State v. Willyard

• Decision Date: 17 June 2019
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-36455,A-1-CA-36455
• Citation: 450 P.3d 445
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terrell WILLYARD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

450 P.3d 445

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Terrell WILLYARD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. A-1-CA-36455

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: June 17, 2019

Certiorari Denied, September 10, 2019, S-1-SC-37818

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, John J. Woykovsky, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} The State appeals from the district court’s order that (1) set aside the jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI); (2) granted its own motion for a new trial; and (3) dismissed the case after concluding that retrial was not supported by the evidence. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant Terrell Willyard was charged with DWI, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A) (2016), following a single-vehicle collision in which Defendant’s vehicle collided with a telephone pole. A witness heard Defendant’s truck approaching, saw the collision, and then saw Defendant drive his truck from the scene and park it in the shadows behind a business. The witness called 911 and described the collision and Defendant. The witness lost sight of Defendant when Defendant walked away from the scene.

{3} A responding officer spotted Defendant a few blocks away. That officer and two assisting officers believed that Defendant displayed signs of intoxication. When he refused to submit to field sobriety tests and chemical testing, Defendant was placed under arrest and brought back to the scene for identification. Based on the witness’s testimony, no more than twenty-one minutes passed from the time he lost sight of Defendant until the officers brought Defendant back to the scene.

{4} Defendant moved for a directed verdict at trial, both at the close of the State’s evidence and after the defense rested, arguing the State presented no evidence that Defendant was intoxicated at the time he was driving. The district court denied both motions, and the jury found Defendant guilty of DWI.

{5} Following trial, and for the reasons cited in our discussion that follows, the district court, sua sponte, ruled that there was no evidence that Defendant’s driving and impairment overlapped and granted Defendant a new trial. The district court then dismissed the case, concluding that Defendant could not be retried because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. The State appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. The State Has a Right to Appeal the District Court’s Ruling

{6} We first address the question of whether the State has the right to appeal in this case. "The right to appeal is ... a matter of substantive law created by constitutional or statutory provision." State v. Armijo , 2016-NMSC-021, ¶ 19, 375 P.3d 415. "We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. The State Is an Aggrieved Party Under the New Mexico Constitution

{7} The State argues that it has a "strong interest in enforcing a lawful jury verdict" and, therefore, as an aggrieved party, has a constitutional right to an appeal. State v. Chavez , 1982-NMSC-108, ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 682, 652 P.2d 232 (holding "that when the jury reaches a verdict after a trial which is fair and free from error, and such a verdict is set aside, the [s]tate is aggrieved within the meaning of the New Mexico Constitution"); see State v. Heinsen , 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 ("Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution provides ‘that an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.’ This provision gives the [s]tate an absolute, constitutional right to appeal a ruling that is contrary to law."). Although Defendant notes that under Chavez , the State’s right to appeal from a verdict that has been set aside exists only when the verdict is reached after a trial that is "fair and free from error," 1982-NMSC-108, ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 682, 652 P.2d 232, he fails to identify any trial errors that affected the jury’s verdict or rendered the trial unfair. We are not obligated to review Defendant’s undeveloped argument, State v. Guerra , 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031, nor are we obligated to "search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings" to find support for Defendant’s claim of error. Muse v. Muse , 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. We will not scour the record in search of trial error or unfairness, and thus conclude that the State, as the aggrieved party in the instant case, has a right to appeal under Chavez .

B. The District Court’s Ruling Did Not Constitute an Acquittal

{8} Defendant relies on State v. Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886, to argue that the State has no "right to appeal an acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence[.]" The State argues Lizzol is distinguishable because the acquittal in that case was entered before the case was submitted to the jury. The State also argues double jeopardy does not bar this appeal because reversal would only lead to reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. We agree with the State that Lizzol is not applicable here because the district court dismissed this case after the jury rendered its verdict.

{9} In Lizzol , the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. ¶ 2. When the state attempted to lay the foundation for the breath alcohol test (BAT) card through the testimony of the arresting officer, the metropolitan court found the officer lacked knowledge to lay the proper foundation. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The state then rested its case, and the metropolitan court entered a written order suppressing the card and dismissing the case, concluding there was insufficient evidence to proceed. Id. ¶ 4. The state ultimately appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court, which explained that "an acquittal results when, after making an erroneous evidentiary ruling, the trial court concludes the evidence is insufficient to proceed[.]" Id. ¶ 15. The Court held, therefore, that double jeopardy barred the state’s appeal because the defendant was acquitted when the trial court excluded the BAT card and concluded there was insufficient evidence to proceed. Id. ¶ 29.

{10} Here, by contrast, the district court made no evidentiary ruling during trial that resulted in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to proceed, which is the specific and limited scenario addressed in Lizzol . Unlike the trial in Lizzol , the trial in this case was presented in its entirety, after which the district court determined that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury, which then returned a guilty verdict. In this case, the district court addressed an evidentiary scenario applicable only to the granting of a new trial, and not a mid-trial evidentiary determination that mandated acquittal. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s ruling after the verdict was rendered did not operate as an acquittal under Lizzol . See id. ¶ 15. Furthermore, because Defendant was not acquitted and reversal would not require a second trial, but rather reinstatement of the original verdict, we conclude that double jeopardy does not bar this appeal. Cf. State v. Griffin , 1994-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 117 N.M. 745, 877 P.2d 551 ("Allowing an appeal after the second trial would not offend the prohibition against double jeopardy because reversal on appeal would not lead to another trial but to reinstatement of the original jury verdict.").

II. The District Court Erred in Granting a New Trial

{11} Defendant contends that the district court’s grant of a new trial, pursuant to Rule 5-614 NMRA, could be based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. The State responds that the district court exceeded its authority by granting the motion based on what the court concluded was insufficient evidence. We agree with the State for the following reasons.

{12} Rule 5-614(A) provides, in relevant part, "When the defendant has been found guilty, the court on ... its own motion, may grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice." This rule provides the district court with a limited opportunity to consider the verdict and, if warranted, grant a new trial before judgment is entered. Therefore, if such a motion is properly granted by the district court, there is no procedural violation when a judgment consistent with the verdict is not entered.

{13} In deciding a motion for a new trial, the district court "may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses." Griffin , 1994-NMSC-061, ¶ 6, 117 N.M. 745, 877 P.2d 551 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A new trial can be granted and the verdict set aside only if the district court concludes that "the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When the [district] court reaches this conclusion, it is stating not just that it disagrees, but that the evidence so heavily preponderates against the verdict that there evidently has been a miscarriage of justice." Id. ¶ 7. If the district court reaches that conclusion, "the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted." Id. ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{14} Such an inquiry is different than a sufficiency of the evidence determination. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at trial in a motion for directed verdict, the district court must "assume the truth of the evidence offered by the prosecution." Id. (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). When a motion for directed verdict is granted, it results in an acquittal barring even appellate review. See Lizzol , 2007-NMSC-024, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886. Based on these differences, we conclude that it would be inherently...