State v. Willis

• Decision Date: 07 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14316,14316
• Citation: 221 Conn. 518,605 A.2d 1359
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Robert L. WILLIS.

Page 1359

605 A.2d 1359

221 Conn. 518

STATE of Connecticut v. Robert L. WILLIS.

No. 14316.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1991.

Decided April 7, 1992.

Joseph G. Bruckmann, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Arnaldo E. Granados, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Richard F. Jacobson, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., and C. Robert Satti, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Robert L. Willis, was charged in an information with two counts of the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278(b) ¹ and one count of the crime of possession of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(c). ²

The charges arose out of an incident that occurred on January 9, 1989, at approximately 10:55 p.m. in Stratford. The Stratford police, while investigating a stolen marker plate, discovered ninety-four vials of crack cocaine in an automobile occupied by the defendant and two other young men. Subsequently, the defendant was brought to the Stratford police headquarters; there, another ninety-four vials of crack cocaine and two small baggies containing marihuana were found in a trash receptacle in an interrogation room that had been occupied by the defendant.

A jury acquitted the defendant of the charge contained in the first count of the information, which concerned the cocaine found in the automobile. The defendant, however, was convicted by the jury of the charges in the second and third counts of the information, which related to the ninety-four vials of crack cocaine and the marihuana found in the trash receptacle. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirteen years for the defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and a consecutive sentence of one year for his conviction of possession of marihuana, for a total effective sentence of fourteen years imprisonment.

The defendant appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Willis, 24 Conn.App. 678, 591 A.2d 445 (1991). We granted certification limited to the following questions: "1. Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court properly admitted the state's evidence regarding the physical effects of crack cocaine? 2. If the answer to the first question is no, did the trial court properly deny the defendant's motion for a mistrial? 3. If the answer to the first question is no, did the trial court properly deny the defendant's motion to strike the testimony regarding the physical effects of crack cocaine?" State v. Willis, 220 Conn. 907, 597 A.2d 339 (1991).

These questions arise because, in the course of the defendant's trial, on direct examination, Charles Reading, the supervising toxicologist at the state toxicology laboratory, when asked by the prosecutor to describe "the physiological effects of cocaine free base, non-salt form upon the human body," testified: "Cocaine, particularly in the free base form, is readily absorbed across the mucous membranes of the body; that means through the lining of the mouth or the nose or through the mucosa of the lungs. In this form, it travels very rapidly into the blood stream and therefore carried very rapidly to the rest of the body. This is the reason that cocaine when ingested in this manner results in a very intense physiological reaction. One of those reactions is a stimulation of the pleasure centers of the central nervous system. Another reaction, which is particularly a problem, is the irritation of the myocardium, that is the actual tissue of the heart itself which has been recorded in many cases to cause almost instantaneous death."

Immediately after Reading mentioned "instantaneous death," the defendant objected to all of Reading's testimony relating to the physiological effects of crack cocaine. He then asked that the testimony be stricken because it was irrelevant to the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, with which he was charged, and also because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. The state, when asked by the trial court to articulate its claim for the admissibility of Reading's testimony, replied that "it [was] relevant to the issue of the intent to sell." The trial court agreed with the state and overruled the defendant's objection and his request that the testimony be stricken. The defendant took an exception to the trial court's rulings.

Later, following the luncheon recess, the defendant moved for a mistrial arguing that Reading's testimony was "so prejudicial and so inflammatory" that it denied him a fair and impartial trial. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, asserting that it was of the opinion that the testimony concerning the physiological effects of cocaine on an individual had probative value relating to the defendant's intent to sell. It also ruled that the probative value of the testimony outweighed any prejudice that it might engender. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court's ruling and affirmed its judgment. State v. Willis, supra, 24 Conn.App. at 683-84, 591 A.2d 445.

" 'Evidence is admissible when it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case. One fact is relevant to another fact whenever, according to the common course of events, the existence of the one, taken alone or in connection with other facts, renders the existence of the other either certain or more probable. Unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, any fact may be proved which logically tends to aid the trier in the determination of the issue. Evidence is admitted, not because it is shown to be competent, but because it is not shown to be incompetent. No precise and universal test of relevancy is furnished by the law, and the question must be determined in each case according to the teachings of reason and judicial experience.' (Citations omitted.) State v. Schaffer, 168 Conn. 309, 317, 362 A.2d 893 (1975), quoting Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 82, 291 A.2d 715 (1971)." State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 659, 491 A.2d 345 (1985); State v. Holliman, 214 Conn. 38, 50, 570 A.2d 680 (1990). "The trial court is given broad discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Holliman, supra, 214 Conn. at 50, 570 A.2d 680; State v. Parker, 197 Conn. 595, 601, 500 A.2d 551 (1985). The trial court also has broad discretion in balancing the probative value of proffered evidence against its prejudicial effect. That discretion is subject to reversal only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done. State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376, 382, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984); State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 416, 435 A.2d 986 (1980).

We conclude that the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it admitted Reading's testimony wherein he described how free base cocaine rapidly reached the bloodstream through the mucous membranes of the body and resulted in "a very intense physiological reaction" and "a stimulation of the pleasure centers of the central nervous system." That particular testimony of Reading was arguably relevant to prove that the ingestion of free base cocaine results in a quick, pleasurable "high" that might make it a desirable commodity, sought after by that segment of the community that utilizes illicit drugs. Proof of such, in turn, could result in a finding by the jury that the defendant possessed a large quantity of a readily saleable substance. That finding might aid the jury in drawing a reasonable inference that the cocaine the state alleged the defendant possessed was not for his personal use, but for sale to others. State v. Vilalastra, 207 Conn. 35, 42, 540 A.2d 42 (1988); State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 576-77, 353 A.2d 776 (1974). Because Reading's testimony in this regard possessed probative value and did not have an unduly prejudicial impact, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion that it be stricken. ³

Reading's testimony, however, wherein he stated: "[another] reaction, which is particularly a problem, is the irritation of the myocardium, that is the actual tissue of the heart itself, which has been recorded in many cases to cause almost instantaneous death," is a different matter altogether. We fail to see how that portion of Reading's testimony had any probative value relating to the crimes with which the defendant was charged. Because its probative value was nil, and its possible prejudicial effect evident, that portion of Reading's testimony should have been stricken by the trial court. That does not necessarily mean, however, that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial or that the Appellate Court's decision affirming the trial court's judgment need be reversed.

" 'The general principle is that a mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial; State v. Peary, 176 Conn. 170, 172-73, 405 A.2d 626 (1978); State v. Ruiz, 171 Conn. 264, 368 A.2d 222 (1976); State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 703, 364 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Rose, 168 Conn. 623, 635, 362 A.2d 813 (1975)'; State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116, 143, 422 A.2d 749 (1979); 'and the whole proceedings are vitiated.' State v. Peary, [supra, 176 Conn. at 173, 405 A.2d 626]; see State v. Hafner, 168 Conn. 230, 245-46, 362 A.2d 925 (1975)." State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 543, 442 A.2d 927 (1982).

In this instance we determine that, although that portion of Reading's testimony wherein he mentioned ...