State v. Williams, 66749
| Decision Date | 10 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 66749,66749 |
| Citation | 829 P.2d 892,250 Kan. 730 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Kenneth R. WILLIAMS, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A special statute prevails over a general statute unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.
2. A statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is specific.
3. When there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific statute controls unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.
4. The legislature intended aggravated incest, a crime committed by a person related to the victim, to be a less serious offense than when a similar prohibited act is engaged in with a victim with whom the defendant had no family relationship.
Sara Welch, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Paul J. Morrison, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were with her on the brief, for appellant.
Rebecca E. Woodman, Asst. Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, and Mary Beth Easley, Legal Intern, were with her on the brief, for appellee.
Kenneth R. Williams was charged with one count of indecent liberties with a child, K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3503. The charge arose after S.J., a 14-year-old female, reported to her mother that she had been sexually molested by Williams, her step-grandfather. Under the facts, the alleged conduct is proscribed by both K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3503(1)(b), indecent liberties with a child, a Class C felony, and K.S.A. 21-3603(1) and (2)(b), aggravated incest, a Class D felony.
At the preliminary examination, S.J. testified that while visiting Williams at his home, he told her to remove her pants. S.J. said Williams then got on his knees and put his head between her legs and his mouth on her vagina, and that he put his hands inside her shirt and touched her breasts. S.J. further testified Williams had the zipper of his pants undone during the incident. She testified that he got on top of her and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina.
Also at the preliminary examination, the investigating officer testified Williams gave two versions of the incident. In the first version Williams stated that when he went into the trailer, S.J. was sitting on the couch with her shirt up, exposing her breasts. He told her to cover her breasts. She did not, and he accidentally touched her breasts, possibly while pulling her shirt down. The second version was that, when S.J. exposed her breasts to him, she asked him to suck her breasts. He did so. S.J. then asked him to kiss her vaginal area. Williams could not recall whether he actually had done so.
Williams moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that aggravated incest as defined by K.S.A. 21-3603 is a more specific criminal offense than indecent liberties with a child, as defined by K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3503; therefore, he should have been charged with aggravated incest because the alleged victim was his 14-year-old step-granddaughter. The district court granted Williams' motion to dismiss, finding the legislature intended the aggravated incest statute to be a statute of specific application in that it relates to particular persons or things of a class, so Williams should have been charged with aggravated incest. The State appealed.
K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3503 states:
K.S.A. 21-3603 states:
The issue for our determination is whether the State must charge a defendant with aggravated incest rather than indecent liberties with a child when the defendant is related to the victim as set forth in K.S.A. 21-3603(1).
The State first notes the district court relied on the rule of statutory construction that "a special statute prevails over a general statute unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling." Seltmann v. Board of County Commissioners, 212 Kan. 805, 811, 512 P.2d 334 (1973). The State disagrees with the district court's reasoning, contending that the decision to charge the defendant with indecent liberties with a child rather than aggravated incest is a discretionary alternative provided by statute for the prosecutor. It asserts it has authority to charge Williams with either indecent liberties with a child or aggravated incest because
(1) the two statutes establish different classes of felonies, each statute requires proof of at least one element not present in the other statute, and the aggravated incest statute prohibits a greater range of behavior than does the indecent liberties statute; and
(2) the rationale in State v. Helms, 242 Kan. 511, 748 P.2d 425 (1988), that indecent liberties with a child is not a more specific statute than rape applies in this case.
The State also contends State v. Siard, 245 Kan. 716, 783 P.2d 895 (1989), and State v. Hutchcraft, 242 Kan. 55, 744 P.2d 849 (1987), overruled on other grounds State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365, 757 P.2d 724 (1988), support the State's position that charging indecent liberties with a child rather than aggravated incest is a discretionary decision which rests with the State.
The State claims that children who are related to an offender are more vulnerable to sexual victimization than those who are not. The State points out the existing relationship between the child and the offender affords the offender accessibility to the victim which does not exist absent that relationship. The State asserts that if Williams' argument is accepted, it must be concluded that the legislature intended to afford less protection to child victims of sexual molestation if the victim is related to the offender.
Williams claims the State's argument does not address the issue whether, under the facts, he must be charged with aggravated incest but instead focuses on whether aggravated incest and indecent liberties with a child are separate offenses. Williams contends the State implies that because the elements of the two crimes are different, neither is a specific crime; therefore, it has the discretion to charge him with either offense.
Williams claims there is a clear legislative intent that the aggravated incest statute be the exclusive mechanism for punishing those who commit acts which fall within its purview. Williams states that the district court was correct in its determination and in reasoning "[w]hen there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific statute controls unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling." State v. Wilcox, 245 Kan. 76, Syl. p 1, 775 P.2d 177 (1989).
Williams argues the clear legislative intent is that aggravated incest is a specific crime and the offense of indecent liberties is a more general crime. Williams relies on the following portion of the trial court's memorandum decision which addresses the question of legislative intent:
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Beem v. McKune, No. 00-3224.
...charged with aggravated incest rather than indecent liberties with a child pursuant to a state law rule announced in State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892 (1992).2 In 1995, the trial court vacated Beem's sentence for indecent liberties with a child and ordered resentencing, in accor......
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State v. Dunn
...correct crime, rather than declaring the convictions void. See Carmichael , 255 Kan. at 19, 872 P.2d 240 (recognizing State v. Williams , 250 Kan. 730, 829 P.2d 892 [1992], implicitly overruled State v. Moore , 242 Kan. 1, 7, 748 P.2d 833 [1987] ; Moore had allowed two convictions—one for r......
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State v. Williams
...State v. Helms, 242 Kan. 511, 514, 748 P.2d 425 (1988); see State v. Cott, 288 Kan. 643, 645, 206 P.3d 514 (2009); State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, 733, 829 P.2d 892 (1992). The issue of whether the rule applies is “a question of law, and an appellate court's standard of review of a lower c......
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State v. Favela
...states that the sentencing court's finding must be supported by evidence, because 21-4716(c) is the more specific statute. See State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730, Syl. p 3, 829 P.2d 892 (1992) (finding that to the extent there is a conflict between a general and a specific statute, the specifi......