State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 12 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 64987.,64987. |
| Citation | 392 So.2d 619 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. James C. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie B. Brown, Dist. Atty., Tim M. Screen, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
L. Wayne Paxton, Nathan Wilson, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Richard E. Shapiro, New Orleans, amicus curiae, for Southern Prisoners Reform Committee.
The defendant, James C. Williams, was convicted of first degree murder in violation of R.S. 14:30 and sentenced to death. On appeal, he urges eight assignments of error.
On August 3, 1977, at approximately 12:45 a. m., a man armed with a pistol approached the manager, Elmo Plains, of the Stadium Exxon station in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and demanded the cash that he had in his hand. Mr. Plain refused and started to walk away when the robber shot him, grabbed the money from his hand, and then ran. James Williams was arrested the following day and at a line-up, he was positively identified by three of the eyewitnesses.
By this assignment, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to quash the indictment, and in permitting the state's amendment of the indictment filed against him. The defendant was indicted by the East Baton Rouge Parish Grand Jury on October 26, 1977, and the bill of indictment states in pertinent part:
"... James C. Williams committed the offense of first degree murder as defined by Louisiana Revised Statute Title 14; Section 30(1) in that he committed first degree murder of Elmo Plain ..."
By Act No. 109, § 1, the legislature, in 1973, amended La.R.S. 14:30 to provide in pertinent part as follows:
"First degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, or armed robbery; ..."
In 1976, R.S. 14:30 was amended again by Act No. 657, § 1 to read as follows:
"First degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm ..." (As amended by Acts 1976, No. 657, § 1).
Clearly, there was an improper citation in the indictment since the effective law at the time of the offense was the 1976 amendment. In order to correct this citation, the indictment was amended prior to trial to read "14:30" rather than "14:30(1)". La.C.Cr.P. art. 464 establishes the rule regarding improper citations as follows:
There must be a showing of prejudice by the defendant, State v. Brown, 338 So.2d 686 (La.1976), and none has been shown. The charge of first degree murder is clearly stated in the body of indictment. Further, counsel for the defendant was fully aware that R.S. 14:30(1) was no longer in effect at the time of the offense, and since there was no showing of prejudice to the defendant, the court properly allowed the amendment of the indictment prior to trial. La.C.Cr.P. art. 487; State v. de la Beckwith, 344 So.2d 360 (La.1977).
This assignment is without merit.
By this assignment, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in not forcing the state to reveal the identity of Officer Gill's confidential source. On direct examination by the state, Officer Gill stated that the name of the defendant as a possible suspect had first come to his attention through a confidential source. He also noted that the informant had not been a witness to the offense. The defendant claims that the court's refusal to allow disclosure of the informant denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
The informer privilege is a right which the state has to withhold the identity of one who supplies information to law enforcement officials concerning crime. It is founded upon public policy and seeks to advance the public interest in effective law enforcement. State v. Williams, 347 So.2d 184 (La.1977). However, the privilege must give way where the disclosure of an informant's identity or of the contents of his communication is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or to the fair determination of an issue before the court. State v. Dabon, 337 So.2d 502 (La.1976); see also Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). Disclosure of the informant's identity in this case would in no way be relevant to the defendant's case because it would have no bearing on the issue of his guilt or innocence. The confidential source here was not a witness to, or a participant in, any act for which the defendant was on trial. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to the identity of the confidential source since this information was neither relevant nor helpful to his defense. See State v. Dabon, supra; State v. Beal, 344 So.2d 1012 (La.1977).
This assignment lacks merit.
By this assignment, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to call three defense witnesses on the ground that the defense had failed to advise the state that said witnesses would be called to support the defendant's alibi.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 727, provides in part as follows:
The purpose in providing for discovery in this area is to prevent surprise and delay at the trial level. The article provides for reciprocal discovery by the defendant of the state's witnesses who tend to prove the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime. As an enforcement measure, C.Cr.P. art. 727 provides for the exclusion of undisclosed witnesses as follows:
The defendant's proof of alibi is based upon his testimony that he had left his girlfriend's home earlier in the evening and had gone to his mother's home. There, he watched television with the three witnesses in question. He also testified that he left there at 11:30 p. m. and went directly to Shelby's Bar, where he stayed until approximately 2:00 a. m., at which time he was picked up by his girlfriend. His girlfriend testified that after having stepped out for a while, she returned to find a message to call the defendant at Shelby's Bar. After having returned his call, she drove to the bar and picked him up.
The defendant called Mildred Douzier, one of the barmaids at Shelby's Bar. She testified that the defendant did not arrive at the bar until 1:45 a. m., and further testified that she did not receive a phone call for the defendant at any time that night. Emanuel Campbell, the owner of Shelby's Bar, was also called by the defendant. He testified that he was sleeping that night and never saw Mr. Williams in the bar. Mildred Price, the defendant's girlfriend's daughter, testified that she received three phone calls from the defendant that night in which he stated that he was at Shelby's Bar.1
The trial judge's decision that the witnesses were alibi witnesses is not erroneous. Defendant's sole defense was that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. To support counsel's argument that they could not be alibi witnesses, he asserted to the court that the witnesses had no idea as to the whereabouts of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime, and had not known of his whereabouts for one hour and fifteen minutes. When questioned as to the relevance of the testimony, counsel replied he could show that as a mitigating circumstance, the defendant had been drinking that night with the witnesses. Whatever possible advantage could have come from the mitigating nature of this testimony was later destroyed when the defendant took the stand and testified that he was not drunk. Thus, if the purported testimony to be elicited was relevant, it was later repudiated by defendant's own testimony, and no possible harm could have resulted from its exclusion.
In brief, however, defendant's argument, and one not made to the trial judge, takes a different course. Here, it is asserted that the testimony of these witnesses would corroborate the defendant's statement as to the time he left his mother's home (45 minutes before the commission of the crime), and where he was going (Shelby's Bar), the manner in which he was dressed, and his hairstyle. Defendant testified that he had on blue slacks and a red and blue tank shirt, and that his hair was braided. However, the witnesses at the scene of the crime described the perpetrator of the crime as having worn blue jeans, a long-sleeved shirt, and a cap with a zipper.
If the testimony was to show that...
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