State v. Williams

• Citation: 184 So.3d 1205
• Decision Date: 15 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1D14–5510.,1D14–5510.
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jeffrey D. WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

184 So.3d 1205

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Jeffrey D. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 1D14–5510.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Jan. 15, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney General, and Jack Campbell, Assistant State Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Kevin Alvarez of Anabelle Dias, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

ROWE, J.

The State appeals an order granting Jeffrey D. Williams' motion to suppress marijuana found in a package received by a third party at the third party's address where Williams was neither the sender nor the addressee even though he was the intended recipient. As a result of the search of the package, Williams was charged with conspiracy to possess more than twenty grams of marijuana with the intent to sell. The trial court granted Williams' motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of the package, finding that law enforcement should have known that the third party did not have authority to consent to the search. Because the factual findings in the trial court's order are not supported by competent, substantial evidence and because Williams lacks standing to challenge the search, we reverse.

Facts

The charges against Williams arose from a joint investigation between the United States Postal Service and the Tallahassee Police Department. Local law enforcement was informed of a suspicious package that arrived overnight from California at the postal facility. The package listed "T. Lopez" as the sender and "Key Phillips" as the addressee. Law enforcement learned that no one named "Key Phillips" lived in the apartment complex designated on the address label. An investigator delivered the package as addressed; Cynthia Richardson, who resided at the apartment, accepted the package, identified herself as "Key Phillips," and signed her name as "Key Phillips." An investigator asked to speak to Richardson about the package and informed her of his belief that the package contained illegal narcotics. She stated that she accepted the package on behalf of her friend, "Jeff." When asked by the investigator if he could search the contents of the package, Richardson consented. Upon opening the package, the investigator discovered 2.12 pounds of marijuana.

Following the search of the package, Richardson showed the officer text messages on her phone that indicated the package was intended for someone listed as "Jeff" in her phone contacts. Richardson agreed to text "Jeff" to tell him to come pick up the package. Williams was the person that responded to the text message, and he was arrested after knocking on Richardson's door. Based on the contents of the package delivered to Richardson, Williams was charged with conspiracy to possess more than twenty grams of marijuana with the intent to sell.

Procedural History

Williams sought to suppress the evidence of the contents of the package opened without a warrant, arguing that law enforcement could not have reasonably relied on Richardson's consent. He argued that the investigator's reliance was unreasonable because Richardson informed the investigator that the package did not belong to her, that she did not know the contents of the package, and that "Jeff" was the intended recipient of the package. At the beginning of the suppression hearing, the State argued that Williams lacked standing to challenge the search because he did not have a legitimate privacy interest in the package. In an attempt to establish Williams' standing, defense counsel presented the testimony of Investigator Daryl Morris.

Investigator Morris testified that inspectors at the post office flagged the package as suspicious and attempted to deliver the package to the front office of the apartment complex; they were advised that no one by the name of "Key Phillips" lived in the apartment complex. When the package was delivered to the listed address, Richardson accepted the package, indicated that she was "Key Phillips," and signed for the package using that alias. Investigator Morris testified that he identified himself as a police officer before asking to speak with Richardson about the contents of the package. He testified that Richardson gave him permission to open the package. Investigator Morris did not obtain "Jeff's" contact information until after he had opened the package. He admitted that he did not have Williams' permission to open the package, but he explained that he did not know "Jeff" was Williams at that time. He testified that Williams was never in possession of the package and Williams never claimed ownership of the package.

In the written order granting the motion to suppress, the trial court found that the package was addressed to "Keith Phillips" and that Richardson signed for the package as "Keith Phillips." The court concluded,

Law enforcement obviously knew that Ms. Richardson was not Keith Phillips. Ms. Richardson informed Inspector Tabb that she was receiving the package for a friend named "Jeff." She then allowed officer Tabb to check her cell phone where he obtained a number for "Jeff". Tellingly, Officer Tabb never asked Ms. Richardson if she had the authority to open the package. No evidence was presented to show that she had either expressed authority or apparent authority to either open the package or give law enforcement the authority to open the package. The officers accepted her consent without question. With the knowledge available to them the officers knew or should have known that Ms. Richardson did not have authority to consent and that a warrant was needed to open the package.

The State appeals, arguing that Williams lacked standing to challenge the search and that Richardson had authority to consent to the search of the package.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must determine whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Simms v. State, 51 So.3d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. The trial court's order in this case suffers from two flaws: (1) the trial court's factual finding that the police obviously knew Richardson was not the addressee is not supported by the record; and (2) the trial court's legal conclusion that Williams had standing to challenge the search and seizure of the package is erroneous.

Factual Findings

In the order on appeal, the trial court found that law enforcement impermissibly relied on Richardson's consent to search the package because law enforcement obviously knew that Richardson was not "Key Phillips."¹ This factual finding is not supported by the record. While law enforcement was aware that no one legally named "Key Phillips" lived at the address listed on the package, this knowledge did not eliminate the possibility that someone using the alias "Key Phillips" lived in the apartment. In fact, the evidence established that Richardson was connected to that alias. She held herself out as "Key Phillips" when she signed for the package at issue, and she admitted to using the alias. From the evidence presented at the hearing, it was impermissible for the trial court to reach the conclusion that law enforcement "obviously" knew that Richardson was not "Key Phillips."

Standing

Next, the trial court erred in determining that Williams had standing to challenge the search. Before a defendant may invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment, he must establish standing by showing that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized. State v. Young, 974 So.2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). "A legitimate expectation of privacy consists of both a subjective expectation and an objectively reasonable expectation, as determined by societal standards." Id. A legitimate expectation of privacy is not created by a mere ownership or financial interest in the item seized. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.1987). "Whether an individual possesses a constitutionally protected privacy interest depends upon the totality of circumstances." Id. Once the State objects to a defendant's standing, the defendant has the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Ingram v. State, 928 So.2d 423, 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

When determining whether a defendant has a legitimate privacy interest in a package sent through the mail or container shipped via a transportation company that was subject to a warrantless search, courts have generally considered the following factors: (1) whether the defendant is listed as the sender or addressee of the package; (2) if there is a fictitious name listed on the package, whether there is a connection between the defendant and the fictitious name; and (3) whether the defendant can demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the location where the package was delivered. Williams is unable to establish standing under any of these standards.

First, a defendant who is listed as the sender or addressee may establish standing to challenge a search because a sender and/or addressee has a legitimate privacy interest in the package sent through the mail. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ; United States v. Goldsmith, 432 F.Supp.2d 161, 170 (D.Mass.2006). Conversely, a defendant who is neither the sender nor the addressee of a package generally has no privacy interest in the package and cannot assert a Fourth Amendment objection to its search. United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir.1992).

These principles are explained in United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir.1994). In Smith, the United States Postal Inspector intercepted an envelope addressed to Raquel Kirkconnell, which he believed contained a controlled substance. Id. at 1144. The inspector confronted Kirkconnell, stated that he knew what was in the envelope, and informed her that he believed that she...