State v. Woodfork

• Decision Date: 11 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 16457,16457
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Don B. WOODFORK, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 332

454 N.W.2d 332

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Don B. WOODFORK, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 16457.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued Oct. 18, 1989.

Decided April 11, 1990.

Brian L. Radke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Atty. Gen. (on brief), Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Shawn Jensen Pahlke, Pennington County Public Defender, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

WUEST, Chief Justice.

Don B. Woodfork (Woodfork) appeals from a judgment of conviction for first degree rape. We affirm.

On the evening of April 18, 1988, the victim of the rape (victim) went with friends to the Reunion Bar in Rapid City. There she met Woodfork with a man named Ed Sapp (Sapp). Prior to this evening, the victim had dated Sapp. The victim approached Sapp and began visiting with him. At some point during the evening the victim's friends left the Reunion Bar. Sapp and the victim then decided they would go to Ellsworth Air Force Base to get Sapp's car. Sapp asked Woodfork for a ride to his car and Woodfork agreed. Shortly thereafter, Woodfork, accompanied by a woman named Margretta Kellum (Kellum), left the Reunion Bar with Sapp and the victim.

The victim, Sapp, Woodfork and Kellum did not go directly to the Air Force Base. Instead, they attended a party. Before attending this party, the four stopped at a convenience store where the victim purchased some cigarettes and shoplifted a pack of condoms at the request of Sapp. After attending the party, the four went to Kellum's house. Time passed and the victim eventually decided to spend the night at Kellum's house. Woodfork and Kellum went up to the second floor of the house, and the victim undressed and went to bed. Shortly thereafter, the victim began to worry about staying the night at Kellum's because she had to work the next morning. She then got out of bed, dressed, and attempted to find a ride home. Sapp and Woodfork offered to give the victim a ride home and she accepted.

Woodfork, who was driving the car, did not take the victim to her home, but instead went to Canyon Lake Park. According to the victim, Woodfork stopped the car at the park and pulled her out of the car. Woodfork then struck the victim and led her to a picnic shelter where he directed the victim to remove her clothing. The victim refused and Woodfork struck her again, giving her a bloody nose. Woodfork then removed the victim's clothing. At that time, Woodfork and Sapp began to search through the victim's clothing. The victim tried to escape at that time but she was tackled by Woodfork not far from the shelter. Woodfork then took the victim back to the shelter. According to the victim, Woodfork forced himself upon her and had intercourse with her.

After having intercourse with the victim, Woodfork began to leave when the victim asked him where her clothes were. He told the victim he would retrieve her clothes and instructed her to stay in the shelter. He never returned. Woodfork threw her clothes in a nearby pond and then left the park with Sapp. The victim, unable to find her clothes, went to a nearby convenience store where the police were contacted and an ambulance summoned. On the basis of these facts, Woodfork was later charged and convicted of first degree rape.

Woodfork raises several issues on appeal. We address them separately without listing them. Woodfork first contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant his requested instruction relating to the issue of consent. The record reflects that Woodfork requested that the jury be given the following instruction:

It is a defense to a charge of rape that the defendant entertained a reasonable and good faith belief that the female person voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse. If from all the evidence you have reasonable doubt whether the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed she voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

This instruction is similar to the requested instruction denied by the trial court in State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895 (S.D.1984) which we labeled as a "mistake of fact" instruction in upholding the trial court. Although the trial court refused to give the jury this instruction, the record reflects that the following instruction was given to the jury:

An act is not a crime when committed or omitted under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent. Where a person honestly and reasonably believes certain facts, and acts or fails to act based upon a belief in those facts, which, if true, would not result in the commission of a crime, the person is not guilty.

In addition to this instruction which similarly addresses the issue of "mistake of fact," several other instructions were given to the jury which indicated that Woodfork's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could find him guilty of rape. In spite of these instructions which were given to the jury, Woodfork contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to give the jury his requested instruction. We disagree.

It is well-settled in South Dakota that it is not error for a trial court to refuse to amplify instructions given which substantially cover the principle embodied in the requested instruction. Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 372 (S.D.1985); Jahnig v. Coisman, 283 N.W.2d 557, 560 (S.D.1979). It is also well settled that jury instructions must be considered as a whole in determining if error was committed in giving or refusing to give certain instructions. Runge v. Prairie States Ins. of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 538, 540-541 (S.D.1986); Wheeldon, supra. In the present case, we believe the instructions given to the jury, when considered as a whole, substantially cover the principle embodied in Woodfork's requested instruction.

The "mistake of fact" instruction which was given to the jury and the instructions concerning the "reasonable doubt" standard, when read as a whole, indicate that if the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether Woodfork reasonably believed the victim consented to intercourse, then Woodfork should be found not guilty. This is precisely the principle embodied in Woodfork's requested instruction. It is clear then that Woodfork's requested instruction would only serve to amplify the instructions which were given to the jury. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to grant Woodfork's requested instruction.

We next address Woodfork's contention that the trial court erred in excluding evidence relating to the victim's theft of condoms at the convenience store before the rape took place. Prior to trial, the State submitted a Motion in Limine arguing the trial court should refuse to allow evidence regarding the shoplifting of the condoms by the victim. The State argued this "shoplifting" evidence was not relevant to any issues relating to the charge of first-degree rape against Woodfork. Woodfork countered by arguing the "shoplifting" evidence was relevant to the victim's character for truthfulness, and hence was admissible under SDCL 19-14-10. ¹ Woodfork also argued such evidence was relevant upon the issue of consent, and hence was admissible under SDCL 19-12-5 for the purposes of proving motive, preparation and plan. ² The trial court, having reviewed the briefs of each party relating to these issues, subsequently granted the State's Motion in Limine. Although the trial court prohibited Woodfork from submitting evidence to the effect the victim had "shoplifted" the condoms, it did allow Woodfork to present evidence to the effect that she had "obtained" the condoms at the convenience store. On appeal, Woodfork contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the "shoplifting" evidence under both SDCL 19-14-10 and SDCL 19-12-5. Woodfork also alleges that the trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value and prejudicial effects of such evidence on the record, as provided in State v. Eagle Hawk, 411 N.W.2d 120, 126 (S.D.1987).

We first address Woodfork's argument regarding the admissibility of the "shoplifting" evidence under SDCL 19-14-10. In addressing this argument, we first note that the admission of testimony involves two inquiries: first, whether the evidence is relevant and, second, if relevant, whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. State v. Reutter, 374 N.W.2d 617, 625 (S.D.1985); State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982). In the present case, the trial court concluded the "shoplifting" evidence was not relevant to the victim's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Having reached this conclusion, there was no need for the trial court to proceed to the next step of balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect. Therefore, we do not believe the trial court erred here in failing to conduct an on-the-record balancing of the probative value and prejudicial effects of the "shoplifting" evidence.

This leaves us with the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the "shoplifting" incident was not relevant to the victim's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and was therefore inadmissible. We have previously stated that before we will disturb an evidentiary ruling, it must be determined that an abuse of discretion has occurred. State v. Bartlett, 411 N.W.2d 411, 414 (S.D.1987). An abuse of discretion "refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence." State v. Bartlett, supra; Gross v. Gross, 355 N.W.2d 4, 7 (S.D.1984). The issue of whether shoplifting or petty larceny is relevant to a person's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is certainly debatable. A number of courts have held that such evidence is not indicative of a person's character for truthfulness or...