State v. Williquette
| Decision Date | 19 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2910-CR,92-2910-CR |
| Citation | 190 Wis.2d 677,526 N.W.2d 144 |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Jerald WILLIQUETTE, Defendant-Appellant. |
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause was argued by Daniel J. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by James M. Bablitch, Stevens Point and oral argument by James M. Bablitch.
This case involves review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Williquette, 180 Wis.2d 589, 510 N.W.2d 708 (Ct.App.1993), wherein the court concluded that a circuit court may not entertain a challenge to a jury verdict based on a claimed clerical error of the jury because jurors are not competent to testify on such matters. The issues we consider on review are: (1) whether the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence provide that post-discharge juror testimony is competent to reveal a clerical mistake in the rendition of an otherwise unanimous verdict; and, if so, (2) what is the appropriate burden of proof that a party asserting a clerical error in the jury verdict must show before a circuit court determines that a correction is necessary to achieve justice. We conclude that following the discharge of a jury, the respective jurors are competent to testify as to a clerical mistake in the jury verdict pursuant to the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. We further conclude that before a circuit court may "correct" a clerical error in a jury verdict, the moving party must present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict, as originally reported, is in error. To present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt on this issue, there must be unanimity among the jurors as to the fact that the original verdict was in error. 1
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. On August 5, 1991, Jerald L. Williquette was charged in a criminal complaint with two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to sec. 948.02, STATS. Specifically, Count I of the complaint alleged that Williquette had sexual intercourse with Kathy L. on or about July 31, 1991. Count II alleged that Williquette had sexual contact with Amanda K. on or between June 1, 1991 and June 30, 1991. On November 7 and 8, 1991, a jury trial was held in Waupaca County Circuit Court, Honorable John P. Hoffmann presiding. On November 8, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to Count II, the sexual assault of Amanda, and not guilty as to Count I, the sexual assault of Kathy. 2 Kevin Reichenbach, the foreperson of the jury, signed and dated the respective verdicts and they were accepted into the record. The individual jurors were then polled and all assented to the verdicts as reported by the foreperson. The jury was then discharged and judgment was entered on the verdicts.
Several hours later that same day, Reichenbach, Mary Anich, the chief investigator in the Williquette case, and Sarah Binder, the victim witness coordinator for the Waupaca District Attorney's office, were playing volleyball at the Waupaca recreational center. The three discussed the Williquette case. From these discussions, Anich and Binder independently concluded that the jury verdicts had been mistakenly recorded and that the jury actually intended to convict Williquette of the sexual assault of Kathy and acquit him of the sexual assault of Amanda. On November 11, 1991, Binder and Anich conveyed this information to Vicki Taggatz, the prosecutor in the Williquette case. Taggatz then contacted the circuit court and informed the court that there may have been a clerical error in the rendition of the jury's verdict forms.
The circuit court subsequently held a series of inquiries into the question of whether a clerical error had been inadvertently made by the foreperson. Hearings were held on November 13, December 2 and December 13, 1991, at which three of the jurors were questioned. Williquette was not present at these hearings; however, his trial counsel was present. Eight of the nine remaining jurors were questioned on January 29, 1992. 3 During this hearing, both Williquette and his trial counsel were present.
The evidentiary hearings resulted in the following record. Ten jurors indicated that their original verdict had been mistakenly recorded and that they had intended to convict Williquette of the sexual assault of Kathy but to acquit him of the sexual assault of Amanda. One juror testified that she believed that the jury had found Williquette guilty of both offenses. Based on the testimony of these eleven jurors, the circuit court concluded that: (1) the jurors were competent to testify as to what their true intent was as to the jury verdict; and (2) the court had the authority to change the verdict to reflect a guilty finding on Count I and a not guilty finding on Count II. Specifically, the court explained:
I think what [the jurors] did testify to, that they are competent to testify that the verdicts were improperly recorded and were not consistent with what their final votes were.
The court under 906.06 has reviewed a series of cases, which includes the After Hour Welding vs. Laneil Management Company at 108 Wis.2d 734 . [1982] I believe that what these jurors testified to, that the evidence is competent. I believe it demonstrates to this court a substantial ground sufficient to not overturn the verdicts but in effect amend the verdicts, and I believe that should be done because the defendant's rights are not being prejudiced.
Following sentencing, Williquette brought a postconviction motion requesting a new trial. Williquette sought a new trial on several grounds including an assertion that the circuit court lacked the authority to change the original verdict. The circuit court entertained a hearing on the motion on September 18, 1992. During the hearing, the final juror testified as to his understanding of the verdict. The juror testified that to the best of his recollection there was not a clerical mistake in the jury verdict. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court denied Williquette's motion for a new trial. Williquette then appealed to the court of appeals which reversed in part and affirmed in part. It concluded that the circuit court had no authority to correct the verdict form and, therefore, the verdicts originally reported by the jury and assented to during polling in open court had to stand. The court of appeals instructed the circuit court on remand to vacate the judgment, reinstate the original verdicts, sentence Williquette on the verdict for which the jury found him guilty, and enter a new judgment of conviction. The court went on to reject Williquette's other challenges to his conviction.
The State filed a petition for review in this court seeking review of that portion of the court of appeals' opinion which reversed the judgment and remanded for resentencing based on the verdict as originally reported by the jury. Specifically, the State took issue with the court of appeals' conclusion that the relevant case law prohibited the circuit court from exercising any authority to correct an allegedly erroneous verdict form based on statements made by the jurors. Williquette opposed the State's petition for review, but filed a cross-petition for review in the event that the State's petition would be granted. In an order dated February 22, 1994, this court granted the State's petition for review but denied Williquette's cross-petition for review.
The issue of a juror's competence to testify about whether a verdict represents the true intent of the jury is an issue this court has previously considered. Almost a century ago, this court addressed the issue in Wolfgram v. Schoepke, 123 Wis. 19, 100 N.W. 1054 (1904). In Wolfgram, a question arose following a jury trial as to whether the jury foreperson had properly transcribed the jury's verdict in a personal injury case. Id. at 20, 100 N.W. at 1055. A special verdict containing twenty questions was returned by the jury with favorable findings for the plaintiff except for question No. 16. Id. Question No. 16, "Was plaintiff guilty of any want of ordinary care?" was answered "Yes." Id. The plaintiff produced affidavits from all twelve jurors that their intent was to answer the question "No." Id. The jury foreperson's affidavit further explained that the jury had intended to find the plaintiff guilty of no contributory negligence. Id. The plaintiff moved for an order changing the answer to question No. 16 from "Yes" to "No." Id. at 20-21, 100 N.W. at 1055. The order was denied. Id. at 21, 100 N.W. at 1055. The plaintiff then petitioned the circuit court for a new trial based on the mistaken verdict recordation. Id. The circuit court granted plaintiff's request for a new trial. Id.
On appeal, this court upheld the circuit court's decision to grant a new trial. Id. at 24-27, 100 N.W. at 1055-57. At the outset, the court recognized the general rule "that the statements of the jurors will not be received to establish their own misconduct or to impeach their verdict." Id. at 24, 100 N.W. at 1056. Thus, the court gave heed to the sanctity of the jury's deliberations and mental processes. Nonetheless, the court noted that many jurisdictions allowed an exception to the rule disallowing juror testimony for "evidence as to what really was the verdict agreed on in order to prove that it has not been correctly expressed, through mistake or otherwise." Id. at 25, 100 N.W. at 1056. 4 The court then adopted the "clerical error exception" for Wisconsin:
That which decides the rights of parties litigant is the unanimous agreement of the jurors. Each party is entitled to such judgment as results from that agreement. Any other is presumptively unjust, and any rule that necessitates it is unreasonable, unless supported by considerations of public policy, or of such danger from...
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