State v. Willis
| Citation | 95 Wash. 251,163 P. 737 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 1917 |
| Docket Number | 13887. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. LEWIS COUNTY BAR ASS'N et al. v. WILLIS. |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County; E. H. Sullivan Judge.
Proceeding by the State, on the relation of the Lewis County Bar Association and others, for the disbarment as an attorney at law of J. E. Willis. From a judgment suspending defendant for one year, he appeals. Affirmed.
J. E Willis, of Chehalis, pro se.
C. H Forney, of Chehalis, and C. D. Cunningham and J. R. Buxton both of Centralia, for respondents.
This proceeding was commenced in the superior court for Lewis county by a committee of the Lewis County Bar Association against the defendant, J. E. Willis, a duly admitted attorney of the courts of this state, seeking his disbarment. A trial upon the merits resulted in findings and judgment against him rendered on July 5, 1916, that he be 'suspended from all his rights and privileges as an attorney and counselor at law in the state of Washington for the period of one year from the date hereof.' From this disposition of the cause the defendant has appealed to this court.
It is first contended by appellant that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction in the proceedings because of want of proper process, in that the only process was an order to show cause issued by the court and served upon appellant April 19, 1916, requiring him to appear and answer the charges on May 1, 1916, thus giving him only 11 days to appear and answer. This contention was timely made in the trial court by appropriate motion. Appellant argues that this is a civil action, and that therefore the trial court could acquire jurisdiction therein only by the issuance and service of a summons giving him 20 days to appear and answer as in other civil actions. Our statutes are silent upon the question of process and time for appearance and answer in disbarment proceedings. We have only the following statutory provision touching this question:
'The proceedings to remove or suspend an attorney and counselor, as provided in the last section, must be taken by the court of its own motion for matter within its knowledge, or may be taken upon the information of another, and in either case the party shall have the privilege of making his defense.' Rem. Code, § 140.
It is true we have held that a disbarment proceeding is 'in the nature of a civil action' ( State ex rel. Mackintosh v. Rossman, 53 Wash. 1, 101 P. 357, 21 L. R. A. [N. S.] 821, 17 Ann. Cas. 625; State ex rel. Murphy v. Snook, 78 Wash. 671, 139 P. 764); but we are of the opinion it is not a civil action in the strict sense that the issuance and service of a 20-day summons as required in civil actions is necessary to the giving of the court jurisdiction in the proceeding. Of course, the trial court might so abuse its discretion in curtailing an accused attorney's 'privilege of making his defense' as to constitute such error that he would be entitled to relief at the hands of this court. But that, we think, would not amount to a want of jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceeding, since we have no statute regulating the process by which the court may acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or as to the time for appearance and answer by the defendant, and that the court could adopt any method of notice which would fairly apprise appellant of the charges against him and give him a fair opportunity to defend which its sound discretion might dictate. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 A. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 539; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 19 L.Ed. 285; 2 R. C. L. 1103.
There is no contention here made but that appellant did in fact have ample opportunity to meke preparation for his defense. Indeed, no such contention could be made with any show of reason in view of the fact that the actual trial of the case occurred over 2 months after the filing of the charges and the service of the order to show cause upon him. We are quite clear that the trial court was not without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and that it afforded him ample time to prepare and make his defense.
The principal contentions made by appellant have to do with the merits of the controversy in that they are directed against the trial court's findings. Among the charges made against appellant was that he published and circulated in Lewis county and elsewhere a pamphlet concerning Hon. Alonzo E. Rice, judge of the superior court for Lewis county, accusing him of a number of misdeeds as being committed in his official capacity, which pamphlet appellant entitled as follows:
That this pamphlet was published and circulated in Lewis county and elsewhere is not denied by appellant. Referring to its contents, the trial court found,...
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