State v. Wood

• Citation: 112 Iowa 411,84 N.W. 520
• Parties: STATE v. WOOD.
• Decision Date: 19 December 1900
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

112 Iowa 411

84 N.W. 520

STATE

v.WOOD.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 19, 1900.

Appeal from district court, Harrison county; George W. Wakefield, Judge.

The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of manslaughter. Affirmed.M. B. Bailey and S. H. Cochran, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and Chas. A. Van Vleck, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LADD, J.

That Achille Chevalier received injuries March 11, 1899, which may have contributed to his death April 24th of the same year, was fully established. Did this defendant, with Mize and Mitchell, inflict them? The evidence was such as to fairly put this question in issue, and it was finally disposed of by the verdict returned. The indictment charged that these parties “did willfully, deliberately, premeditately and with malice aforethought and with the intent to kill and murder one Achille Chevalier, feloniously strike, jump upon, stamp and kick the said Achille Chevalier upon his breast, side and shoulder; did thus strike the said Chevalier with their fists and stamp, jump upon and kick said Achille Chevalier with their feet, and did then and there in the manner aforesaid, inflict mortal wounds of which said wounds so inflicted as aforesaid by the said Archibald Wood, Evan Mize and John Mitchell, the said Achille Chevalier then and there died.” This is not bad for duplicity, as contended. But for the punctuation, no one could have thought of such a thing. While punctuation may sometimes shed light on the meaning of an instrument when somewhat ambiguous, it ought not to be permitted to destroy it. Where its meaning, without the punctuation, is clear, none will be made use of to confuse or defeat what was evidently intended. Scholte v. Rosiers, 4 Iowa, 335; White v. Smith, 33 Pa. St. 186; Weatherly v. Mister, 39 Md. 620;Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 9 L. Ed. 624.

Equally without merit is the claim that murder in the first degree is not charged. By the use of the words “thus” and “then and there in the manner aforesaid” repetition was avoided, and the acts characterized as definitely as though “deliberately, premeditately, and with malice aforethought, and with intent to kill” had immediately preceded “inflict mortal wounds.” In People v. Davis, 73 Cal. 355, 15 Pac. 8, an indictment was held sufficient without these connecting words, on the ground that the description of the assault applied as well to the infliction of the wounds. See, also, St. Clair v. U. S., 154 U. S. 134, 14 Sup. Ct. 1002, 38 L. Ed. 936;State v. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 529. A person of ordinary understanding could experience no difficulty in knowing precisely what was intended, and this is all the law requires. Section 5289, Code.

2. The deceased improved in health up to April 6th, when his physician temporarily left the state. Another was called on the 11th, and soon thereafter empyema set in, resulting in his death on the 24th. The defendant insists the evidence tended to show that, but for mismanagement on the part of this physician, or those caring for deceased, he might have recovered; and that the jury should have been instructed, if they so found, that the accused could not be convicted of manslaughter. The rule is conceded to be, as stated by Greenleaf: “If death ensues from a wound given in malice, but not, in its nature, mortal, but which, being neglected or mismanaged, the party died, this will not excuse the prisoner who gave it.” 3 Greenl. Ev. § 139. The intent is here mentioned, as it is also in many of the cases, but not as a ground for rejecting such an excuse. The true reason for not allowing the defense is that the wound inflicted, though it may not have been the only cause, yet contributed, mediately or immediately, to the death of the person assaulted. To warrant escape from the...