State v. Wilson
Decision Date | 28 October 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 21707.,21707. |
Citation | 987 P.2d 268,92 Haw. 45 |
Parties | STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward Bailey WILSON, Jr., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Georgia McMillen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard L. Rost (James W. Geiger with him, on the brief), Wailuku, for defendant-appellee.
This appeal arises from the criminal prosecution of defendant-appellee Edward Bailey Wilson, Jr. (Wilson) for, inter alia, driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai`i (the prosecution) appeals from the June 25, 1998 order of the district court of the second circuit granting Wilson's motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test taken after his arrest on November 10, 1997. On appeal, the prosecution argues that the district court erred in suppressing the blood test results because: (1) sanctions under the administrative driver's license revocation law do not apply in criminal DUI proceedings; and (2) Wilson validly consented to a blood alcohol test insofar as the arresting officer's statement expressly warned Wilson of the possibility of criminal prosecution.
Because the information conveyed to Wilson regarding his rights under Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 286 was inaccurate and misleading, we hold that Wilson was precluded from making a knowing and intelligent decision whether or not to submit to the evidentiary blood alcohol test, in violation of HRS chapter 286. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting Wilson's motion to suppress the blood test results in his criminal DUI prosecution.
On December 5, 1997, Wilson was charged by criminal complaint with one count of DUI, in violation of HRS § 291-4 (1993).1 The complaint also charged Wilson with one count of disregarding longitudinal traffic markings, in violation of HRS § 291C-38 (1993).
On March 13, 1998, Wilson filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test that he took after his arrest on November 10, 1997. On May 29, 1998, the district court heard the motion. Wilson, through his attorney, stated that "for the purposes of the facts of this case, [the prosecution] and I are going to stipulate that we believe the arresting officer in this case read the sanctions under [HRS] chapter 286 as stated in the form that they use." That "form," the "sworn statement of arresting officer," issued by the state Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO), reads in relevant part:2 Pursuant to the Administrative Driver License Revocation Law, I must inform you (arrestee) of the following:
(Emphasis added.)
In his motion, Wilson objected to the representation in the arresting officer's statement that a person who consented to the blood test and failed it would have his or her driving privileges revoked for only three months. Citing our decision in Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 931 P.2d 580 (1997), Wilson pointed out that, as someone who consented to the test and failed it, he in fact faced the possibility of revocation of his driving privileges under HRS § 286-261(b) (Supp.1998)3 anywhere from three months to one year.4 Therefore, insofar as the arresting officer misstated the legal consequences of consent, Wilson argued that
At the hearing, the district court granted Wilson's motion. The hearing transcript reads in relevant part:
The court's order, filed on June 25, 1998, states in relevant part:
The prosecution timely appealed.
We review a circuit court's findings of fact in a pretrial ruling according to the following standard:
State v. Abordo, 61 Haw. 117, 120-21, 596 P.2d 773, 775 (1979) (citation and footnote omitted). The proponent of the motion to suppress must satisfy this "burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence[.]" Pattioay, 78 Hawai`i at 466, 896 P.2d at 922 (citation omitted).
State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai`i 462, 466-67, 935 P.2d 1007, 1011-1012 (1997) (emphases omitted).
A. Because The Arresting Officer Inadequately Advised Wilson of the Applicable Administrative Penalties Under HRS chapter 286, Wilson Did Not Knowingly and Intelligently Consent to a Blood Test, in Violation of HRS chapter 286.
The prosecution argues that the district court erred in suppressing Wilson's blood alcohol test results because (1) sanctions under ADLRO do not apply in criminal DUI proceedings; and (2) Wilson voluntarily and intelligently consented to the blood test insofar as the arresting officer's statement warned Wilson of the possibility of criminal prosecution. With respect to both contentions, we disagree.
(Citation omitted.) Under this "implied consent" scheme, when a person is arrested for violation of HRS § 291-4, the arresting officer must, inter alia, "take possession of any license held by the person and request the arrestee to take a test for concentration of alcohol in the blood." HRS § 286-255(a) (Supp.1998).6 Upon informing the arrestee of his or her choice of taking a breath test, blood test, or both, "[t]he arresting officer shall also inform the person of the sanctions under this part, including the sanction for refusing to take a breath or a blood test." See id. (emphasis added). HRS § 286-151 likewise requires that "the test or tests shall be administered ... only after ... [t]he person has been informed by a police officer of the sanctions under part XIV and sections 286-151.5 and 286-157.3." (Emphasis added.) Thus, as the statutory language makes clear, a driver's "implied consent" to an evidentiary chemical alcohol test is qualified by his or her implied right to refuse such a test after being accurately informed of his or her statutory right to consent or refuse, as well as the consequences of such consent or refusal.
HRS § 286-261(b) specifies the applicable periods of time an arrestee's license may be administratively revoked upon the arrestee's consent to a blood alcohol test. See supra note 4. In Gray, supra, we held that HRS § 286-261(b) grants the ADLRO the discretion to increase the minimum periods of administrative revocation for "non-refusing" arrestees. Id. at 160, 931 P.2d at 602. This discretionary authority under HRS § 286-262(b) is "capped" by the mandatory periods of revocation for "refusing" arrestees under HRS § 286-261(c). Id. at 160-61, 931 P.2d at 602-03. Thus, if an arrestee with no prior alcohol enforcement contacts during the five years predating the date of arrest consents to a blood test and fails, he or she may face revocation of his or her driving privileges from three months up to one year. See HRS §§ 286-261(b)(1) and (c).
Among other things, our implied consent statute is intended to provide an efficient means of gathering evidence of intoxication. See Rossell v. City and County of Honolulu, 59 Haw. 173, 181, 579 P.2d 663, 669 (1978)
. The statutory scheme, however, also protects the rights of the driver in that he or she may withdraw his or her consent before a test is administered. To this end, Hawai`i's implied consent scheme mandates accurate...
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