State v. Williams

Decision Date23 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. C4-93-437,C4-93-437
Citation525 N.W.2d 538
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Paula Michele WILLIAMS, Petitioner, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Criminal defendant claiming she did not consciously possess illegal drugs found in her luggage is entitled to new trial because prosecutor committed plain error of a prejudicial nature in improperly eliciting clearly inadmissible hearsay evidence relating to that issue, improperly eliciting clearly inadmissible evidence that defendant fit a so-called "drug courier profile," and improperly belittling the defense of lack of conscious possession as the only defense that was available to defendant.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Scott G. Swanson, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., and Tom Foley, Ramsey County Atty., Steven C. DeCoster, Darrell C. Hill, Asst. Ramsey County Attys., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

COYNE, Justice.

Defendant, Paula Michele Williams, was found guilty by a district court jury of first-degree controlled substance offense (possession of more than 10 grams of cocaine with intent to sell), Minn.Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (1992). She was sentenced by the trial court to an executed term of 81 months in prison, the low end of the presumptive sentence range of 81-91 months for the offense, a severity level VIII offense, when committed by a person with a criminal history score of zero. 1 The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction against claims that (1) her convictions should be reversed outright because the evidence that she consciously possessed the cocaine was insufficient; (2) she should be given a new trial because (a) the jury that found her guilty was drawn from a pool that failed to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury represent a fair cross-section of the community and (b) the trial court committed plain error of a prejudicial nature in failing to exclude sua sponte the state's evidence that defendant fit a so-called "drug courier profile"; and (3) at a minimum, her 81-month executed prison sentence should be modified to a stayed sentence because, as a 37-year-old first offender, she is particularly amenable to rehabilitation or treatment in a probationary setting and it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny her request for probation. State v. Williams, 510 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.App.1994). We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. However, a review of the record convinces us that defendant is entitled to receive a new trial because the prosecutor, in our opinion, committed plain error in eliciting certain hearsay evidence, in eliciting the drug courier profile evidence, and in closing argument, and we are of the opinion that the cumulative effect of these errors was to deprive defendant of a fair trial.

Late on the evening of Friday, October 2, 1992, defendant arrived at the Amtrak railroad station in St. Paul after a trip which commenced that morning in Detroit, where she lived. Two plain clothes officers approached defendant after she emerged from the last car of the train and after she began walking, alongside other people, toward the train terminal. One of these officers was Jerry Joel ("J.J.") Kramer, an experienced DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) agent who works out of an office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The other officer was Jo Ann Edblom, a narcotics investigator who is employed at the airport police department and who works with Kramer.

Kramer and Edblom identified themselves to defendant, displayed their badges, told her she was not under arrest and was free to leave, and asked her if they could speak with her for a few minutes. Defendant agreed and, when asked, displayed a photographic identification card with her name on it. Kramer told her that he was looking for a suspect who might be bringing drugs into the Twin Cities, said he did not have a search warrant but asked her if she would consent to a search of her purse. Defendant then handed her purse to Edblom, who searched it without finding any drugs. Defendant was then asked if she would consent to a search of her carry-on bag, and she said yes. A St. Paul police officer who was backing up Edblom and Kramer then directed a police dog, which was trained in detecting the odor of narcotics, to sniff the bag. The dog did so and "mauled" the bag, indicating that it contained drugs. Edblom then opened the bag and, inside one of a pair of socks, found a number of pieces of crack cocaine having a combined weight of approximately 125 grams, which had an estimated street value in excess of $20,000.

A St. Paul police officer custodially interrogated defendant at the jail after her arrest. The interrogation was not recorded. 2 Defendant admitted the carry-on bag was hers but, as she later did in her testimony at trial, denied that the crack was hers or that she had put it in the bag or that she had given anyone permission to do so.

Defendant, who is African-American, challenged the jury venire by pretrial motion, asserting that African-Americans were underrepresented on the venire in violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. Specifically, she claimed that the underrepresentation was significant and was the result of systematic exclusion of African-Americans on jury venires in Ramsey County, as demonstrated by juror statistics kept in Ramsey County since 1990. The trial court denied defendant's motion.

State's evidence against defendant at trial included:

(a) Testimony concerning the objective facts relating to defendant's arrival on the train and the discovery of the crack cocaine in her carry-on bag.

(b) Testimony regarding defendant's statements to the police relating to (i) the reason she was traveling to Minnesota and (ii) the circumstances of the trip.

(c) Testimony that the officers were at the train station looking for defendant because of a "tip" that Kramer had received earlier that day from a police officer in Detroit.

(d) Testimony relating the contents of the tip, including information relating to defendant's arrival at the train station in Detroit that morning, her appearance, the circumstances relating to her purchase of a ticket, information that defendant was carrying cocaine, and information that defendant was traveling to Minneapolis-St. Paul via Chicago.

(e) Testimony about the so-called "drug courier profile" used by drug investigators at airports, train stations and bus terminals to help spot drug couriers.

(f) Testimony describing how defendant's conduct both in Detroit that morning as well as on her arrival at the Amtrak terminal in St. Paul that evening fit the profile.

The jury retired to deliberate at 11:10 a.m. and returned with the verdict at 9:50 p.m. that same day. The presumptive sentence, as we indicated earlier, was an executed term of 86 (81-91) months in prison. The probation agent who prepared the presentence investigation report recommended to the trial court that it depart dispositionally and place defendant on probation on the ground that defendant is particularly amenable to treatment or rehabilitation in a probationary setting. The trial court, as we said, sentenced defendant to 81 months in prison, the low end of the presumptive sentence duration, and refused to depart dispositionally.

1. At oral argument in this court the parties focused their attention upon the question whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial challenge to the jury venire on Sixth Amendment grounds.

By order of this court Ramsey County has retained data on the racial composition of jury pools since August 1, 1990. The jury manager for Ramsey County testified that pursuant to Rule 806 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice (Jury Management Rules), Ramsey County compiles a master source list of eligible jurors. That list is generated by collecting names from voter registration lists and from lists issued by the Department of Public Safety of all licensed drivers and all individuals who are issued Minnesota state identification cards. By law, there is no racial indicator in any of these lists. Ramsey County has used this system of compiling master source lists of persons eligible for jury duty for approximately 10 years. Since August of 1990, all counties in the state are required to use driver's license lists and state identification lists, as well as voter registration lists, to compile their master juror lists. Each week, the jury manager's office estimates the number of jurors required to meet the court's needs, and randomly selects the requisite number of jurors from the master list.

Information on the races of the jurors is obtained through a voluntary self-reporting procedure. When prospective jurors report for service, they fill out a questionnaire which asks them to identify their race as American Indian, Eskimo, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, African-American, Caucasian, or other. Williams introduced evidence of the racial composition of Ramsey County derived from 1990 census data (African-Americans comprised 3.7% of the population), the racial composition of jury venires since August of 1990 (African-Americans comprised 2% of the jurors in 1990, 2.65% in 1991 and 3% in 1992), and the racial composition of the jury venire for the week of December 7, 1992, when defendant's case was tried (2 of the 102 members of the jury venire were African-Americans). Defendant also introduced weekly summaries of the racial composition of Ramsey County jury venires.

The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a criminal defendant a jury of a particular composition or one that mirrors the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692,...

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