State v. Wilson, 2 CA-CR 2017-0229

• Decision Date: 20 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0229,2 CA-CR 2017-0229
• Parties: THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOSEPH ROBERT WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JOSEPH ROBERT WILSON, Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0229

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

July 20, 2018

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County

No. S1100CR201500795

The Honorable Kevin D. White, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General

Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel

By Mariette S. Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson

Counsel for Appellee

Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Staring concurred.

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge:

¶1 After a jury trial, Joseph Wilson was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to a presumptive, 10.5-year term of imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by admitting into evidence three photographs showing the victim's body. He also contends that several instances of prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to a fair trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to affirming Wilson's conviction. See State v. Granados, 235 Ariz. 321, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). In March 2015, C.S. and S.S. were at a bar in San Tan Valley where they met Wilson. Wilson had been drinking and boasted about a 1965 Shelby Cobra kit car he had built with his father. He invited the couple to his parents' house to see the car, and once there, he took S.S. for a ride. S.S. described Wilson's driving as so fast that he was "pushed back by [his] own inertia in the back of [the] seat." As they returned to the house, S.S. told Wilson that C.S. probably would want to go for a ride but she would not be comfortable "going at the speeds that [they] were going." He asked Wilson to "do [him] a favor and not go as fast," and Wilson agreed.

¶3 At the house, Wilson asked C.S. if she wanted to go for a ride, and she responded that she did. Wilson helped strap her into the passenger seat with the five-point harness, as he had done for S.S. Minutes after they left, S.S. became concerned when he could no longer hear the car's loud engine. He went to the front of the property and could see a fire in the distance.

¶4 K.D., who lived nearby, looked out his window after hearing what he described as "not your everyday motor" and saw the car going east on Sundance Road in front of his house. He described the road as a "country road," with no streetlights and two "nasty" dips. The car turned around at an intersection and sat in the road facing west for a minute or twowith the engine running and lights on. K.D. testified that suddenly, "[t]he car took off and went through three gears," reaching speeds he estimated were between seventy-five and one hundred miles per hour. After the car was out of sight, K.D. heard it scrape the ground in a dip, after which the car engine died and lights went out. K.D. then saw sparks and heard "violent crashing." He called 9-1-1.

¶5 J.R., who also lived nearby and had heard the crash, got in his vehicle and went to see if anyone needed help. As he approached the scene, J.R. saw oil on the road. Meanwhile, Wilson had unbuckled his harness and pushed his way out of the car. As J.R. approached, Wilson flagged him down. Wilson had blood on his head, arms, and legs, and he was getting up off the ground on the north side of the road. He told J.R., "[F]ind the girl, . . . she's in the car." J.R. saw that the car, which had crashed through a barbed-wire fence, was upside down on the south side of the road. He hurried over and looked without getting too close because of the fire, but he saw and heard no one in the car or the surrounding area.

¶6 According to the first sheriff's deputy who arrived, Wilson initially identified himself as "Joseph Thompson." But when Wilson dropped his wallet, the deputy picked it up and saw Wilson's Arizona driver license showing his true name. The deputy claimed that he asked follow-up questions about the name Wilson had given initially and that Wilson did not deny giving a false name. Then, according to the deputy, Wilson "reached into his pocket[,] pulled out a wad of cash[,] attempted to hand it to [him]," and said, "[I]t doesn't have to be like this." The deputy reportedly saw at least one $100 bill and told Wilson to "put it away."

¶7 Meanwhile, the car had become completely engulfed in flames. J.R. continued looking for C.S. with the assistance of a deputy who had a flashlight, and they eventually saw her body on the ground under the car. Moments later, the car exploded. A "big ball of fire" shot out of the car, debris flew into the air, and a "plume of smoke" filled the sky. It was later determined that C.S. died "a very rapid death" as a result of "thermal injuries" suffered from "a very intense heat when the fire started."

¶8 An expert witness for the state opined that the accident occurred because the car "was traveling faster than the dip would allow" and, when it "bottomed out" in the dip, the oil pan, which was "the lowest point of the vehicle," struck the ground. The force of the impact "split open" the oil pan, leaving a "gouge mark" in the road and causing oil to leak out of the car. The expert additionally testified that "excessive speed for [this] terrain was a contributing factor."

¶9 A grand jury indicted Wilson for second-degree murder, bribery of a public servant, and false reporting to a law enforcement agency. A jury found him not guilty of the bribery and false-reporting charges but guilty of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. He was sentenced as described above. We have jurisdiction over Wilson's appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

Photographs

¶10 Wilson argues the trial court erred by admitting "three gruesome photographs of [C.S.'s] burned body underneath the burned-out car." As Wilson points out, the photographs are "almost identical," showing the accident scene with the car on the dirt and surrounding shrubbery and rocks. We review the court's decision to admit a photograph for an abuse of discretion. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 69 (2007). In making that determination, we consider three factors: "the photograph's relevance, its tendency to inflame the jury, and its probative value compared to its potential to cause unfair prejudice." State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, ¶ 17 (2006).

¶11 "Photographs of a victim's body are always relevant because 'the fact and cause of death are always relevant in a murder prosecution.'" Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 70, quoting State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 142 (1997); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 401 (evidence relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action"). "[E]ven if the defendant stipulates to the manner of death, some photographs of victims depicting important aspects of the crime are relevant to show what actually occurred." State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 494 (1996); see State v. Purcell, 117 Ariz. 305, 309 (1977) (photographs assisted jury in determining whether killing was first- or second-degree murder or manslaughter). Photographs of a victim's body may also be relevant to, among other things, identify the victim, show the nature and location of the fatal injury, corroborate the evidence, illustrate the testimony, or corroborate the state's theory of the case. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, ¶ 39 (2005).

¶12 However, photographs may not be introduced "for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury." State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 169 (1982). That said, "[t]here is nothing sanitary about murder." State v. Reinhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 584 (1997). Although gruesome photographs have "some potential to inflame the jury," their probative value may still not be outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1,¶ 62 (2015); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (court may exclude relevant evidence if probative value substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).

¶13 Citing the statutes for second-degree murder and manslaughter, Wilson first contends the photographs were not relevant "to prove either of these crimes." See A.R.S. §§ 13-1104(A)(3), 13-1103(A)(1). We disagree. The photographs were relevant to C.S.'s cause of death. See §§ 13-1104(A)(3), 13-1103(A)(1); see also Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 70. They also depicted the accident scene, including C.S.'s location and the magnitude of the accident, and helped illustrate the witnesses' testimony. Cf. State v. Bailey, 160 Ariz. 277, 280-81 (1989) (photograph depicting victim in particular spot in restaurant relevant).

¶14 Wilson next claims that the photographs showed C.S.'s body in an "especially gruesome way," comparing her body to "a pig roasting in a pit." As the prosecutor pointed out below, however, the photographs do not clearly depict C.S.'s body—they were "taken from a distance," show no facial features, and seem to reveal "only a leg or part of her torso." Simply put, her body is not readily distinguishable. Accordingly, the photographs are not gruesome or inflammatory.¹ Cf. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 71 (photographs not gruesome when they showed victim's hands or feet and nude body from distance); State v. Harding, 141 Ariz. 492, 499 (1984) (photograph not showing result of any violence to victim except gag around mouth not gruesome).

¶15 Wilson lastly maintains that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed any probative value. However, as described above, the photographs are not "of a nature to incite passion or inflame the jury." State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 288 (1983); see also State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 60 (1995) ("If inflammatory, the trial...