State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 30 October 1931
• Docket Number: 13262.
• Citation: 161 S.E. 104,162 S.C. 413
• Parties: STATE v. WILSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

161 S.E. 104

162 S.C. 413

STATE v. WILSON.

No. 13262.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 30, 1931

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Charleston County; M A. McCrae, Special Judge.

W. K Wilson was convicted of an assault with intent to ravish, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

The charge of presiding judge requested to be reported follows:

Mr Foreman and Gentlemen of the Jury: The duty now devolves on me of charging you the law with reference to the offense with which the defendant, W. K. Wilson, is charged and on which trial you are now engaged. The prisoner in the dock, W. K Wilson, is charged in this indictment with assault with intent to ravish. There is a technical distinction in law between an attempt to commit a felony and this crime of assault with intent to ravish, and I will have something to say later on with reference to specific intent as an element of this crime. Now under the law of South Carolina, I read you from volume 2 of the Code, section 7, "Rape: Who ever shall ravish a woman, married, maid or otherwise, where she did not consent either before or after, and likewise where a man shall ravish a woman with force, although she consent after, he shall be guilty of rape and shall upon conviction suffer death in the same form and manner as now provided by law for wilful murder, provided, however, that in each case where a prisoner is found guilty the jury may find a special verdict recommending him to the mercy of the court where upon the punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment in the penitentiary with hard labor as provided in Section 8." Now I read you section 8, "The Punishment for Rape or Assault with Attempt to Rape: Any person convicted of rape or assault with attempt to rape shall suffer death unless the jury shall recommend to the mercy of the court in which the defendant shall be confined at hard labor in the State Penitentiary for a term not exceeding 40 years or less than 5 years in the discretion of the presiding Judge."

Now, gentlemen, it becomes necessary that I give you some definitions of the meaning of the term "rape" or "ravish" as it is used in this indictment. Rape is an unlawful and violent deflowering of a female person with force and against her will and without her consent. I will have more to say later about consent. In rape, that is, the consummated act of rape, there must be a show of violence, the use of force to effectuate the purpose, there must be shown resistance on the part of the victim, if she be of legal age, there must be shown penetration of the female parts by the male organ not to any given depth, the slightest penetration is sufficient; this defendant, however, is not charged with the completed crime of rape, but I deem it necessary to explain to you that offense so that you may better govern yourselves in your deliberations upon this indictment which charges an assault with intent to ravish. Now what is an assault? An assault is any rude offer to do violence to the person of another with a present apparent ability to carry that show or offer of violence into effect that constitutes what we know in law as an assault. This crime of assault with intent to ravish like all high crimes is composed of two distinct elements, first, the act, first you must find that the act of the crime was committed, not the completed act of rape, but the overt act, something more than mere preparation, but the overt act of an assault, a show of violence, an offer to do some forceful act with element No. 2, the specific intent which embraces the motive, the reason, the prompting of the assault with what mind did he do this thing, if he did it, if he made an attempt at sexual intercourse with this girl, Helen Forrest, and whether or not such an attempt was made is a question peculiarly within your jurisdiction for you to determine, for you to find from the evidence in the case. If the defendant, Wilson, made such a move towards the girl, Helen Forrest, with the intention, with the purpose, with the mind of sexual intercourse, the two elements are present; if not, if either the one or the other be lacking, then the crime is not made out and it would be your duty to so state.

Now with reference to specific intent. Specific intent may be shown like many other facts from circumstances or events surrounding other events, circumstantial evidence some times is very strong and yet falls short of proof sufficient to convince a jury of twelve men. Circumstantial evidence must be measured by the yardstick that the law provides; that this, all of the circumstances must link together to form a complete chain, all the links of that chain must be consistent with the theory of his guilt, none of those circumstances must be inconsistent with his guilt, those circumstances when taken together must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt.

Now intent may be shown in many ways. Intent may be inferred from acts, known events, it is within your province to inquire into what mind did this man do this thing, what was he about if he did it, if the defendant, Wilson, did what the witnesses say he did, then with what mind, with what purpose, with what intent, with what end in view were these acts committed. Those facts are for you, gentlemen of the jury. Now with reference to this matter of consenting. There can be no rape where the victim legally consented; there can be no conviction of an assault with intent to ravish where the alleged victim willingly consented, lawfully, capably, and competently assented. Under the old common law, the age at which a female human being could legally consent to sexual intercourse was 10 years in South Carolina since December the 31st, 1895, the age at which a female human being can legally competently consent to such intercourse is 14 years. I will now read you from the State Constitution of 1895, article 3, section 33; "Marriage of Whites and Negroes. Sexual Intercourse. The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto or person who shall have one-eighth or more negro blood shall be unlawful and void. No unmarried woman shall legally consent to sexual intercourse who shall not have attained the age of fourteen years."

So that, gentlemen, if you should find from the evidence in this case that the girl, Helen Forrest, or that the defendant, W. K. Wilson, sought to and intended to have sexual intercourse with Helen Forrest, but fell short of the completed act, if you should find that he made an assault upon her for the purpose of having such intercourse, and if you should further find that the prosecuting witness, Helen Forrest, at the time of the alleged assault, was under the age of 14 years, then I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the consent or willingness or indifference or ignorance on her part, if any, as to what was taking place, does not excuse, cannot excuse since the Constitution of our State directly states that a female under the age of 14 is legally incompetent, incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. Now whether or not she consented goes out of the case if you find that she is under the age of 14 years. Whether or not the act was committed, or any act was committed tending to this crime of assault with intent to ravish, those facts, each and every part of the component parts of the crime itself which I explained to you, are exclusively within your power to determine from the evidence from that witness stand. In your deliberations bear in mind this thing which we have heard from the beginning of our law that a defendant comes into court clothed with innocence, presumed to be innocent, and the burden rests on the state throughout the entire trial to prove his guilt to you beyond a reasonable doubt, that burden never shifts, it rests upon the state throughout the trial and a reasonable doubt does not mean a fanciful doubt or imaginary doubt, it means a strong substantial doubt arising out of the evidence out of the testimony or lack of testimony adduced or not produced upon the witness stand, a substantial doubt, one for which you, a juror, can give a reason to your fellow juror, and, if such a doubt exists in the minds of any one of you, it would be your duty to make it known to your fellow jurors in your deliberations upon this case, discuss it with them, and, if that doubt exists, resolve it in favor of the defendant, give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt in this case.

In every felony it is necessary for the state to prove what is known as the corpus delicti, the body of the wrong, those material and outstanding facts which go to make up the crime; that duty rests upon the state, and it devolves upon you gentlemen as jurors in inquiring for the truth to see whether or not the state has proven those things to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if not, then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant.

Now gentlemen, there is another thing that comes into this case, a crime of lesser degree or lower grade, and I feel that it is my duty to charge you with reference to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. An assault and battery is an unlawful, unwarranted offer and show to do violence to the person of another and some overt act carrying into effect of that offer to do violence. I charge you that a rude, vulgar unwarranted touching of the person of another may constitute an assault and battery. The question of aggravation is a question of fact for the jury, and it is necessary for me to give you some illustrations of the various forms of aggravation. Suffice it to say that if you should find that the defendant, Wilson, made improper advances to the prosecuting witness, Helen Forrest, that he touched her person in a rude or vulgar manner, it is entirely within your...