State v. Williamson

Decision Date17 November 1936
Docket NumberNo. 34801.,34801.
Citation99 S.W.2d 76
PartiesTHE STATE v. JOHN F. WILLIAMSON, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Ste. Genevieve Circuit Court. Hon. Taylor Smith, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Raymond S. Roberts, Alfred F. Moeller and Harry J. Petrequin for appellant.

The appellant insists that the confession was not voluntary and that therefore the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the confession in testimony. State v. White, 292 S.W. 412; State v. Brown, 73 Mo. 631; State v. Keller, 263 Mo. 557; Couley v. State, 12 Mo. 462; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695; State v. Hart, 237 S.W. 477.

Roy McKittrick, Attorney General, and Franklin E. Reagan for respondent.

The court committed no error in admitting the confession. State v. Roland, 79 S.W. (2d) 1050; State v. Hershon, 45 S.W. (2d) 60.

ELLISON, J.

The appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree and his punishment assessed by a jury at death for the fatal shooting of one George Williams, a recluse, who lived alone in a cabin in a wooded section of Ste. Genevieve County. The body of Williams was found in the woods about half a mile from the cabin late in the afternoon of Sunday, August 11, 1935. The undertaker testified from the condition of the corpse that death had occurred some thirty hours earlier. The cabin of the deceased had been broken into and certain articles of personal property taken therefrom, which were later found in the appellant's possession. While the sheriff, coroner and others were on the way to recover the body they came upon the appellant, with a drayman he had hired, in the act of hauling two hogs from the premises of the deceased. He was seen going in the direction of Williams' home and later returning therefrom carrying something in sacks about the time the killing must have occurred. He admitted the murder to the officers sometime after his arrest and signed a written confession. No evidence was introduced in his behalf before the jury, though he did testify before the court in the absence of the jury relative to this confession.

The appellant's motion for new trial and typewritten brief contain only two assignments of error: (1) that his confession was not voluntary, and was obtained through promises of clemency made by the officers, and should not have been admitted in evidence; (2) that the argument of the Assistant Attorney General at the trial was improper and prejudicial.

I. Before passing on the assignment that the appellant's confession was induced through promises of clemency, we must review the evidence further. The day after the corpse of Williams was found the appellant told the sheriff, Henry Drury, that he had been convicted of murder in Illinois and had served twenty-one or twenty-two years of a life sentence in the penitentiary at Chester, Illinois; and that he had violated his parole and come to Missouri. He was arrested on August 17 and thereafter on several occasions the sheriff tried to get him to confess, but he denied any knowledge of the homicide. Some three weeks before the trial (which began on October 25, 1935) the sheriff read to the appellant a telegram he had received from the warden of the Chester penitentiary, and asked the appellant if he would be willing to go back to Chester. The appellant said he would. At various times after that the appellant said he would like to return to the Chester penitentiary; that he would know a lot of the boys over there, and would prefer going there to going to the Missouri prison.

Two days before the trial the sheriff engaged the appellant in conversation and asked him if anybody was with him when he shot Williams and the appellant said, "Nobody." The sheriff inquired, "Were you alone?" and the appellant answered, "Yes." Thereupon the appellant said, "Wait a minute, before I tell you any more, I want to know what I am going to get out of this." The sheriff told him he would recommend to the prosecuting attorney that he be sent back to Chester. The appellant did not tell the sheriff any more at that time, but the next day made a written confession to other officers — deputy sheriffs. On the witness stand the sheriff said he presumed his promise to make this recommendation had some influence in inducing the appellant's admissions, but he insisted repeatedly that he made it plain he had no power other than the making of a recommendation, and that the disposition of the case was up to the prosecuting attorney and circuit judge. He said he resorted to no persuasion or coercion and that the appellant's admissions were voluntary. He was not present when the appellant signed a written confession the next day. He could not remember telling his deputies about the appellant's admission to him — though he did tell Mr. Reagan, Assistant Attorney General — and he did not think they knew of it when they obtained the written confession. But they did know the appellant was getting restless in jail, and the other prisoners said he was probably about ready to make a statement.

Deputy Sheriff Turner testified that he brought the appellant from the jail to the sheriff's office the day before the trial. He did not recall that he knew the appellant had made admissions to the sheriff on the day previous. The appellant had talked to him about going to Chester, and he told the appellant that so far as he was concerned it was immaterial, and that he would recommend it to the sheriff. He said that to the appellant before he took his written statement. He told him if he would make a complete statement he, Turner, would recommend his being sent to Chester; but he only said he would make that recommendation to the sheriff and that it would not be final as he had no authority to promise and could only recommend.

Deputy Sheriff George Rozier testified he was present when the appellant signed the written confession. Deputy Sheriff Turner and Mr. B.K. Miller, county agent, were there at the time. Nobody made any threats against the appellant or promises to him while the witness was present. Rozier asked him if the statement was voluntary and he answered that it was. It was written with a lead pencil by Deputy Sheriff Turner and was a faithful report of what the appellant said. It was read to him two or three times. Then Mr. Miller was called in to witness the signature of the appellant and the statement was read again in his presence.

On cross-examination witness Rozier testified that when the written statement was taken he did not think he knew the appellant had talked to the sheriff along the same line the day before. He declared, "I don't believe I paid much attention;" then he answered more positively that the sheriff had not at that time told him about his conversation with the appellant. It was the first time the witness had talked to the appellant, and he did not think he knew at that time the appellant had asked if he could not go back to Chester. Then he recalled that answer and said he had learned a short time before the statement was written that the appellant would like to go back to Chester. He heard the appellant say this to Deputy Sheriff Turner and several of the prisoners, but the witness did not hear anyone say to the appellant that a recommendation to that end would be made.

B.K. Miller, the county agricultural extention agent, testified Deputy Sheriff Rozier called him into the sheriff's office to witness the statement made by the appellant. Deputy Sheriff Turner read it aloud and asked the appellant if he was willing to sign the statement — if it was all right. The appellant inquired if it should be typewritten and Turner told him it would be all right as it was and then the appellant signed the statement after it had been read to him. Nothing was said in Mr. Miller's hearing about the appellant's going back to Chester. No threats or promises were made to him.

On this showing, the State's attorneys offered the written confession in evidence, whereupon counsel for the appellant objected on the ground that it was obtained through the promises of the sheriff and Deputy Sheriff Turner that if he would confess they would recommend his being sent back to the penitentiary at Chester, Illinois. The objection is long and reviews the testimony above set out, but that is the substance of it. Thereupon the court suggested that there had been no proof on the part of the appellant as to the effect the promises of the officers had on him.

The appellant was then called to the stand. He said he signed the written confession "because they, both deputies, promised me they would recommend me to the Chester penitentiary." Later he said it was because "they" promised to recommend his being sent to Chester. The cross-examination shows it was the promises of both the sheriff and the deputies that were regarded as the basis of the claim that the confession was not voluntary. The appellant admitted he signed the statement substantially in the circumstances testified to by Turner, Miller and Rozier, and that he knew its contents. Being asked if he did not know the officers, alone, could not take him back to Chester, that they could only make a recommendation, and that the disposition of the case rested with the circuit judge and prosecuting attorney, the appellant answered that he did not know a thing about law; that he did not know what the sheriff and his deputies could do, but that they had told him they would talk to the prosecuting attorney, and he knew he had some authority in the matter. Thereupon, the State renewed its offer of the confession and it was admitted in evidence over the appellant's renewed objection and exceptions. It is as follows:

                              "Ste. Genevieve, Mo
                              "Thursday, Oct. 24th, 1935
                

"My name is John Flannery Williamson. I am making the followering statement of my own free will. Without threat or promise, knowing the same can be used against me in a court of trial. I left my home at New...

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13 cases
  • People v. Conte
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1984
    ...promises affecting the charges against the defendant, and promises granting a benefit to some third person. See State v. Williamson, 339 Mo. 1038, 1043-1045, 99 S.W.2d 76 (1936). Defendants are often more concerned with the welfare of relatives or close friends than they are with their own ......
  • State v. Williamson
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 17, 1936
  • State v. Vinson
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 20, 1993
    ...292 Mo. 74, 237 S.W. 473, or hope of mitigation of punishment for the crime charged, or of "worldly advantage," State v. Williamson [1936], 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S.W.2d 76, are not voluntary and are not admissible in 456 S.W.2d at 316. The law presumes that an inculpatory statement, induced by a......
  • State v. Wilson, WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 1986
    ...defendant's attorney about the appellant's mental state. The court relied on State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 (1884), and State v. Williamson, 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S.W.2d 76 (1936), to find that the promise merely went to a collateral benefit which would not invalidate the confession. According to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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