State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 22 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-2341,95-2341
• Citation: 673 N.E.2d 1347,77 Ohio St.3d 334
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. WILSON, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 334

77 Ohio St.3d 334

673 N.E.2d 1347

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. WILSON, Appellee.

No. 95-2341.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Oct. 15, 1996.

Decided Jan. 22, 1997.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

In determining the scope of an "existing sections" repeal, a court need only look to the body of an enrolled Act to which that repealer applies. Matter to be affected by an "existing sections" repeal must appear in the body of the enrolled Act and must be stricken through.

The defendant-appellee, Anthony Wilson, entered a plea of no contest for assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.13. The indictment under which Wilson was charged alleged that he caused or attempted to cause physical harm to a police officer while that officer was performing his official duties. The trial court found that the offense as charged constituted a fourth-degree felony and sentenced Wilson to a one-year term of imprisonment.

Wilson appealed, urging that the offense as charged could constitute no greater than a first-degree misdemeanor. The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for resentencing, concluding that at the time Wilson was sentenced, ¹ the version of R.C. 2903.13 in effect did not authorize a felony conviction for an assault on a police officer performing his or her official duties.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. Susan Laker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Dennis R. Lapp, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Judith Stevenson, Franklin County Public Defender, Paul Skendalas and David L. Strait, Assistant Public Defenders, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Franklin County Public Defender.

Gold, Rotatori & Schwartz Co., L.P.A., and John S. Pyle, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Frederick D. Puckett, William Michael Burns and Michael S. Franczak, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Legislative Service Commission.

COOK, Justice.

In this appeal we analyze how the General Assembly contemporaneously effects multiple, unrelated amendments to a single statutory section while complying with Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, requiring that "the section or sections amended shall be repealed."

In May 1994, the General Assembly enacted a new law making assaults on law enforcement officers a felony. ² This new law amended R.C. 2903.13. Two days later, the General Assembly passed another Act changing terminology used throughout the Revised Code from "penal or reformatory institution" to "correctional institution." ³ This second enactment affected a multitude of sections of the Revised Code, including R.C. 2903.13. The amendment to R.C. 2903.13 in the earlier Act making assaults on law enforcement officers a felony, however, was not reflected in this later enactment. The bills encompassed separate subjects. Both bills included standard language stating that "existing section [ ] * * * 2903.13 * * * of the Revised Code [is] hereby repealed." (Emphasis added.)

The ultimate question in this case is what "existing section" of R.C. 2903.13 is repealed by the later enacted law. If the later enactment repealed the change incorporated in the law passed two days earlier, making assaults on law enforcement officers a felony, then the trial court here was without authority to classify Wilson's offense as a fourth-degree felony. We conclude, however, that the "existing sections" repeal contained in the later enacted law was limited in scope so as not to effect a repeal of the amendment to R.C. 2903.13 instituted in the earlier Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the original conviction.

As noted in Cox v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 501, 21 O.O.3d 313, 424 N.E.2d 597, the legislature has long used "existing sections" language as part of a standard form of repealing clause for the purpose of complying with Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Cox, however, is not dispositive of this case. In Cox, this court examined the issue of the effective date rather than the scope of an "existing sections" repeal. The enactment in Cox became effective on one date, yet included language delaying the accordant changes to the Revised Code one year from the effective date of the Act. The question, then, was when the "existing sections" repeal was to take effect. This court found that the "existing sections" repeal of the statute in controversy did not come into operation until its concomitant amendment became effective. Unlike our case today, Cox did not involve intervening revisions to a statute, and thus fails to bear on the scope of an "existing sections" repeal.

In determining the proper scope of an "existing sections" repeal, we use the rules of statutory construction. The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Carter v. Youngstown (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 32 O.O. 184, 65 N.E.2d 63, paragraph one of the syllabus. It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that "the General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose." State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid (1959), 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 8 O.O.2d 480, 482, 159 N.E.2d 756, 759.

In reviewing a statute, a court cannot pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must look to the four corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting body. MacDonald v. Bernard (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 1 OBR 122, 125, 438 N.E.2d 410, 413. Here, to determine the meaning of the term "existing sections," we refer to the form of a legislative enactment as prescribed by R.C. 101.52. That section requires a bill to be printed for enrollment ⁴ in the exact language in which it was passed, with "[n]ew matter * * * indicated by capitalization and old matter omitted by striking through such matter." Id. Language unaltered by the amendment remains in regular type. Accordingly, the enrolled Act permits a comparison of the amended statutory section and the section that it is intended to replace.

In looking to the face of a statute or Act to determine legislative intent, significance and effect should be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part thereof, if possible. Wachendorf v. Shaver (1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, 36 O.O. 554, 78 N.E.2d 370, paragraph five of the syllabus; R.C. 1.47(B). Thus, the use of the term "existing" must be given effect. Inclusion of that term as a modifier is meaningful in light of R.C. 101.52. In determining the scope of an "existing sections" repeal, a court need only look to the body of an enrolled Act to which that repealer applies. Matter to be affected by an "existing sections" repeal must appear in the body of the enrolled Act...