State v. Wilson, No. COA08-1536 (N.C. App. 7/21/2009)
| Decision Date | 21 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. COA08-1536,COA08-1536 |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARCUS ANGELO WILSON |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Gilda C. Rodriguez, for defendant.
"The test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter."1 Defendant Marcus Angelo Wilson argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because he stopped his car in response to the beams of police officers' flashlights. Because the police officers made no orders or coercive gestures that Defendant could have reasonably interpreted as an indication that he was not free to leave, we hold that Defendant was not seized under the Fourth Amendment and affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress.
On 1 April 2007, the Guilford County Sheriff's Department received a tip from an anonymous caller stating that three to four males at 651 Sedalia Road were using illegal drugs. The caller gave no additional information, but officers had been dispatched to that location previously "on numerous occasions." Deputies Stephen Burns and Harry Reid responded to the call. Deputy Burns had eleven and Deputy Reid had thirteen total years of experience in law enforcement.
The deputies arrived at 651 Sedalia Road in marked patrol cars without sirens on or blue lights flashing. It was nighttime when they arrived, and they wore dark brown uniforms with reflective nameplates. The deputies parked their patrol cars near the residence's driveway and began walking diagonally across the yard toward the front door. As they approached the door, they heard a vehicle coming from the right side of the house. The deputies were standing ten to twenty feet from the side of the house where the vehicle emerged. When the deputies directed their flashlights on the vehicle, the vehicle stopped immediately. The deputies testified that their only intention in initially shining the flashlights toward the vehicle was to illuminate a dark area for safety concerns.
With the car stopped, Deputy Burns approached the passenger's side and Deputy Reid walked around the rear of the vehicle to the driver's side. Defendant was in the driver's seat and two other males occupied the vehicle. On the passenger's side, Deputy Burns used his flashlight to illuminate the interior of the "vehicle for officer safety, doing a plain view search for weapons." He "noticed a . . . plastic baggy, on the center console of the vehicle, through [his] training and experience [he] knew to be used to package illegal drugs." Defendant was then arrested and charged with felony possession of cocaine.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle. Defendant's motion to suppress alleges that the stop of the vehicle was unlawful because officers lacked an articulable suspicion to make the initial encounter. Therefore, Defendant contends that any evidence must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. The trial court consequently limited testimony to events occurring prior to and during the vehicle's coming to a stop.
In its order following the suppression hearing, the trial court made these relevant findings of fact:
1. During the evening hours on April 7, 2007, Guilford County Sheriff's Deputies Barnes and Reid responded to a dispatch reporting an anonymous telephone tip of illegal drug activity at 651 Sedalia Road, Sedalia, NC.
2. After arriving at the residence located at the address, the deputies parked at and near the driveway entrance at the left side of the residence, alighted from their marked patrol cars and began to walk diagonally across the lot toward the front door of the residence.
3. As they did so, they heard and then observed a vehicle coming from the right rear of the residence, on the side opposite the driveway, heading toward the street.
4. The deputies shone their flashlights in the direction of the vehicle.
5. The vehicle stopped.
6. The deputies approached the vehicle, one on the passenger and the other on the driver side.
7. Deputy Burns recognized the defendant in the vehicle [as one of the occupants].
8. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged with Possession of Cocaine.
From those findings of fact, the trial court concluded that "the vehicle was not stopped by action of either" Deputy Burns or Deputy Reid. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, and he entered a no contest plea to possession of cocaine. The court placed him on probation for twelve months and ordered that he undergo a drug education requirement. Defendant preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling and appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Defendant's only argument is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. His challenge is based solely on the initial stop, not the lawfulness of the search or his arrest.
"Our standard of review to determine whether a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress is `whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.'" State v. Icard, 190 N.C. App. 76, 81, 660 S.E.2d 142, 146 (2008), rev'd in part on other grounds, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (filed 18 June 2009). The trial court's findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, but we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 141, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)).
It is well established that "`[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.'" State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2005) (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002)). Rather, "[t]he encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature." Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991)). "A seizure does not occur until there is a physical application of force or submission to a show of authority." State v. West, 119 N.C. App. 562, 566, 459 S.E.2d 55, 58, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 656, 462 S.E.2d 524 (1995) (citations omitted). "The test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter." State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 142, 446 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1994) (citations omitted).
In Brooks, an SBI agent and other officers arrived during the dark evening hours in marked patrol cars to execute a search warrant for illegal drugs at a nightclub. Id. at 136, 446 S.E.2d at 583. The SBI agent wore a marked "raid" jacket with a badge on the front and "POLICE" written in big letters across the back and a baseball cap...
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