State v. Wood, 8020

Decision Date26 March 1954
Docket NumberNo. 8020,8020
Citation2 Utah 2d 34,268 P.2d 998
Partiesd 34 STATE, v. WOOD.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

R. R. Hackett, Ogden, for appellant.

E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L. Budge, Aldon J. Anderson, Dist. Atty., D. Christian Ronnow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

McDONOUGH, Justice.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to the State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than fifteen years as being an habitual criminal. He was found guilty by a jury of grand larceny and then was tried by the same jury on the charge of being an habitual criminal, both charges being contained in the information.

Appellant was arrested in Ogden as he was loading three footlockers into a taxi cab. When he was questioned by the officer, witnesses stated that he first claimed ownership of the footlockers and their contents and then reversed his story, saying that he was taking them to the depot for one James O'Neil and did not know what was in them. The footlockers were found to contain articles of men's clothing, from which most of the labels had been removed but which were identified as items taken from Heusted and Montague, a Salt Lake City men's furnishings firm.

The appellant was charged with grand larceny and being an habitual criminal, the charges being that he stole from Heusted and Montague, a corporation, personal property having a value in excess of $50; and that he had been previously convicted of four felonies: Burglary in the State of Oregon, where he was sentenced and committed for 3 years in the Oregon State Penitentiary; Burglary in the First Degree in the State of Nevada, where he was sentenced and committed for 1 to 10 years in the Nevada State Penitentiary; Burglary in the First Degree and Prior Conviction in the State of California, where he was sentenced and committed for 5 years to life in the California State Prison; Burglary in the Second Degree and Persistent Offender in the State of Idaho, where he was sentenced and committed for 20 years in the Idaho State Prison.

Appellant's first assignment of error concerns the information; he attacks it on the bases that (1) there was not allegation of ownership in one other than the appellant and (2) that two crimes were charged in the information.

The information, with regard to the Grand Larceny charge, is in accord with the short form authorized by U.C.A.1953, 77-21-47. He complains that there was no allegation of ownership of the stolen goods, but such an allegation is made unnecessary by statute, U.C.A.1953, 77-21-16(1) and (2), and we cannot see how he was prejudiced by not knowing whether title to the clothing had passed to the firm or whether they held it on a consignment basis. The information, by the use of the words 'stole from Heusted and Montague * * * property having a value in excess of $50.00' was valid and sufficient to charge an offense under U.C.A.1953, 77-21-8(1)(b). Additionally, appellant, upon his request, was served with a Bill of Particulars and his complaint that he was unable to properly prepare his defense because of lack of information as to the charge is groundless.

Appellant contends that, inasmuch as the information contained, in addition to the charge of grand larceny the further charge of being an habitual criminal, that the information was fatally defective. This court has held that being an habitual criminal is a status, and to be charged with being an habitual criminal is not to be charged with a crime. State v. Russum, 107 Utah 94, 152 P.2d 88; State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383. It follows that including the charge of being an habitual criminal in an information charging a crime is not error, provided the requisite facts are set out in the information which charges one with being an habitual criminal. State v. Russum, supra.

Assignments of error regarding the binding over of the appellant are refuted by the record. He was bound over by the committing magistrate in a manner recognized by law and custom.

Objections to the trial on the charge of larceny include the often-considered effect of U.C.A.1953, 76-38-1, '* * * Possession of property recently stolen, when the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt.' and that appellant did make satisfactory explanation of his possession of the stolen clothing. The contention that this portion of the statute forces upon the defendant the burden of proving his innocence has been rejected by this court in many instances. The state must prove not only the larceny and recent possession but also that he failed to make a satisfactory explanation of his possession. State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023; State v. Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P. 635. And by 'prima facie evidence' it is not meant that in absence of other evidence the jury must find the defendant guilty, but rather that there would arise an inference that the defendant committed the larceny and that this inference might, with all other circumstances, be considered in determining whether or not the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 [2 UTAH2D 38] P.2d 228, reversed on rehearing 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494, State v. Potello, supra. A discussion of the difficulty of phraseology such as appears in this statute is found in State v. Brady, Iowa, 91 N.W. 801, 805:

'The use of the terms 'presumption of guilt' and 'prima facie evidence of guilt' with reference to the possession of stolen goods has perhaps been too long indulged in by courts and text-writers to be condemned, but we cannot resist the conclusion that, when so employed, these expressions are unfortunate, and often misleading. In a civil proceeding, when a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden is shifted, and, in the absence of any countershowing, he is entitled to recover as a matter of law. This rule is understood by the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Adoption B.B. v. R.K.B.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 31, 2017
    ... ... So it is vital that the courts of this state, this court included, take care to ensure that adoption proceedings are as free as possible from ... ...
  • Brady v. Kang S. Park
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • April 18, 2013
    ...evidence, would entitle the party having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. ¶ 14 (citing State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954)). ¶ 49 “An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract.” Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 U......
  • State v. Stilling
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • February 15, 1989
    ...State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah 1978)); see also State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 37, 268 P.2d 998, 1000 (1954) ("to be charged with being an habitual criminal is not to be charged with a crime"), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900, 75 ......
  • Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • March 2, 2001
    ...of contrary evidence, would entitle the party having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d 998, 1001 (1954). The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT