State v. Woodling

• Decision Date: 27 April 1893
• Citation: 54 N.W. 1068,53 Minn. 142
• Parties: STATE v WOODLING.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

53 Minn. 142

54 N.W. 1068

STATEvWOODLING.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 27, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The defendant in a criminal case in the municipal court of Minneapolis (which has jurisdiction only of offenses cognizable before a justice of the peace) may waive a jury, and consent to trial by the court.

2. Evidence held sufficient to justify the finding.

Appeal from municipal court of Minneapolis; Mahoney, Judge.

M. E. Woodling was arraigned before the municipal court of Minneapolis on a complaint for assault and battery. Defendant waived a jury, and was found guilty by the court, and ordered to pay a fine. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

S. M. Finch, for appellant.

H. W. Childs, Atty. Gen., David P. Simpson, and M. D. Purdy, for the State.

MITCHELL, J.

The defendant, having been arraigned before the municipal court of Minneapolis upon a complaint for assault and battery, pleaded not guilty, and expressly waived a jury, and thereupon the court, having tried the case, found the defendant guilty, and ordered that he pay a fine of $25. The defendant on appeal raises two points: First, that the judgment was not justified by the evidence; and, second, that the court had no jurisdiction to render judgment without the verdict of a jury.

1. All we deem necessary to say upon the first point is that, even upon defendant's own testimony, he was guilty of an assault and battery. As the battery was not serious, and as the provocation from the indecent conduct of the complaining witness was great, we would have been better satisfied if the court had imposed a lighter fine; but this furnishes no ground for a reversal.

2. As to what constitutional rights may be waived by defendants in criminal cases, and particularly whether they can waive the right of trial by jury, is a subject upon which much has been written, and upon which there is much difference of opinion. Without going into any general discussion of the subject, we may say that it seems to us that perhaps the true criterion is whether the right is a privilege intended merely for the benefit of the defendant, or whether it is one which also affects the public, or goes to the jurisdiction of the court. If it belongs to the first class, we see no good reason why the accused may not waive it; but, if it belongs to the latter, it would seem that no consent on his part could amount to a valid waiver; and the different views entertained as to the nature and object of constitutional provisions relating to the right of trial by jury in criminal cases will probably account for the conflict of decisions as to whether it can be waived. Those who construe the right as a matter in which the public has no interest, and which is not jurisdictional, but designed solely for the protection of the defendant, naturally hold that it may be waived; while those who take the view that it affects the public as well as the defendant, or that it relates to the constitution of the court, of which it is intended to make the jury an essential part, as naturally hold that it cannot be waived. If our constitution provided, as did the original constitution of the United States, (article 3, § 2,) that “the trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury,” there would be good grounds for arguing that a jury was intended to be an essential part of a constitutional tribunal for the trial of crimes, without which it would not be legally constituted, any more than it would be without a judge. But our constitution contains no such provision. Its language is, (article 1, § 6:) “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury,” etc. This language imports merely a grant or guaranty of a right to the accused for his own protection, and seems to us never to have been intended to prescribe the organization of the court, or to make a jury an essential part of it. If this be so, it necessarily follows that the presence or absence of a jury is not a jurisdictional matter,-that is, it does not go to the constitutional organization of the court,-and that, if the defendant cannot waive a jury trial, it must be purely upon grounds of public policy, and because the public have such an interest in the life and liberty of the citizen that he ought not to be allowed to waive this...