State v. Witzel
| Citation | 312 P.2d 1044,79 Idaho 211 |
| Decision Date | 01 July 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 8536,8536 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wallace WITZEL, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen., T. J. Jones, III, and Edward Aschenbrener, Asst. Attys. Gen., James W. Ingalls, Pros. Atty., Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Herbert Nagel, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
An information was filed in the District Court of Kootenai County charging defendant with the crime of burglary in the first degree. To such information defendant entered his plea of guilty. Thereupon the court entered its judgment that defendant was guilty of the crime of burglary in the first degree and imposed the following sentence:
Thereafter the State of Idaho moved the court to correct such judgment (Spanton v. Clapp, Idaho, 299 P.2d 1103) 'so that said judgment, when corrected, sentences the Defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Idaho State Penitentiary of not to exceed fifteen years and which gives the Defendant no credit for the time during which he was imprisoned in the Kootenai County jail prior to the entry of said judgment.'
Such motion of the State having been presented, the trial court entered its order that such motion be denied in toto. From such order, the State has appealed to this court.
It is the theory of appellant that the trial court was without authority to commute the sentence of fifteen years in the penitentiary to five years in the penitentiary and to allow credit for the time spent in the Kootenai County jail; and that such provisions in the judgment are surplusage and without effect and that the judgment should be corrected to eliminate such provisions.
Section 19-2513, I.C., known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, reads as follows:
The maximum penalty for burglary in the first degree is imprisonment in the state prison for not more than fifteen years. Section 18-1403, I.C. The court properly sentenced defendant to confinement in the state prison for a period of not more than fifteen years. The court had no other alternative unless it acted under the provisions of Section 19-2601, I.C. State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97. Section 19-2601, I.C., as it existed at the time involved herein, read as follows:
'Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty in any District Court of the State of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the State, except those of treason or murder, the court may, in its discretion, commute the sentence, confine the defendant in the county jail, or if the defendant is of proper age, in the State Industrial School, suspend the execution of the judgment, or withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may, at such time or at any time during the term of sentence in the county jail, prescribe and may put the defendant on probation in charge of some proper person selected and disignated by the court for that purpose, and make such orders relative thereto as the Court in its sound discretion deems necessary and expedient.'
Prior to 1943, Section 19-2501, I.C.A. [now Section 19-2601, I.C.], read as follows:
'Parole.--Whenever any person shall have been convicted of any crime against the laws of this state except those of treason or murder, and the defendant has never before been convicted of a felony, the court may in its discretion, commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the defendant is of proper age, in the state industrial school, suspend the execution of judgment or withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe, and, in either event, may put the defendant on probation in the charge of one of the probation officers of the juvenile court of the county in which the court is sitting or other probation officer, or of any other proper person selected and designated for that purpose.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 19-2501, I.C.A., was amended by Chapter 14 of the 1943 Session Laws to read as follows:
'Parole.--Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty in any District Court of the State of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the State, except those of treason or murder * * * the court may, in its discretion, upon application by the defendant, commute the sentence, confine the defendant in the county jail, or * * * suspend the execution of the judgment, or withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe * * * and may put the defendant on probation in charge of * * * some proper person selected and designated by the court for that purpose, and make such orders relative thereto as the Court in its sound discretion deems necessary and expedient.'
Section 19-2501, I.C.A., was again amended by Chapter 79, 1947 Session Laws and Chapter 117, 1949 Session Laws. These amendments do not change the language of such section questioned in these proceedings but go to other provisions in such statute.
Section 19-2601, I.C., does not deal with the maximum term for which a defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary. It is a section giving the trial court discretion to grant leniency as therein prescribed. State v. O'Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 225 P.2d 1020; State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 289 P.2d 315. Section 19-2501, I.C.A., prior to 1943, carried the word 'and' after the words 'commute the sentence.' The 1943 apparent amendment of such section dropped the word 'and' and substituted a comma after the words 'commute the sentence.' Prior to 1943, the court, upon commuting the sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary, could sentence the defendant to a term in the county jail or confine the defendant if of proper age in the state industrial school. The statute did not provide upon the commutation of sentence for the reduction of the term of imprisonment in the state penitentiary to a lesser term and no contention is made herein that the statute as it then existed authorized such action by the trial court.
It is the contention of appellant that the deletion of the word 'and' after the words 'commute the sentence' and the insertion of a comma in place thereof in the 1943 amendment of the statute was done by inadvertence and clerical error and did not express the intention of the legislature; and that the alleged amendment in this respect should be disregarded by this court and the statute read in this connection as it was prior to such amendment.
Respondent contends that the 1943 amendment with which we are concerned is a proper part of Section 19-2601, I.C.; and having commuted the sentence, the trial court is not limited to confinement of defendant in the county jail or in the state industrial school if of proper age, but may reduce the maximum term of imprisonment in the state penitentiary to a lesser term.
This court will take judicial notice of the contents of the Journals of the Idaho Legislature. Section 9-101, I.C.; Peavy v. McCombs, 26 Idaho 143, 140 P. 965; State v. Eagleson, 32 Idaho 280, 181 P. 935; Lloyd Corporation v. Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217; Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662.
House Rule No. 3 for the 1943 Legislative Session (appearing on page 21 of the Permanent House Journal for 1943 and on page 23 of the printed copies thereof) reads as follows:
'Amendatory Bills--All Bills introduced which are intended to amend existing statutes, shall have the words which are amendatory to such statute underlined; when the amendment is to strike out any part of an existing statute, space with stars therein shall be provided.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The 1943 amendment of Section 19-2501, I.C.A., was contained in House Bill No. 16. Although the word 'and' was deleted and a comma inserted in its stead after the words 'commute the sentence,' no asterisk was placed instead of the word 'and' nor was the comma underlined in the 1943 Session Laws or in the original enactment now on file in the office of the Secretary of State although other asterisks and underlinings were used in said Chapter 14 of the 1943 Session Laws. Although the failure to comply with the amendatory rules as provided by House Rule No. 3 of the 1943 Legislative Session is not conclusive against the validity of the...
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