State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 28 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-764, No. 99-765., No. 99-286 |
| Citation | 88 Ohio St.3d 513,728 NE 2d 342 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WORTHY, APPELLEE. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SUFFECOOL, APPELLANT. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, Vincent A. Culotta and Julie Mitrovich King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant in case No. 99-286.
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa MacKnight, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee in case No. 99-286.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant in case No. 99-764.
Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co., L.P.A., and Michael A. Partlow, for appellee in case No. 99-764.
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Chief Appellate Prosecuting Attorney; and Frederic R. Scott, for appellee in case No. 99-765.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Robert L. Lane, Chief Appellate Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 99-765.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, pro hac vice, State Solicitor, David M. Gormley and Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitors, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764, and urging affirmance in case No. 99-765.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Renee L. Snow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office in case No. 99-286.
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Prosecuting Attorneys of the Eleventh Ohio Appellate District in case No. 99-286.
Michael K Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys' Association in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764.
Gray & Duning and Donald E. Oda II, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in case No. 99-286.
In 1996, in an effort to protect the public, the General Assembly repealed and reenacted Ohio's sex offender registration statute. See Am. Sub. H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560 ("H.B. 180"). The General Assembly concluded that "[s]exual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after being released from imprisonment." R.C. 2950.02(A)(2). H.B. 180 created more stringent sex offender classification, registration, and notification provisions within R.C. Chapter 2950.
We have previously disposed of two challenges to the constitutionality of revised R.C. Chapter 2950. In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, certiorari denied (1999), 525 U.S. 1182, 119 S.Ct. 1122, 143 L.Ed.2d 116, we held that R.C. 2950.09(B) is not a retroactive law in violation of Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and that R.C. Chapter 2950 is not an ex post facto law in violation of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution as applied to conduct occurring prior to the effective date of H.B. 180.
Today we are asked to determine whether R.C. Chapter 2950 violates constitutional rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy, Bill of Attainder, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and whether R.C. Chapter 2950 violates rights enumerated in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. For the following reasons, we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 is constitutional.
Although sex offender registration statutes have been in effect for many years, see, e.g., former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669, it was not until 1994 that sex offender laws were updated to the form that now exists. On July 29, 1994, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl, Megan Kanka, was raped and murdered after a convicted sex offender moved into the house across the street from Megan, and lured her into his house by promising Megan that she could see his new puppy. See Weston, Megan's Law Familiarity Complicates Jury Selection (Jan. 13, 1997), N.N.J. Record at A4. In response to this horrible crime and what was deemed by the New Jersey legislature as a legislative emergency, New Jersey enacted "Megan's Law," a sex offender registration statute that includes a public notification provision. N.J. Stat.Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq.; see, also, Zolper, State Again Tightens Megan's Law Notification—Heeds Court Order to Protect Sex Offenders' Privacy Rights (Mar. 24, 2000), N.N.J. Record at A3.
After the enactment of Megan's Law, Congress in 1994 passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code ("Jacob Wetterling Act"). Under the Jacob Wetterling Act, Congress recognized two classes of sex offenders, "predators" and those convicted of a sexually violent offense or a crime against a minor. Sections 14071(a)(3)(A) through (C), Title 42, U.S.Code. The Jacob Wetterling Act also mandates that the states either adopt sex offender registration laws, or lose funding under the Public Health and Welfare Code. Sections 14071(g)(1) and (2), Title 42, U.S.Code. The Act further authorizes the release of information collected under state registration programs to law enforcement agencies where the sex offender resides, and requires immediate transmission of information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Section 14071(b)(2), Title 42, U.S.Code.
In its original version, the Jacob Wetterling Act permitted, but did not require, state agencies to notify appropriate communities about sex offenders. Former Section 14071(d)(3), Title 42, U.S.Code. In 1996, however, Congress amended the Act to require community notification when a registered sex offender moved into the neighborhood. Former Section 14071(d)(2) (now Section 14071[e][2], Title 42, U.S.Code). Since enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Act, all fifty states have passed some form of sex offender registration law. See People v. Ross (1996), 169 Misc.2d 308, 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250, fn. 1 ().
Although all fifty states have enacted a sex offender registration law, the laws vary significantly in what sex offenses are covered, registration and notification procedures, and the process of assessment used to determine sex offender status. See Note, Who are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws (1999), 74 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1451, 1459-1460. In addition to the common registration and notification provisions, some states such as California and Texas are considering more extreme methods of addressing repeat sex offenders. Id. at 1460, fn. 42.
The major differences among sex offender registration laws are found in the registration and notification provisions. For instance, the laws differ with regard to retroactive application. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted laws that are fully retroactive, applying to all sex offenders regardless of the date of their offense. See Note, "Megan's Laws" Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police Harassment (1999), 87 Geo.L.J. 2431, 2467-2473. Twenty-nine states have partially retroactive laws that, generally, apply to all sex offenders under some form of criminal supervision on the effective date of the particular statute. Id. The remaining states apply sex offender registration laws to sex offenses committed on or after the effective date of their statute. Id.
The scope of community notification also varies among the states. Several states have no community notification provisions. Id. Other states will release information only upon request, when the information concerns high-risk offenders, or when dissemination of information is necessary for public protection. Id. In addition, the Internet is being used more frequently for the dissemination of sex offender data. According to a United States Department of Justice report, over half of the states have, or are planning to develop, an Internet site for public access to sex offender registries. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet, Summary of State Sex Offender Registry Dissemination Procedures (August 1999), at 1.
Ohio first enacted a sex offender registration statute in 1963. See former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669. In 1996, the General Assembly revised R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of H.B. 180. The classification provisions in R.C. 2950.09 became effective on January 1, 1997, and the registration and notification requirements contained in R.C. 2950.04, 2950.05, 2950.06, 2950.10, and 2950.11 became effective July 1, 1997. Although we provided a comprehensive review of R.C. Chapter 2950 in State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 406-409, 700 N.E.2d at 574-576, we find it necessary to discuss the requirements contained in R.C. Chapter 2950 in the context of the constitutional challenges presented in these appeals.
In revising R.C. Chapter 2950, it was the stated intent of the General Assembly to "protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state." R.C. 2950.02(B). In the opinion of the General Assembly, the classification, registration, and notification requirements in H.B. 180 are a "means of assuring public protection." Id. To support its conclusion that the provisions of H.B. 180 were necessary, the General Assembly advanced several findings.
The General Assembly found that...
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