State v. Williams

Decision Date03 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 26808.,26808.
Citation102 Conn.App. 168,926 A.2d 7
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey B. WILLIAMS.

George G. Kouros, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, were Richard A. Reeve, Michael O. Sheehan, New Haven, and Cyd O. Oppenheimer, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James G. Clark, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

HARPER, ROGERS and LAVINE, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey B. Williams, was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison after a jury found him guilty of two counts of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a(a)(1), seven counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997 and 1999) §§ 53-21(1) and (2), and three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial denied him the constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial,1 and (2) the trial court denied him the constitutional right to counsel by denying his motion for new counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts on the basis of the evidence presented. Between the spring of 1997 and mid-October, 1999, the victim2 and her three younger sisters lived with their mother, who was the defendant's girl-friend, her uncle and the defendant at various residences in the city of New Haven. The victim was approximately eight years old when the defendant began to abuse her. The defendant beat her about once a week for a variety of reasons. In November, 1997, the defendant knocked the victim to the floor, causing a spiral fracture of her left humerus. The victim was taken to a hospital, but her mother instructed her and her sisters to attribute the injury to the victim's having fallen off her bed. On another occasion, the defendant banged the victim's head on a sink, breaking one of her teeth. When the victim told her mother of the broken tooth, her mother instructed her to go outside and play. The defendant struck the victim with a wooden paddle and on one occasion gave her a black eye. The victim's mother put makeup on the bruise to cover it. The victim's teacher, however, noticed the makeup and bruise. At another time, the school personnel discovered a hickey on the victim's neck. The victim had told her mother that the defendant had given her the hickey. The defendant convinced her mother that someone else had given the victim a hickey and then beat the victim.

Sometime between August and October, 1999, the defendant placed the victim in a situation that was likely to injure her health. When the victim did not comply with the defendant's instructions, he made her put her head out a window and then he poured water over her head. He made her stay there until it was time to go to school.

At night, the defendant would awaken the victim and take her to his room where he told her to rub his back.3 Initially, the defendant lay face down but would turn over and instruct the victim to rub his lower body. The defendant took the victim's hand and placed it on his penis, at first outside of his boxer shorts and then inside. The defendant's sexual abuse progressed beyond back-rubs and having the victim touch his penis. The defendant began to grope the victim's vagina, buttocks, thighs and undeveloped chest. On three or four occasions, the defendant forced his penis into the victim's vagina.4 If the victim asked the defendant to stop, he would tell her not to tell him what to do. The victim bled after the first and second rapes and told her mother, who told her she was having her menstrual period. Although the victim reported the abuse to her grandfather, he refused to believe her.

Consequently, the victim did not report the continuing abuse for fear that no one would believe her. The victim eventually disclosed the defendant's sexual abuse to her cousin but implored her not to tell anyone.

In early 2001, the victim, her sisters and mother moved to a homeless shelter in Waterbury, after which the victim and her sisters were removed from their mother's custody by the department of children and families (department). The victim was placed in a foster home. While the victim and her foster mother were watching a television movie about sexual abuse, the victim ran from the room crying. Because the victim was so overcome with emotion, her foster mother waited until the next day to discuss the subject with her. During the conversation, the victim confided that the defendant had raped her and hurt her private parts. The foster mother reported the complaint to a department social worker.

Subsequently, the victim was interviewed by a forensic specialist, examined by a pediatric nurse practitioner and interviewed by a detective, Michael Hunter. The nurse practitioner found a furrow running through the victim's hymen, an injury consistent with penile penetration. Hunter also interviewed the defendant and recorded his statement. According to the defendant, subsequent to his having back surgery, he slept in a hospital bed in the living room where he awoke one night to find the victim stroking his penis. The defendant so informed the victim's mother, who beat the victim. One month later, the defendant again awoke and found the victim fondling his penis. He again reported the incident to the victim's mother who administered "a whupping." In his statement, the defendant acknowledged having spanked the victim, but denied that he ever punched her, hit her, broke her arm or had sexual intercourse with her.

The defendant was arrested and charged on December 5, 2002. The state filed a twelve count long form information. The theory of defense was that the victim lied about the abuse to avoid being returned to the care of her mother. The jury found the defendant guilty of all charges alleged. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that he was denied due process of law and a fair trial due to a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial. The defendant claims that the prosecutor (1) violated the court's order regarding uncharged misconduct evidence, (2) elicited inadmissible evidence from a state's expert witness and (3) argued improperly during summation. Although the defendant failed to object to any of the alleged misconduct, we will review his unpreserved claims pursuant to State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572-73, 849 A.2d 626 (2004), and State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). Because we conclude that there was no pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we do not agree that the defendant was denied due process of law or a fair trial.

The following principles govern claims of prosecutorial misconduct. "[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, and not the culpability of the prosecutor.... The issue is whether the prosecutor's conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.... In determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial [by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct] we must view the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire trial....

"[I]t is not the prosecutor's conduct alone that guides our inquiry, but, rather, the fairness of the trial as a whole.... We are mindful throughout this inquiry, however, of the unique responsibilities of the prosecutor in our judicial system. A prosecutor is not only an officer of the court, like every other attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the State, who seeks impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent.... By reason of his [or her] office, [the prosecutor] usually exercises great influence upon jurors. [The prosecutor's] conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he [or she] represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice or resentment. If the accused be guilty, he [or she] should none the less be convicted only after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established rules which the laws prescribe....

"[I]n analyzing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we engage in a two step analytical process. The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether misconduct occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that misconduct deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Put differently, misconduct is misconduct, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial; whether that misconduct caused or contributed to a due process violation is a separate and distinct question...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, supra, 269 Conn. at 571-72, 849 A.2d 626. We apply the Williams factors to the entire trial only in instances of misconduct to determine whether a defendant has been denied the right to due process and a fair trial.5

Our Supreme Court has emphasized "the responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they occur at trial, and ... continue[s] to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time.... Moreover ... defense counsel may elect not to object to arguments that he or she deems marginally objectionable for tactical reasons, namely, because he or sh...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • State v. Rios, AC 36987
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 2017
    ...frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams , 102 Conn.App. 168, 197, 926 A.2d 7, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 267 (2007).Instead, the prosecutor's primary point, in context, was to suggest ......
  • State v. O'brien-Veader
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • September 8, 2015
    ...that “this question concerning prejudicial and collateral matters put him ‘a half a step away from a mistrial’ ”); State v. Williams, 102 Conn.App. 168, 181, 926 A.2d 7 (“[a]lthough the prosecutor may have gone to the edge of the court's order, we cannot say on the basis of the record befor......
  • State v. Franklin
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • July 25, 2017
    ...denied, 326 Conn. 913, ––– A.3d –––– (2017); see also State v. Bennett , supra, 324 Conn. at 778, 155 A.3d 188 ; State v. Williams , 102 Conn.App. 168, 193–94, 926 A.2d 7, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 267 (2007). This latitude does not, however, permit a prosecutor to state, commen......
  • State v. Jordan
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 29, 2012
    ...in total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 102 Conn.App. 168, 205, 926 A.2d 7, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 267 (2007). 13. It is only after trial begins that “the right of self-representa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT