State v. Williams

Decision Date14 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 384A11.,384A11.
Citation726 S.E.2d 161
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Norma Angelica WILLIAMS.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A–30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 714 S.E.2d 835 (2011), affirming a judgment entered on 3 November 2009 by Judge Christopher M. Collier in Superior Court, Iredell County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 March 2012.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by J. Allen Jernigan, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Scott A. Conklin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Michele Goldman for defendant-appellant.

PARKER, Chief Justice.

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Defendant was arrested in Iredell County, North Carolina, after sixty-five pounds of marijuana were found in an SUV in which she was traveling. Defendant was indicted under N.C.G.S. § 90–95(h)(1) for one count of trafficking in marijuana by possession and one count of trafficking in marijuana by transport. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the recovered marijuana. After the trial court denied the motion, defendant entered into a plea agreement. Defendant reserved her right to appeal from the trial court's ruling on her motion to suppress and then pleaded guilty to one trafficking count in exchange for the State's dismissing the second count. The trial court sentenced defendant to an active term of twenty-five to thirty months' imprisonment. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The State's evidence before the trial court at the suppression hearing tended to show the following. At 10:55 a.m. on 21 May 2008, Sergeant Randy Cass stopped an SUV traveling south on Interstate 77 for a window tint violation. Sergeant Cass directed the driver, Michelle Perez, to step to the front of his cruiser; he requested her driver's license and then asked her several questions. Perez told Sergeant Cass that the SUV belonged to defendant and that she was driving because defendant did not have a driver's license. When asked where she was coming from, Perez told Sergeant Cass that she just “flew out of Houston.” Sergeant Cass told her that she was driving south on Interstate 77 and Houston was to the south. Perez was also not sure where she was going; she said that she was driving defendant so defendant could “DJ somewhere.” Perez told Sergeant Cass to ask defendant where they were going because she “knows everything” and their destination was circled on defendant's map.

Sergeant Cass left the front of his cruiser and approached the SUV's passenger side to question defendant. Defendant declared that she did not own the SUV, but had arranged to purchase it from a friend. Defendant provided Sergeant Cass the SUV's registration and two state-issued identification cards from different states and with different addresses. Sergeant Cass determined that the SUV was registered to an Arkansas resident. Defendant also said that they were coming from Louisville, Kentucky, and that she was going to Club Kryptonite in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. When asked how she knew Perez, defendant stated that she and Perez were cousins.

Sergeant Cass left defendant to ask Perez additional questions. Perez told him that she flew from Tucson, Arizona, to Houston and that she and defendant had hooked up at the airport. Perez initially said that she and defendant were cousins, but then said that they simply refer to each other as cousins because of their longstanding relationship. Sergeant Cass returned to defendant and asked her how she and Perez were cousins. Defendant first stated they were cousins on her dad's side, then said they were cousins on her grandmother's side, and finally said “that basically we grew up together.” Sergeant Cass returned to Perez and asked her to have a seat inside his cruiser.

While inside the cruiser, Perez became nervous and “real fidgety.” Sergeant Cass contacted a database to see if the SUV had been reported stolen and if either Perez or defendant had outstanding warrants or criminal histories. Several minutes later he learned that “everything was good.” At some point while Perez was seated inside the cruiser, Sergeant Cass contacted other officers to assist with a search of the SUV. Sergeant Cass left his cruiser, returned defendant's identification cards, and then motioned for Perez to exit his cruiser. Once she exited, he handed her a warning citation for the tint violation and returned her driver's license. Sergeant Cass then asked Perez if there were any weapons, drugs, or large amounts of money inside the SUV. Perez answered, [N]o,” but declined to give consent to search the SUV. Sergeant Cass then requested that both defendant and Perez wait by his cruiser while a canine team arrived to conduct a sweep of the SUV. Once the team arrived, the drug dog alerted at the rear of the SUV, and law enforcement conducted a search, finding approximately sixty-five pounds of marijuana inside.

Sergeant Cass testified that he based his decision to search on several factors, including Perez's inability to articulate where she was coming from, “the conflict in the stories of being family,” an absent third party's ownership of the SUV, and Perez's and defendant's consistency with aspects of the drug courier profile, such as the SUV's dark tinted windows and the use of an interstate highway.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

1. That on May 21st, 2008 Sgt. Randy Cass with the Iredell County Sheriff's Department was working on patrol duty on Interstate 77 South here in Iredell County.

2. That about 10:55 AM that he observed a white SUV with what appeared to be illegally tinted windows, at which time he initiated a traffic stop.

3. Sgt. Cass approached the vehicle and spoke with the occupants briefly, then asked the driver, later identified as Perez, to step out of the vehicle.

4. The officer had Perez step to the front of his vehicle and asked where they were coming from. Perez eventually stated they were coming from Houston, Texas, even though they were traveling south on the interstate.

5. That during this conversation Perez could not articulate their destination, even in general terms, even though she was driving the vehicle. Perez further stated that she and the defendant were cousins.

6. Sgt. Cass then spoke with the passenger, later identified as Defendant Williams, who was still seated in the vehicle.

7. During this conversation Ms. Williams stated they were coming from Kentucky and headed to Club Kryptonite in Myrtle Beach.

8. When asked Williams said that Perez was her cousin and claimed a familial relationship initially, but then later stated they simply called each other cousins based on their close and long term relationship.

9. Ms. Williams produced driver's licenses from the states of Arizona and Texas and had indicated the car was owned by a friend of hers, that she intended to purchase it. The officer then at 11:04 AM told Perez that she was going to get a warning ticket, at which time she was seated in the vehicle.

10. At 11:08 he begins writing a warning ticket after calling in to check on the status of the vehicle, whether or not either the driver or the passenger had any outstanding warrants. At 11:15 the ticket was given to Perez while they were, Perez and Sgt. Cass were in front of the patrol car, and as she started to walk away the officer asked if she would answer further questions, at which time she was asked for consent to search the vehicle, to which she did not give consent.

11. At that time Sgt. Cass indicated he was going to call for a canine unit, which unit arrived at 11:28 AM and indicated positive on the car within a minute or two after arriving.

Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that Sergeant Cass had a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances to call for the canine unit.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana, and defendant timely appealed to the Court of Appeals. State v. Williams, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 714 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2011). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding that defendant's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were either without merit or inconsequential and that Sergeant Cass had reasonable suspicion to extend the detention after Perez received a warning for the tint violation. Id. at ––––, 714 S.E.2d at 838–41. The dissent disagreed on all accounts. Id. at ––––, ––––, 714 S.E.2d at 842–45, 848 (McGee, J., dissenting). Defendant appeals to this Court as a matter of right based on the dissent. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the majority below.

Before this Court defendant renews her challenge to three of the findings of fact and argues that the findings of fact do not support the trial court's conclusions of law. In evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress, the reviewing court must determine “whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167–68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140–41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)). The trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress “are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.” State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994) (citing State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 523, 412 S.E.2d 20, 23 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001); and State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 573, 342 S.E.2d 811, 820 (1986)), cert. denied,513 U.S. 1096, 115 S.Ct. 764, 130 L.Ed.2d 661 (1995). “In...

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