State v. Williams

Decision Date27 September 2018
Docket NumberNo. 34959-4-III,34959-4-III
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RUDY E. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIDDOWAY, J.Rudy Williams appeals his convictions for third degree assault, felony violation of a court order and three counts of witness tampering, entered following a bench trial in which he represented himself.

We reject Mr. Williams's contentions that the amended information was insufficient in charging felony violation of a court order; that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to counsel; and that the evidence is insufficient to support his five convictions.

We agree with him that his Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution right to confrontation was violated when two witness statements were admitted based on an insufficient demonstration of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The error in admitting the evidence was harmless in the case of the felony violation of a court order charged in count 1 and the witness tampering charged in counts 3 and 4. In the case of the assault charged in count 2 and the witness tampering charged in count 5, it was not harmless, and requires reversal and retrial.

For those reasons, and because Mr. Williams raises no meritorious arguments in a pro se statement of additional grounds, we affirm the convictions for counts 1, 3, and 4 and remand counts 2 and 5 for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At around 9:00 p.m. one evening in May 2016, Misty Shoemaker called 911 and reported that Rudy Williams had hit her with a belt. Deputy Daniel Vargas and a second deputy responded. Deputy Vargas spoke to Ms. Shoemaker, who was upset and crying at the time of their arrival. She told the deputy that she and Mr. Williams had argued and Mr. Williams had struck her three times with a belt. She showed the deputy her back, and he saw "two distinctive belt marks," which he photographed. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 148. She also complained of pain to her knee, which is where she said she was struck the third time. Nothing was visible on the knee so it was not photographed.

Deputy Vargas then spoke to Mr. Williams, who stated that he had nothing to do with whatever had happened with the belt. According to Mr. Williams, it was only Ms. Shoemaker and the children who had been "horsing around" with a belt. RP at 135.

The deputy also spoke to Mr. Williams's and Ms. Shoemaker's son, La'Quan, who said he had seen Mr. Williams strike his mother with the belt three times.

Deputy Vargas arrested Mr. Williams that night for fourth degree assault. Within days, the State discovered that at the time of the assault, a valid Idaho domestic violence order resulting from Mr. Williams's domestic battery of Ms. Shoemaker on January 17, 2016, forbade him from having contact with her. The State refiled its case against Mr. Williams in superior court, this time charging him with third degree assault and felony violation of a court order. At the hearing at which the superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss and found probable cause for the new charges, it was informed that public defender Richard Laws had represented Mr. Williams in connection with an earlier controlled substances charge. It appointed Mr. Laws to represent him in this matter. Mr. Williams did not object.

At arraignment 10 days later, represented by Mr. Laws, Mr. Williams asked to be heard. He told the court he wanted a different lawyer appointed, stating "there's just too many different issues with me and [Mr. Laws] and his office" and he did not believe Mr. Laws would give him "a proper defense." RP at 21. Although Mr. Williams offered to go into specifics, the trial court stated, "This is not the day for that," and told Mr. Williams he should note a motion for an upcoming law and motion docket. RP at 21.

Approximately a month later, correction officers at the Asotin County Jail intercepted correspondence contained in an envelope addressed to "Cathy McNeil," with the envelope indicating it was from "Daniel K"—evidently Kevin Daniel, an inmate at the jail. The correspondence was referred to Detective Jackie Nichols, who concluded that all but one of the documents in the envelope were in Mr. Williams's handwriting. From the handwriting and the content of the documents, she construed them to be the following:

¦ A cover letter intended for a person named Cathe McNeill, from Mr. Williams, thanking her for her friendship and help;
¦ A second page of instructions from Mr. Williams, directing Ms. McNeill to print out statements he had enclosed, get them signed, and deliver them as instructed. The page of instructions included an expression of concern that a statement from Ms. Shoemaker needed to be signed and notarized or Mr. Williams would be given 10 years, because the State could use the police report against him "even though [M]isty dosent [sic] show." It also stated, "Inside is a letter to Lisa, from Kevin."
¦ A one page letter from Kevin Daniel to Lisa Bond. Ms. Bond was one of the State's witnesses in the pending Idaho domestic battery case against Mr. Williams. Mr. Daniel's letter asked Ms. Bond to "[p]lease help Misty get this taken care of with Rudy"; and
¦ Three more pages in Mr. Williams's handwriting, comprising witness statements for court that recanted the witnesses' earlier statements against him in two pending cases. One was for Lisa Bond, to be filed in the Idaho district court. Another was for Ms. Shoemaker, also to be filed in the Idaho district court. The last was for Ms. Shoemaker, to be filed in this case.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 12-14. True copies of the documents, which were admitted at trial as Exhibits P-4 through P-8, are included in an appendix.

Detective Nichols forwarded her analysis of the documents to the Asotin County prosecutor with a recommendation that Mr. Williams be charged with witness tampering. The State amended its information in July 2016 to include three counts of witness tampering.

In late September 2016, Mr. Williams filed a handwritten declaration requesting appointment of a new attorney and outlining his complaints about Mr. Laws. His complaints all had to do with what he felt was insufficient contact with Mr. Laws and insufficient progress in preparing his defense. On October 17, 2016, a telephonic hearing was conducted. Mr. Laws was present, but the trial court spoke principally with Mr. Williams, informing him that the court did not "have the ability just to appoint you different counsel because you have disagreements with the way that you think he is hand[ling] the case. . . . I can allow you to proceed pro se if you want." RP at 32. Mr. Williams stated that he did not have disagreements with Mr. Laws; the problem was "his lack of . . . dedication to my case." RP at 32.

The court acknowledged Mr. Williams's frustration but stated that if it reassigned cases every time a defendant was dissatisfied with defense counsel, it would be reassigning a third of all cases and would be unable to "marshal [its] resources effectively." RP at 33. The trial court went on to explain, "You have a right to . . . court appointed counsel, but you don't get to pick who it is." RP at 33.

Ultimately, Mr. Williams stated: "[A]t this point in my life right now, I cannot see myself proceeding with Mr. Laws, so, therefore, I'm going to have to try to represent myself." RP at 34. The trial court gave the following warning: "[I]f you represent yourself . . . I can't save you from up here. . . . [Y]ou're going to be required . . . to know the laws of evidence and the rules of procedure just like any lawyer would be required to do. . . . I can't play with kid gloves just because you're representing yourself pro se; do you understand?" RP at 35. Mr. Williams stated, "I don't have any choice right now at all. I mean, I could do a better defense." RP at 35. The trial court acceded to his waiver of counsel.

A few days later, on October 20, with Mr. Williams proceeding pro se, the prosecutor met with him at the jail in an effort to negotiate a resolution to the case. During the meeting, Mr. Williams told the prosecutor that Ms. Shoemaker and their son would not testify against him.

The State had filed for and been granted a material witness warrant for Ms. Shoemaker two days earlier. Before long, she was found at her mother's home in Lewiston and was arrested. The State moved for her release at a hearing on October 31, explaining that it was content to have her released on her own recognizance and "we are not alleging that she was on the dodge. We lost track of her; we couldn't find her." RP at 51. Ms. Shoemaker promised the trial court she would provide "solid contact information" and was released. RP at 54. The State proved unable to contact her thereafter, however, and a second material witness warrant was issued on November 18, 2016.

At a telephonic hearing on November 18, 2016, several motions were heard and both Mr. Williams and the State reported they were ready for trial. The State brought with it to the hearing a form document, a "Colloquy and Defendant's Waiver of Right to Counsel," that it asked the court to review with Mr. Williams. The trial court reviewed the document with Mr. Williams on the record. It covered, e.g., Mr. Williams's right to self-representation, his education and his fluency in English, whether he had represented himself in prior legal proceedings, his understanding of the charges against him and the maximum penalties, his understanding that the judge could not help him, his understanding of the legal rules that would apply, and whether Mr. Williams's decision to represent himself was voluntary. He indicated it was voluntary. Mr. Williams's answers were handwritten by someone on the form, which was filed, but Mr. Williams refused to sign it.

On November 21, the State moved the court to admit the statements to law enforcement made by Ms. Shoemaker and La'Quan on the basis of ...

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