Spanton v. Clapp
Decision Date | 20 July 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 8441,8441 |
Citation | 78 Idaho 234,299 P.2d 1103 |
Parties | Ronald D. SPANTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. L. E. CLAPP, Chairman of the Idaho State Board of Correction and Warden of Idaho State Penitentiary, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Karl Jeppesen and Frank E. Chalfant, Jr., Boise, for appellant.
Graydon W. Smith, Atty. Gen., Edward J. Aschenbrener, T. J. Jones, III, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of issuing a check without funds § 18-3106, I.C., in the district court of the Eighth Judicial District. By the judgment of that court, dated September 23, 1953, appellant was sentenced to the state penitentiary for 'a period not exceeding one (1) year' and to pay a fine of $1,000. The judgment further provided 'that the sentence is hereby suspended and you are hereby paroled to E. J. Beaton, District Parole Officer, on the following conditions:' (Conditions stated.)
The probation was thereafter revoked by the district court and appellant was committed to the state penitentiary where he was received and began serving his sentence on January 29, 1954. The $1,000 fine was remitted by the state board of correction in October, 1954. December 1, 1954, appellant was paroled. October 24, 1955, the parole was revoked by the board for violation of its terms and appellant was recommitted. February 3, 1956, appellant was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the district court of the Third Judicial District. After hearing thereon, judgment was entered quashing the writ and remanding appellant to the custody of respondent. This appeal is from that judgment.
Respondent contends that, since the statute, § 18-3106, I.C., fixes the penalty at 'imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years,' the district court was required by the indeterminate sentence law, § 19-2513, I.C., to enter judgment of imprisonment for the maximum of five years; that the portion of the judgment fixing the penalty at one year is properly regarded by the board as surplusage; and that respondent must look to the statute to determine the period of imprisonment authorized by the judgment. In support of this position respondent cites: Matter of Setters, 23 Idaho 270, 278, 128 P. 1111; State v. Lottridge, 29 Idaho 822, 162 P. 672; In re Erickson, 44 Idaho 713, 260 P. 160.
It was early held by this court that the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties belongs to the legislative department of government; that the power to try offenders, and to enter judgment convicting and sentencing those found guilty, belongs to the judicial department; that the power and prerogative of granting pardons, paroles or commutations belong to the executive department. In In re Prout, 12 Idaho 494, 86 P. 275, 276, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 1064, it was said:
Section 7, Article 4, of the constitution, which provides for the board of pardons and for the exercise of the power of clemency, specifically provides: '* * * Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, and to grant commutations and pardons after conviction and judgment,' (emphasis added). This is a constitutional recognition of the authority of the courts in the sphere of conviction and judgment, as well as a limitation of the power of the board to the period following the entry of judgment.
Storseth v. State, 72 Idaho 49, 236 P.2d 1004, 1005.
See also, State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, at page 60, 245 P.2d 788.
Assuming the judgment is erroneous because of the failure of the district judge to pronounce the maximum sentence, it is not void. State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 P. 561, 208 P. 871; In re Bottjer, 45 Idaho 168, 260 P. 1095; In re Jennings, 46 Idaho 142, 267 P. 227; People v. Conley 27 Cal.App. 362, 150 P. 412, 150 P. 413; Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510, 70 A.L.R. 819; Gamron v. Jones, 148 Neb. 645, 28 N.W.2d 403; Smith v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 297, 77 S.E.2d 860. See also, State v. Ryan, 146 Wash. 114, 261 P. 775; State ex rel. Plumb v. Superior Court, 24 Wash.2d 510, 166 P.2d 188; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1589; 15 Am.Jur., Crim. Law, § 473. If erroneous, it was subject to correction on timely motion by ...
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