State v. Williams

Decision Date06 December 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2011–2094.,2011–2094.
Citation134 Ohio St.3d 521,983 N.E.2d 1278
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. WILLIAMS, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

[Ohio St.3d 521]Syllabus of the Court

Evid.R. 404(B) is in accord with R.C. 2945.59 in that it precludes the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character of an accused in order to show that the accused acted in conformity therewith, but it does not preclude admission of that evidence for other purposes.

Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and

Matthew E. Meyer and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen A. Goldmeier, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor General, and Peter K. Glenn–Applegate, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General.

O'DONNELL, J.

{¶ 1} The state appeals from a judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals that reversed the convictions of Van Williams for rape, gross sexual imposition, kidnapping, and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and held, pursuant to State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), that other acts evidence offered to show a scheme, plan, or system is inadmissible unless it shows the background of the alleged crime or proves the identity of the accused. State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807, 2011-Ohio-5650, 961 N.E.2d 1200 (8th Dist., en banc), ¶ 50–51. The appellate court determined that our holding in Curry precluded the admission of evidence of a prior sexual relationship Williams had had with a different minor, because the sexual acts of that relationship had [Ohio St.3d 522]been “chronologically and factually separate occurrences” and the identity of the accused was not an issue at trial. Id. at ¶ 58.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), however, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to prove intent or plan, even if the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is not at issue. Consequently, evidence that Williams had engaged in sexual relations with a teenage boy on previous occasions may be admissible to prove that Williams had a plan to target vulnerable teenage boys, to mentor them, and to groom them for sexual activity with the intent of sexual gratification. The rule precludes admission of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character of an accused to demonstrate conforming conduct, but it affords the trial court discretion to admit other acts evidence for any other purpose, and therefore, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} Williams met J.H. at the Good Shepherd Baptist Church in East Cleveland, Ohio, became a mentor to him, as J.H. had no contact with his natural father and lived with his grandmother, and would often buy him gifts and pay him to do odd jobs at his home. In 2008, when J.H. was 14, Williams began to sexually abuse him. During a counseling session at his school, J.H. revealed to Michael Tesler that Williams had abused him, and as a result, Tesler notified the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services.

{¶ 4} A grand jury subsequently indicted Williams on 12 counts of rape, 12 counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, 12 counts of kidnapping, 24 counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of intimidation of a crime victim or witness.

{¶ 5} Prior to empaneling a jury, the state moved to admit evidence that Williams had had a similar relationship with a different teenage boy, A.B., a 16–year–old member of the high school swim team that Williams coached in 1997. In support of its motion, the state asserted that the fact that Williams's relationship with A.B. paralleled that with J.H. indicated a course of conduct constituting a common plan, demonstrated a distinct pattern of sexual conduct constituting a modus operandi, and, by reasonable inference, tended to prove Williams's intent to achieve sexual gratification with teenage males. Williams objected to the admission of testimony of A.B. and requested a hearing, but the court deferred the hearing until after trial began.

{¶ 6} During opening statements, defense counsel told jurors that Williams had treated J.H. like a son but that J.H. had “betrayed” him and that the boy had “issues”—had made suicide attempts and liked pornography. Defense counsel [Ohio St.3d 523]suggested that J.H. had made up the accusation to get out of trouble: [J.H.] is in the [school] office perhaps under a disciplinary situation for something related to inappropriate conduct regarding female students and so forth.” Defense counsel further stated, “So he may be confused about his sexual preference. Mr. Williams is not. [J.H. is] in the office in this context being confronted with his own bad behavior, and this is the first time the evidence will show that this whole thing about Mr. Williams comes up.”

{¶ 7} At a hearing, out of the presence of the jury, on the state's motion to admit the testimony of A.B., A.B. stated that at the time of his relationship with Williams, his father did not have an active involvement in his life and he trusted Williams. He explained that they had a sexual relationship that lasted until the end of the school year that included kissing, masturbation, and oral sex in the high school locker room, as well as a sexual encounter at a swim meet. According to A.B., Williams received “some type of sexual gratification” when he touched A.B.'s genitals. After transferring to another high school, A.B. disclosed the relationship to a tutor.

{¶ 8} Over objection, the court permitted A.B. to testify at trial, but at that time it also gave the following cautionary instruction: “The evidence [from this witness] is going to be received for a limited purpose. It's not going to be received, and you may not consider it, to prove the character of the Defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity or accordance with that character.” The court also permitted Shawana Cornell, a social worker, to testify that Williams had admitted to her that he had been accused of sexual abuse about 12 earlier but that the charge in that matter had been reduced to misdemeanor assault. Cornell further testified that, in response to her question whether he was attracted to men or women or both, he responded that he was attracted to women.

{¶ 9} When the state rested, the court dismissed seven counts of rape, 18 counts of gross sexual imposition, five counts of kidnapping, seven counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and the intimidation count. In its charge to the jury at the close of the case, the court repeated its limiting instruction regarding other acts evidence. Following deliberation, the jury found Williams guilty of five counts of rape, six counts of gross sexual imposition, seven counts of kidnapping, and five counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The court sentenced him to an aggregate 20–year prison term.

{¶ 10} Williams appealed, challenging the admission of the testimony of A.B. and Cornell. Relying on Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, the appellate court stated that there “are only two situations in which other-acts evidence is admissible to show a defendant's ‘scheme, plan, or system’: (1) to show the background of the alleged crime or (2) to show identity.” (Emphasis sic.) [Ohio St.3d 524]State v. Williams, 195 Ohio App.3d 807, 2011-Ohio-5650, 961 N.E.2d 1200, ¶ 51. Concluding that identity was not at issue, that the other acts with A.B. were remote and distinct occurrences, and that the testimony of A.B. and Cornell was unduly prejudicial, the court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

{¶ 11} We accepted the state's appeal on two propositions of law. The state claims that other acts evidence is “admissible to show his intent, where intent is an element of the statute and both acts are committed against teenage boys of similar ages,” and it also contends that, notwithstanding Curry, [o]ther acts evidence demonstrating that a defendant exhibited a pattern of isolating certain types of victims and then abused a position of authority to engage in grooming behaviors for the purpose of sexual gratification is admissible to show his unique, identifiable plan, independent of whether it shows identity.”

{¶ 12} What the state really argues is that two independent bases exist to admit the other acts evidence in this case: the intent and the plan of the accused, i.e., intent of sexual gratification emanating from sexual conduct with teenage males and a specific plan to target vulnerable teenage boys and groom them for eventual sexual activity.

{¶ 13} Williams argues that evidence of his prior sexual relationship with A.B. is admissible only if it is introduced to prove identity or to establish the immediate background of the charged offense, claiming that Curry should apply to Evid.R. 404(B) to limit “plan” evidence to proof of identity or establishment of the immediate background of an offense.

{¶ 14} Accordingly, we are asked to consider whether our decision in Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720, which addressed R.C. 2945.59 and stated that scheme, plan, or system evidence is relevant in two general factual situations—when the other acts form part of the immediate background of the alleged act that forms part of the foundation of the crime charged and when the identity of the perpetrator is at issue—also precludes admission of plan evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the accused pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B).

Law and Analysis

{¶ 15} Evidence that an accused committed a crime other than the one for which he is on trial is not admissible when its sole purpose is to show the accused's propensity or inclination to...

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