State v. Woodbury County

• Decision Date: 27 October 1936
• Docket Number: 43607.
• Citation: 269 N.W. 449,222 Iowa 488
• Parties: STATE et al. v. WOODBURY COUNTY et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

269 N.W. 449

222 Iowa 488

STATE et al. v. WOODBURY COUNTY et al.

No. 43607.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 27, 1936

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; F. H. Rice, Judge.

An action in equity to enjoin the defendants from receiving within the state of Iowa, from outside the state, motor vehicle fuel for use or sale in this state, without first having obtained a distributor's license as required by chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-Fifth General Assembly Extra Session, and for an accounting as to the quantities of motor fuel received by the defendants from outside the state for use or sale within the state after April 1, 1934, and to determine the license fees owing to the state, and for judgment for the amount thereof. The court dismissed plaintiffs' petition, and plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed.

Edward L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., and Clair E. Hamilton, of Winterset, for appellants.

M. E Rawlings, Co. Atty., Franklin E. Gill, Asst. Co. Atty., and F. E. Gill, all of Sioux City, for appellees.

ALBERT, Justice.

This case was tried on a stipulation, and the amount due the state, if it is entitled to recover herein, is stipulated as $4,235.25; and the penalty, if one is to attach, as $423.48.

The facts stipulated are that the defendant Woodbury county between the dates of April 1, 1934, and February 25, 1936 (the date on which the stipulation was made), purchased from outside the state of Iowa, and received within the state motor fuel, as that term is defined in chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-Fifth General Assembly, Extra Session; that said motor fuel was shipped from refineries located outside the state of Iowa, by railway tank cars into Woodbury county, billed to the said county, and delivered to the said county at the town of Moville therein; that said motor vehicle fuel was purchased for and used by the defendant county in the construction and maintenance of its highways within its borders, and was purchased solely for and actually used in its trucks and power maintainers in said construction and maintenance work. It was further stipulated that neither the county nor its officers applied to the treasurer of state for a distributor's license under the provisions of the aforesaid act, and that neither the defendant county nor its officers have reported the amount of motor vehicle fuel purchased by or on behalf of the defendant county under the provisions of said chapter, and that neither the defendant county nor its officers have paid to the treasurer of state any of the motor vehicle fuel license fees as provided by statute.

Since the trial of this case in the district court, two opinions of this court have been filed which practically control the disposition to be made of this case, to wit, Scott v. State Board of Assessment and Review, 267 N.W. 111, and State v. City of Des Moines, 266 N.W. 41. These opinions dispose of most, if not all, of the questions raised on the appeal in the case at bar.

The first question raised is as to the constitutionality of the aforesaid chapter 56 of the Acts of the Forty-Fifth General Assembly, Extra Session. The fact situation with reference to the passage of this bill, without going into detail, is that the bill originated in the House, where, after passing through the necessary steps, it was duly passed and adopted. It was then messaged to the Senate, where certain amendments were made, after which it was duly and legally passed by the Senate. It was then messaged back to the House, where the Senate amendments were considered and, by the necessary majority, were concurred in by the House; and in due time the Senate was informed of the concurrence by the House in the Senate amendments. It was then duly enrolled, properly signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, was approved by the Governor, and published and lodged in the office of the Secretary of State. All proceedings in both the House and the Senate were properly recorded in their respective journals.

The appellees' assertion is that the record does not show a compliance with section 17 of article 3 of the State Constitution. We so recently considered this question in the case of Scott v. State Board of Assessment and Review, 267 N.W. 111, that it hardly demands further attention in this case. Suffice it to say that, under the principles and rules laid down in the Scott Case, this bill was properly passed in compliance with all the requirements of said section of the Constitution.

Appellees however, insist that there is a conflict between the decision in the Scott Case and the case of Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 258 N.W. 190. We are unable to see where this conflict arises. The Smith Case, among other things, decides two propositions. The first was that, in the investigation of the question of the constitutionality of a statute, the court has a right to consider a fact extrinsic of the record to determine whether or not a bill was constitutionally passed. Second, in the Smith Case one of the crucial points on which the opinion was turned arose as follows: Three separate bills were duly passed in the House, each bearing a House number. They were duly messaged to the...