State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 14 November 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 49200,49200 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Edward WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Charles W. Meoley, Flat River, Robert A. McIlrath, Flat River, for appellant.
Thomas F. Eagleton, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Kingsland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Defendant sentenced to death on plea of guilty to a charge of forceable rape. (Sec. 559.260, statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.M.S.) Defendant's motion to withdraw plea was overruled and he has appealed.
Under the circumstances of this case our conclusion is that defendant should have been permitted to withdraw his plea and have a trial on the merits. (See Mo. Rule 27.25, V.A.M.R.; see also Federal Rule 32(d) and discussion in Barron and Holtzoff Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2264 and cases cited.) Defendant was represented by appointed counsel, who made very thorough investigation, taking depositing of the principal witnesses and attempting to find where defendant had been during the period from noon when defendant was in St. Louis on the day the crime was committed (in St. Francois County) and the next morning when he was located at his father's home in Flat River. Defendant's lawyers told the court that defendant had taken 'dope of some sort' in St. Louis and did not remember anything until the next morning; that defendant took the dope because he was disturbed over a divorce suit against his wife who had taken their children out of the state; that from their investigation they were not convinced of defendant's guilt; that defendant had only told them 'I don't know'; and that they hated to enter a plea of guilty in a case they were not sure of but did so because defendant did not know where he was and they could not find out. Upon entry of this plea, with the State making no recommendation, the court pronounced a sentence of death and defendant's counsel immediately asked leave to withdraw the plea of guilty. This was denied and a written motion to withdraw the plea was thereafter field.
In the first place, the plea made by defendant's counsel was of an equivocal nature stating they hated to make it because defendant did not know where he was or what he did and that, after most thorough investigation, they were not sure of his guilt. Our Rule 25.04 provides: 'If a defendant refuses to plead or pleads equivocally, or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty, * * * the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.' One ground of the motion to withdraw the plea was based on facts showing the equivocal nature of the plea.
Second: Our Rule 25.04 (as does Federal Rule 11) provides: 'The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.' This plea was accepted by the court without questioning, cautioning, or saying anything to the defendant or in any way asking if he assented to the plea. The only inquiry made by the court was to defendant's counsel, saying:
Concerning the same requirements of the federal rule, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, said: United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 499.
In the Davis case, 212 F.2d l. c. 267, the court said: Certainly in a case where the punishment may be death, the court should proceed with care, cautioning the defendant as to the gravity of his admission and making sure that he voluntarily and understandingly desires to enter a plea of guilty. See 14 Am.Jur. 951, Criminal Law, Sec. 271; see also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law Sec. 422(5), p. 1172; 4 Wharton's Criminal Procedure 767-769, Sec. 1900; 110 A.L.R. 228 Annotation. Of course, this does not mean that the court must tell the defendant, before his plea is entered, what sentence he intends to impose.
Third: At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw the plea, an offer of proof was made, which was in accordance with the allegations of the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and was in part, as follows:
'We would further prove that for several weeks prior to the date this case was set for trial the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Grosh
...(1954). And he did not assert that the plea was procured by fraud, mistake, misapprehension, fear, or improper means, State v. Williams, 361 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo.1962); State v. Cunningham, 185 Neb. 488, 489, 176 N.W.2d 732, 733 (1970). Instead, Mr. Grosh apparently just changed his mind bas......
-
Flood v. State, 56269
...aside and the defendant granted leave to plead anew. In support of his position he cites State v. Reese, Mo., 457 S.W.2d 713; State v. Williams, Mo., 361 S.W.2d 772; State v. Smith, Mo., 421 S.W.2d 501; and State v. Blaylock, Mo., 394 S.W.2d 364. Unlike Federal Rule 11 3 (as amended effecti......
-
McClure v. State, 55707
... ... Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473; State v. Williams, ... Page 552 ... Mo., 361 S.W.2d 772; State v. Dale, Mo., 222 S.W. 763; that his lawyer was ineffective for failure to investigate movant's sanity, Jones v. Cunningham, 4 Cir., 313 F.2d 347; and that he was misled by his attorney, State v. Rose, Mo., 440 S.W.2d 441; M.L.R. Vol. 36, No. 1, p ... ...
-
State v. Rose
...the prosecuting attorney, in conversation with the defendant and members of his family, had held out the hope of parole. In State v. Williams, Mo.Sup., 361 S.W.2d 772, the state withdrew the habitual criminal charge. The court considered that the action could have caused the defendant, who ......