address the error, but only to inform the defendant of the proper range. 157 Wn.2d at 591 (). Williams had opportunity, prior to the trial court entering his sentence, to withdraw his plea on this basis. Thus, we determine he waived his opportunity to do so.
Williams argues, in the alternative, that we must allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court improperly denied his motion for a competencyevaluation. The State disagrees. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a competency evaluation.
The due process clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an accused person the right not to stand trial unless they are legally competent. State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800, 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S. Ct. 896, 904, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975)). Likewise, under RCW 10.77.050, "[n]o incompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues." Under Washington law, we apply a two-part test to assess a criminal defendant's legal competency: "(1) whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (2) whether [they are] capable of assisting in [their] defense." In re the Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 862, 16 P.3d 610 (2001).
If a defendant is not competent to stand trial, they cannot effectively enter a guilty plea. Fleming, 142 Wn.2d at 864. "The factors a trial judge may consider in determining whether or not to order a formal inquiry into the competence of an accused include the defendant's appearance, demeanor, conduct, personal and family history, past behavior, medical and psychiatric reports and the statements of counsel." Fleming, 142 Wn.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, where the defendant has not previously been found incompetent, they bear the burden of establishing theirincompetence. State v. P.E.T., 174 Wn. App. 590, 599, 300 P.3d 456 (2013), citing Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wn.2d 304, 607, 422 P.2d 812 (1967).
We review a trial court's competency determination for abuse of...
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