State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. 4372,4372
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Curtis WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 896

593 P.2d 896

122 Ariz. 146

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Curtis WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 4372.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

March 20, 1979.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1979.

John A. LaSota, Jr., Former Atty. Gen., Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Gerald R. Grant, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Harold C. Stephenson, Flagstaff, for appellant.

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice.

On October 31, 1977, appellant Curtis Williams was adjudged in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and sentenced to Arizona State Prison. He raises these issues on appeal:

(1) Did the State violate its plea agreement with appellant?

(2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

(3) Was the Petition for Revocation of Probation fatally defective and violative of appellant's rights to due process?

(4) Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the Petition for Revocation of Probation?

(5) Was appellant afforded effective assistance of counsel during the proceedings?

(6) Did the trial court violate appellant's constitutional rights when he pled no contest to the first degree burglary charge?

(7) Was the trial court racially biased against defendant?

(8) Was appellant denied due process of law when denied access to a law library?

(9) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a mental competency hearing?

Appellant and three codefendants were arrested in the early morning hours of July 18, 1976, on charges of first degree burglary and grand theft. On October 3, 1976, while in county jail on these charges, appellant was involved in a scuffle with guards and struck an officer, for which he was charged with aggravated battery. He was also charged with two misdemeanors.

Appellant reached an understanding with the State which resulted in two separate plea agreements concerning all charges against him. The grand theft and misdemeanor charges were dismissed, and appellant agreed to plead no contest to the burglary charge and guilty to the aggravated battery charge. The agreement on the burglary charge provided that any jail time would be limited to one year in Coconino County Jail. The second agreement provided that appellant would receive the same sentence for the battery conviction as for the burglary charge, and that the sentences would run concurrently.

On November 3, 1976, appellant received a two-year suspended sentence on the burglary charge, and as a condition of probation, one year in jail. He was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement on the battery charge on November 15, 1976.

A petition to revoke appellant's probation was filed on September 14, 1977, after he was arrested for aggravated assaults of his wife and mother-in-law. Appellant's probation was revoked and he was given concurrent prison sentences of seven to nine years on the burglary conviction and four to five years on the battery conviction.

Appellant claims the State has breached the plea agreements by sentencing him to prison, pursuant to the probation revocation, after he served his time in Coconino County Jail. He claims that it was his understanding that the one year in jail was the final disposition of the case.

The Court of Appeals, in State v. Fuentes, 26 Ariz.App. 444, 549 P.2d 224, approved and adopted, 113 Ariz. 285, 551 P.2d 554 (1976), was faced with a similar situation. In the plea agreement reached in Fuentes, the State stipulated to a maximum prison sentence of two to three years. Appellant was placed on probation. When his probation was revoked, he received a sentence of eight to ten years in prison. In rejecting appellant's contention that the State breached the plea agreement, the Court said:

"We recognize that under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the state is bound by plea agreements which induce a plea of guilty. This principle also finds recognition in the provisions of Rule 17.4 e, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which specifically requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw his plea if the trial judge rejects the plea agreement or any of its provisions. With these principles in mind, we have reviewed the record, and there is nothing to indicate that the sentencing stipulation contained in the plea agreement was to apply to any post-revocation sentencing. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that at the time defendant was placed on probation, the trial court specifically advised the defendant that if he violated the terms of his probation he could be sentenced 'in accordance with the law', that is, to a term of up to ten years as outlined in the original plea agreement signed by the defendant. * * *" 26 Ariz.App. at 447, 549 P.2d at 227.

In the instant case, the plea agreement on the burglary charge provided:

"The Judge of the Superior Court * * * will not be bound by any agreement between the State and the defendant as to what sentence the defendant shall receive, except: (t)he State agrees not to make any recommendation to sentence except that any confinement is to be served within the confines of the Coconino County Jail."

At the sentencing hearing for the burglary charge held on November 3, 1976, appellant's counsel and the prosecutor informed the court that they had reached an agreement on the disposition of all the charges pending against appellant, and stated that as a condition of probation, appellant would not be sentenced to a term of more than one year in county jail. The trial court then entered into the following discussion with appellant:

"THE COURT: Would you have Mr. Williams come forward, please.

Mr. Williams, you have been in the courtroom while Mr. Aspey was explaining your case and these other cases and the Court was making certain statements.

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: Was there anything said that is contrary to what you understand?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: All right.

THE COURT: Is that

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yes, that's it.

THE COURT: as you understand it?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, is there anything you want to say to the Court?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams, I assume you know what probation is; namely, that if you violate any terms of probation that you could be then sentenced to prison for this charge. Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yes.

THE COURT: And you could be sent to prison, I believe, for up to ten years. Is that the first degree burglary?

(PROSECUTOR): It would be up to 15.

THE COURT: Fifteen is the maximum. In other words, notwithstanding the plea agreement which calls for County Jail time, if you violate the terms of probation you could be sent to prison for this original charge. Do you understand?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Yes."

On November 15, 1976, appellant was sentenced on the aggravated battery charge and given the same sentence, to run concurrently, which he received on the burglary charge: namely, two years suspended sentence, with one year in the county jail as a condition of probation. The court reiterated that when appellant was released from county jail, he would still be required to comply with the terms of his probation for the remainder of the two-year term.

The written plea agreement is not a paragon of clarity. Nonetheless, the record is clear that appellant knew the consequences of a violation of his probation. The State did not breach the provisions of the plea agreements entered into with appellant.

Appellant urges that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to withdraw his pleas after his probation was revoked. This claim is based on the previous assertion that the plea agreements were breached when appellant was sentenced to prison. Since we have found that agreements were not breached by the State, we find no legal basis to set aside the revocation for this reason.

The petition for revocation of probation, filed on September 14, 1977, recited as follows:

"Information has come to the Probation Officer that CURTIS WILLIAMS has violated the conditions of his imposition of sentence given November 15, 1976, in that he has failed to comply with the terms in conditions 2 and 4 of his probation:

2. The defendant shall not violate any State, Federal or City laws or ordinances.

The defendant was arrested by the Flagstaff Police Department on September 13, 1977 for two (2) Counts of Aggravated Assault, which resulted in the hospitalization of a 73 year old woman.

4. The defendant shall obey any other reasonable terms and conditions of probation as may be imposed by the Probation Officer.

The defendant failed to leave the premises of the victim in the present action, Francis Beasley, to-wit: the defendant was to take up residence elsewhere and did not;

and it is suggested that he be brought before the Court for hearing in the matter."

Appellant argues that the petition was defective and violative of his due process right to notice because conditions two and four cited in the petition do not match terms two and four of the written conditions of probation signed by appellant. ¹ Rule 27.1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., provides that all conditions of probation shall be in writing, and Rule 27.7(c)(2) provides that probation shall not be revoked for violation of a condition of which the probationer did not receive a written copy. Since it is uncontroverted that appellant did not receive written notice to vacate Frances Beasley Williams' residence, his probation cannot be revoked on that ground. See State v. Gomez, 112 Ariz. 243, 540 P.2d 1224 (1975).

Appellant was apprised, however, in his written conditions of probation, that he "shall at all times obey all laws of the State of Arizona and of the United States Government, and of any state where he might be during probation." The petition therefore adequately and reasonably informed appella...