State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. COA08-1578.,COA08-1578.
• Citation: 689 S.E.2d 412
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Rodney Levon WILLIAMS, Defendant.

689 S.E.2d 412

STATE of North Carolina v. Rodney Levon WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. COA08-1578.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

December 8, 2009.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 25 January 2008 by Judge Benjamin G. Alford in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 September 2009.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

William D. Spence, Kinston, for defendant-appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant was charged in bills of indictment in which K.N.J.W.¹ was alleged to be the victim with first degree rape, first degree sex offense, common law robbery, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and first degree kidnapping. Defendant was charged in a bill of indictment in which M.L.W. was alleged to be the victim with two counts of first degree sex offense, common law robbery, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, assault by strangulation, and first degree kidnapping. Defendant was charged in a bill of indictment in which K.L.A. was alleged to be the victim with assault by strangulation, common law robbery, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and first degree kidnapping. Defendant was charged in a bill of indictment in which L.T. was alleged to be the victim with common law robbery, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, assault by strangulation, and first degree kidnapping. Defendant was charged in a bill of indictment in which C.D.S. was alleged to be the victim with common law robbery and assault on a female. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to each of the charged offenses.

Upon the State's motion, all of the charged offenses were joined for trial. At the close of the State's evidence, the charge of first degree rape of K.N.J.W. was dismissed; defendant's motions to dismiss the remainder of the charges, made at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the evidence, were denied. A jury rendered verdicts finding defendant not guilty of assaulting K.L.A. by strangulation, and guilty of each of the other offenses with which he was charged. He appeals from judgments entered upon the verdicts, sentencing him to consecutive sentences within the presumptive range totaling a minimum term of 1122 months and a maximum term of 1411 months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction.

Briefly summarized, the State's evidence at trial tended to show that during the period from the cold months of late 2004 or early 2005 to 10 October 2006, defendant picked up five different women, who were apparently working as prostitutes, in Goldsboro, North Carolina. Four of the women, C.D.S., L.T., K.L.A., and M.L.W., testified that defendant negotiated with them for the performance of various sexual acts in exchange for money and drove them to more secluded locations for performance of the acts. The women testified that defendant assaulted them, took the money he had given them and, while they fled or lay unconscious, he absconded with their personal belongings which had been left in his vehicle or at the scene. Defendant's admissions and testimony from witnesses, investigators, and hospital personnel established a similar set of circumstances for the fifth victim, K.N.J.W. We will summarize the evidence with respect to each of the victims in more detail only to the extent necessary to address defendant's assignments of error.

L.T.

The State's evidence with respect to the charges relating to L.T. tended to show that during the cold months of late 2004 or early 2005, L.T. was picked up by a man, whom she identified as defendant, after midnight. They negotiated for a sexual act in exchange for money. They drove to a parking lot. Defendant gave L.T. money and tried to perform the sex act, but could not maintain an erection. Defendant then punched L.T. and told her "this is what I like, bitch" and immediately obtained an erection. Defendant pushed his knee into L.T.'s pelvic bone and pressed against her throat while she was struggling to get away. L.T. managed to get out of the vehicle and defendant grabbed her belongings as they fell out. He asked her, "where's my fucking money, bitch?" L.T. told him the money was in her pants. Then, defendant put his foot on her neck and pressed down with his weight. Defendant put his other foot on L.T.'s rib cage, pushing until she heard her rib pop. A man came out on the porch of a nearby house and asked if L.T. wanted him to call 911. Defendant gathered up L.T.'s belongings and fled.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of common law robbery against L.T. In ruling upon a defendant's motion to dismiss in a criminal trial, "the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense." State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). Substantial evidence is defined as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). "[S]o long as the evidence supports a reasonable inference of the defendant's guilt," the motion should be denied. State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 99, 678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009). In addition, "[t]he reviewing court considers all evidence in the light most favorable to the State," State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156, 125 S.Ct. 1301, 161 L.Ed.2d 122 (2005), and "[a]ny contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal." State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992).

"Robbery at common law is the felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear." State v. Black, 286 N.C. 191, 193, 209 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1974). Defendant appears to concede both that force was used and property was taken, but contends that the force was not used to take the property, but was instead a reaction to his failure to perform sexually. L.T. was severely beaten by defendant until she sought refuge behind a telephone pole, leaving her possessions. Defendant's grabbing of her possessions and saying "where's my fucking money, bitch?" indicate his intent to take her property. The evidence shows that the victim was fearful enough of defendant to tell him that the money was in her jeans and to try to escape from his vehicle. In the light most favorable to the State, this shows that defendant intended to take, and did take, by force the money which he had earlier given to L.T. This assignment of error is overruled.

Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Under N.C.G.S. § 14-32.4(a), this crime requires proof of (1) an assault and (2) infliction of serious bodily injury. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-32.4(a) (2007). Under this statute, serious bodily injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization." Id.

Defendant contends the injury inflicted on L.T. was not serious bodily injury, as required by the statute. The evidence showed that as a result of defendant's assault upon her, L.T. suffered a cracked pelvic bone, a broken rib, torn ligaments in her back, and a deep cut over her left eye. She was also unable to have sex for seven months. The eye injury developed an infection which lingered for months and was never completely cured. The incident left a scar above her eye. The scar amounts to permanent disfigurement. This case is similar to State v. Downs, 179 N.C.App. 860, 635 S.E.2d 518, disc. review dismissed and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 173, 640 S.E.2d 57 (2006), in which this Court held that the loss of a natural tooth, even one that could be replaced with a dental implant, was enough permanent disfigurement to go to the jury on the issue of serious bodily injury. Downs, 179 N.C.App. at 861-62, 635 S.E.2d at 520. L.T.'s injuries were sufficient for a reasonable mind to conclude that she had suffered serious bodily injury. Therefore, we overrule this assignment of error.

Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of assault by strangulation against L.T. Under N.C.G.S. § 14-32.4(b), the above crime is committed when a person (1) assaults another person (2) and inflicts physical injury (3) by strangulation. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-32.4(b).

Defendant first contends the indictment contained a "fatal" variance from L.T.'s testimony at trial. The indictment alleges that defendant strangled L.T. by placing his hands around her throat. Defendant contends L.T. testified that it was his elbow or his foot which was pressed against her neck. "A variance occurs where the allegations in an indictment, although they may be sufficiently specific on their face, do not conform to the evidence actually established at trial." State v. Norman, 149 N.C.App. 588, 594, 562 S.E.2d 453, 457 (2002).

L.T. testified that defendant pressed his foot or elbow on her neck. However while on the witness stand, she also verified that in her statement to Goldsboro Police Investigator Learnard, which was entered into evidence, she had stated that defendant "put his hand upon [her] chest, pushing [her] neck." This testimony indicates there may not have been a variance at all. However, even if L.T.'s testimony was at variance with the...