State v. Williams

• Citation: 165 Ohio App.3d 594,847 N.E.2d 495,2006 Ohio 617
• Decision Date: 10 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-T-0136.,2004-T-0136.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

847 N.E.2d 495

165 Ohio App.3d 594

2006-Ohio-617

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 2004-T-0136.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Trumbull County.

Decided February 10, 2006.

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

John B. Juhasz, Youngstown, for appellant.

DIANE V. GRENDELL, Judge.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Andre R. Williams, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for postconviction relief. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the court below and remand the cause.

{¶ 2} On August 15, 1988, George and Katherine Melnick were attacked in their home on Wick Street in Warren, Ohio. In September 1988, Williams and an accomplice, Christopher Daniel, were indicted for the crimes. In 1989, Williams was convicted on three counts of aggravated felony murder, based on the underlying felonies of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and rape. Each count contained three felony-murder death penalty specifications and one "course of conduct" death-penalty specification. Williams was also convicted of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and attempted rape. Williams's convictions and sentence were upheld in State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 660 N.E.2d 724. Further details of Williams's crimes and trial are contained in State v. Williams (Mar. 24, 1995), 11th Dist. No. 89-T-4210, 1995 WL 237092.

{¶ 3} Subsequent to Williams's conviction, the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Atkins v. Virginia (2002), 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335. In State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the implications of the Atkins decision on capital punishment in Ohio. The court adopted three criteria for establishing mental retardation from the Atkins decision: "(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18." Id. at ¶ 12. The court further held that "there is a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally retarded if his or her IQ is above 70." Id. Finally, the court stated that "any petition for postconviction relief [under R.C. 2953.21] specifically raising an Atkins claim must be filed within 180 days from the date of the judgment in this case [December 11, 2002]." Id. at ¶ 24.

{¶ 4} On June 9, 2003, Williams filed a petition for post-conviction relief, captioned "petition to vacate Andre R. Williams' death sentence pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (2002), State v. Lott, 97 Ohio State 3d 303 [2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011] (2002), and Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21." Williams alleged that his death sentence was void or voidable on account of his mental retardation under the authority of Atkins and Lott. In the alternative, Williams requested an evidentiary hearing on his petition to adduce evidence on the issue of his mental retardation.

{¶ 5} In support of the petition, Williams referred the court to the testimony of Frank C. Goodman, Director of Student Services in Special Education for the Warren City School District. Goodman testified during the mitigation phase of Williams's trial that, in the fourth grade, Williams was enrolled in the Adjusted Curriculum Program/Developmentally Handicapped Program. Goodman testified that, in order to qualify for these programs, the student "must have a measured intelligence or IQ of 80 or below and have deficiencies in two areas of what is called adaptive behavior." Goodman had also testified that, in 1983, when Williams was 15 years old, Williams's IQ was tested at 67.

{¶ 6} Williams also attached the affidavit of Stacey Vail, Williams's cousin, to his petition. Vail swore that "it was common, accepted knowledge in the Warren School system and neighborhood that [Williams] was severely challenged in [his] mental capacity and could not learn to cope on a day to day basis"; that Williams "would oftentimes be unable to respond to basic inquiries from others and would stammer incomprehensible babble on these occasions"; and that "she never observed any improvement in [Williams'] mental capacity at any time during the relevant period."

{¶ 7} The state responded by filing a motion to dismiss Williams's successive postconviction petition and/or motion for summary judgment. The basis for the state's motion to dismiss Williams's petition was that Williams had failed to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. In regard to the motion for summary judgment, the state argued that the evidence submitted with its motion "makes it patently obvious that Williams does not suffer from mental retardation."

{¶ 8} The state argued that Williams has never been diagnosed or described as being mentally retarded. The state cited testimony from Goodman that Williams's IQ was tested at 76 in 1973 and at 78 when tested in 1978. The state also introduced substantial evidence that Williams is not mentally retarded. This included the opinion of Dr. Kenneth E. Covey, a prison employee, that Williams functions at a "level far above that of mental retardation"; Williams's mental health assessments while in prison; letters written by Williams from prison; and evidence that Williams has not demonstrated any significant limitations in his adaptive skills or ability to care for himself while in prison, such as the fact that Williams drafts and files his own legal documents, fills out his own commissary sheets, maintained a website soliciting correspondence, seeks medical attention, and administers his own medication.

{¶ 9} On October 22, 2003, Williams filed a motion captioned "petitioner's request for appropriation of funds, appointment of expert, an order granting access to institution." Williams requested the court to appropriate $3,000 to retain Dr. James Eisenberg of Painesville, Ohio, as an expert to investigate Williams's Atkins claim, and to authorize the forwarding of Williams's records to Dr. Eisenberg from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation. The trial court granted Williams's motion on October 24, 2003.

{¶ 10} Dr. Eisenberg's report was filed with the court on April 23, 2004, as an attachment to petitioner's motion opposing judgment and brief in support in response to the state's motion to dismiss Williams's petition.

{¶ 11} Dr. Eisenberg reported that he had conducted a clinical interview with Williams and had administered the Wechsler Adult Scale of Intelligence Test, 3rd Edition ("WAIS-III"), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 2nd Edition ("MMPI-2"), and the Test for Memory Malingering ("TOMM"). Dr. Eisenberg found that Williams's "results on the WAIS-III place him in the borderline range of intelligence. * * * He is significantly impaired in all areas of intellectual functioning both verbal and nonverbal, though his testing does not place him in the mentally retarded range of intelligence. * * * There is no indication of malingering." Dr. Eisenberg concluded: "It is my preliminary opinion, with reasonable psychological certainty, that Mr. Williams does not currently meet the criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation based on the Lott definition. Mr. Williams obtained a full scale IQ of 75, placing him in the borderline range of intelligence."

{¶ 12} On October 19, 2004, the trial court denied Williams's petition for postconviction relief. The court found that Williams failed to meet his burden "to submit evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate his mental retardation." Absent substantive grounds for relief, Williams's petition was "subject to dismissal without hearing." The court also concluded that "the State's motion for summary judgment is well taken."

{¶ 13} The court found that the four IQ tests, school records, and cousin's affidavit "do not prove that [Williams] suffers from significant subaverage intellectual functioning" and that Williams "failed to argue or demonstrate any limitations, let alone significant limitations in any adaptive skills." The court then set forth, in detail, the evidence before it that Williams suffers from no deficiencies in adaptive skills.

{¶ 14} The trial court noted that Williams developed and executed a thought-out and logical plan for robbing the Melnick residence and that Williams demonstrated considerable self-direction in maintaining his innocence under police interrogation and assisting in his defense. Accordingly, the court concluded that Justice Stevens's concerns expressed in the Atkins decision, that mentally retarded defendants might "unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit" and lack the ability "to give their counsel meaningful assistance," were not present in Williams's case. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335.

{¶ 15} The trial court also referred to the evidence produced by the state from the Mansfield Correctional Institution as "fortify[ing] this Court's impression of [Williams's] well-developed adaptive skills, particularly in the arena of communications, self-direction and self care." After reviewing Williams's commissary orders, medical and psychological records, pro se legal filings, website, and written correspondence, the court concluded that Williams demonstrates "an utter and total lack of deficiencies in the adaptive skill of communication."

{¶ 16} Williams timely appeals the trial court's judgment and raises the following assignment of error: "The trial court erred in denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief, thus depriving Appellant of liberties secured by U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV, and Ohio Const. art. I, §§ 1, 2...