State v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 05 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. COA96-564,COA96-564 |
| Citation | 488 S.E.2d 303,127 N.C.App. 129 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Joe Louis WILSON, Defendant. |
Hunt and White by George Hunt and Andrew Hanford, Graham, for defendant-appellee.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley by Special Deputy Attorneys General Robin P. Pendergraft and Isaac T. Avery, III, for the State.
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of the charge against defendant of selling an alcoholic beverage to a person under the statutory age in violation of N.C.G.S. § 18B-302(a)(1995). The State argues the court erred in its determination defendant would be exposed to double jeopardy if tried for the offense by virtue of having previously been punished for the same conduct in an administrative proceeding. We conclude the trial court was in error and reverse.
Pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: Defendant, trading as Joe's Shopwell Mini Mart in Burlington, was holder of off-premise Malt Beverage, Fortified Wine and Unfortified Wine permits issued by the North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Commission (the Commission). On 20 May 1995, defendant was charged by an Alcohol Law Enforcement agent with selling a malt beverage to a person under the age of twenty-one in violation of G.S. § 18B-302(a)(1). Following defendant's arrest, he was notified by the Commission that a complaint had been filed against him as a permittee alleging defendant or his agent had violated state ABC laws.
In response to the complaint, defendant tendered an offer of compromise dated 7 August 1995 wherein he stipulated and agreed that on 20 May 1995 an employee of the permittee had sold a malt beverage on the licensed premises to a person less than 21 years of age. In turn, the Commission issued a Final Agency Decision/Order of Compromise on 8 September 1995 setting out defendant's stipulation, suspending his permits for a period of fifteen days, and providing that, upon payment of $400.00, "said 15 day suspension will be suspended for a period of one year on the condition that [defendant and his employees] not further violate the [ABC] laws." Defendant paid $400 to the Commission pursuant to this order.
Defendant's criminal matter came on to be heard 4 October 1995 in Alamance County District Court. Upon defendant's motion, the charge against him was dismissed on grounds of double jeopardy. On appeal by the State, the Superior Court likewise concluded in pertinent part:
(3) That the defendant's payment of a $400.00 administrative penalty to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission prior to the trial of this action is punishment for double jeopardy purposes (4) That the prosecution of the Defendant for a violation of the criminal law would constitute double jeopardy and this criminal prosecution must be dismissed.
The State gave timely notice of appeal to this Court.
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969), companion case overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989)(footnotes omitted). The Law of the Land Clause of our North Carolina Constitution, Art. I, § 19, incorporates similar protections. State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 205, 470 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1996).
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that civil penalties under certain circumstances may constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
[I]n determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated.
Id. at 447 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7, 104 L.Ed.2d at 501 n. 7. The Court observed that "a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment," id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d at 501, and went on to hold that
a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.
Halper made clear that double jeopardy analysis concerning a particular civil fine consists of balancing the amount of the penalty with the loss the government has suffered due to the unlawful actions of the person fined; if an offender's sanction is "overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused," the penalty constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.
"We acknowledge that this inquiry will not be an exact pursuit," the Court wrote, as "the precise amount of the Government's damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain." Id. In recognition of this fact, the Court also observed:
[T]he Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
Id. at 446, 109 S.Ct. at 1900, 104 L.Ed.2d at 500.
Further, should a particular civil penalty "bear[ ] no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss," then "the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs" to enable the trial court "to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second...
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...us, this Court may conclude remand is unnecessary."), aff'd per curiam , 364 N.C. 127, 691 S.E.2d 411 (2010) ; State v. Wilson , 127 N.C. App 129, 133, 488 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1997) (determining that remand was not required because it would serve no useful purpose, "particularly from the point......