State v. Woodly
| Citation | 2 Jones 276,47 N.C. 276 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
| Decision Date | 30 June 1855 |
| Parties | STATE v. ALFRED WOODLY. |
Every material averment, necessary to constitute a substantive offense, must be charged in the indictment and proved on the trial, by the State.
Therefore, where it is alleged in an indictment, that the defendant did carry, convey and conceal a slave, without the consent in writing of the owner of such slave, with the intent he should escape beyond the limits of the State, it is incumbent on the State to prove that such notice in writing was not given.
THIS was an INDICTMENT, tried before PERSON, Judge, for carrying, conveying and concealing a slave, in order that he might escape; at Spring Term, 1855, of Bertie Superior Court.
The first count in the indictment was as follows, viz:
+---------------------------------------------------------+
¦“State of North Carolina,¦)¦Superior Court of Law, Spring¦
+-------------------------+-+-----------------------------¦
¦Bertie County. ¦)¦Term, 1855. ¦
+---------------------------------------------------------+
The jurors for the State, upon their oath present, that Alfred Woodly, and Richard Wynns, free persons of color, late of said county, with force and arms, at and in Bertie county aforesaid, on the thirteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, did, wickedly, wilfully and feloniously, carry, convey and conceal a certain negro slave, named Anthony, the property of one Tristram L. Skinner, executor of Joshua Skinner, deceased, he the said Tristram L. Skinner, then and there, being a citizen of this State, to wit, North Carolina aforesaid, without the consent in writing of the said Tristram L. Skinner, the owner of said slave, previously to the felonious carrying, conveying and concealing aforesaid of the slave aforesaid, obtained, with the intent, and for the purpose, then and there, of carrying and conveying said slave, Anthony, out of the limits of the said State, contrary to the form of the statute, in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.”
There were various other counts: the 2nd, charging that the defendants “feloniously, wickedly and wilfully, did take and conceal, and then and there, did permit and suffer the same to be done, without the consent in writing of the said Tristram,” &c., “with the intent of carrying and conveying the said slave, &c.”
The 3rd count is like the 1st, only it charges the property as belonging to Tristram L. Skinner, without naming him as executor, and alleges the intent to be “for the purpose then and there of enabling said slave, Anthony, to effect an escape out of the State.”
There were other counts varying the allegation of ownership, and somewhat varying the other allegations, but substantially charging as in one or another of those noticed, each one containing the allegation that the acts were done without the consent in writing of the owner.
Upon the trial, much evidence was adduced to show that the principal witness had sworn falsely, both before this trial, and upon it, and the defendant's counsel called on the court to charge the jury that they were bound to disregard his testimony entirely.
But his honor laid down the rule to be, that if they believed the witness (Anthony) had sworn corruptly false, in a matter material to the issue ““here, upon this trial,” it was their duty to discard his testimony entirely: but if the false oath was taken formerly, in another part of this proceeding, to wit, on the trial before the examining magistrate, it went only to the credit of the witness. For this defendant's counsel excepted.
Among other instructions to the jury, (which are not excepted to,) his Honor charged, that it was not incumbent on the State to prove, affirmatively, that the taking and concealing were done without the consent in writing of the owner, but that the prisoners, if they relied on it, must shew such consent in writing. For this defendant's counsel again excepted.
The jury returned the following verdict, viz: “That the prisoner, Alfred Woodly, is guilty of the felonious carrying, conveying and concealing in manner and form as charged in the bill of indictment, and that the defendant, Richard Wynns, is not guilty.”
The counsel for the prisoner moved in arrest of judgment: First, because the bill of indictment was defective in not stating that the prisoners intended to deprive the owner of Anthony of his property, or some words of similar import. 2ndly, “because it is not stated to what State or country they intended to carry him, and to which, to enable him to make his escape.” This motion was overruled, and his Honor having also refused a new trial, the judgment of the court was pronounced, and the defendant appealed to this court. In this court, a further reason for arresting the judgment was urged on account of the insufficiency of the verdict.Attorney General, for the State .
Winston, Jr., for the defendant .
The counsel for the prisoner has urged several objections to the legality of the proceedings on the trial, which, as he contends, entitle his client to a venire de novo, and if that be not granted him, he has insisted, for several reasons, that the judgment shall be arrested.
Two of the alleged errors are of the same import with some of those which were assigned, and have been overruled by us, in the case of the State v. Joseph T. Williams, decided at the present term, (47 N.C. 257.) Of the remainder, it will be necessary to notice with much particularity only one, and upon that we are of opinion that the prisoner is entitled to another trial.
The act of Assembly upon which the indictment is framed, makes the want of the written consent of the owner, or owners, necessary to complete the offense therein prescribed. This requisition is embraced in the enacting clause of the statute and does not come in by way of proviso or by a distinct enactment. It is therefore properly negatived in each count of the indictment.
An important question arises; upon whom is imposed the burden of proving it? In the present case no proof of it was offered on the part of the State, and the court held that such proof was unnecessary: that it was a matter of defense which the prisoner was bound to make out; and to this ruling of the court, the prisoner has excepted. The question thus raised would be an important one in a case of less magnitude than the present, but when it comes to involve the life of the prisoner before us, and of every other person who may hereafter be indicted upon the same statute, it acquires a momentous interest, which may well make us approach it with the utmost caution and deliberation. The opinion of the court below is sought to be sustained by the general rule, which is said to be founded on convenience and common sense, that the affirmation of every allegation must be proved. “He who alleges a fact to be, is naturally expected to show its existence, and not he who denies it, to show that it is not.”
This is a rule of pleading and evidence: which, it is contended, extends to criminal, as well as civil cases; and as an authority in support of it, the case of the State v. Morrison, 3 Dev. Rep. 299, is strongly relied upon. We admit the general rule, and do not intend to question the authority of the case referred to, and yet we cannot sanction the application of the principle to the case now under consideration. We believe that it is opposed to another fundamental principle, that every person charged with a criminal violation of the laws of his country, is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is shown, and in aid of that principle, that all the facts necessary to constitute the offense must be averred in the bill of indictment, and every substantial averment must be proved on the part of the prosecution.
If there be any exception to the general rule which requires such proof, it must arise from necessity, or that great difficulty of procuring the proof, which amounts practically to such necessity; or, in other words, where the prosecutor could not show the negative, and where the defendant could, with perfect ease, show the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Falkner
...burden is still with the state, under all the evidence, to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. State v. Woodly, 47 N.C. 276; State v. Wilbourne, 87 N.C. 529; State Hopkins, 130 N.C. 647, 40 S.E. 973; State v. Connor, 142 N.C. 700, 55 S.E. 787; State v. Leepe......
-
State v. Falkner
...is still with the state, under all the evidence, to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. State v. Woodly, 47 N. C. 276: State v. Wilbourne, 87 N. C. 529; State v. Hopkins, 130 N. C. 647, 40 S. E. 973; State v. Connor, 142 N. C. 700, 55 S. E. 787; State v. Lee......
-
State v. Herring
... ... mind from which reasonable doubt arises. State v ... Sears, 61 N.C. 146; State v. Knox, 61 N.C. 312; ... Coffin v. U. S., 156 U.S. 432, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 ... L.Ed. 481. We have examined the above cases, and also the ... following North Carolina cases cited by defendant: State ... v. Woodly, 47 N.C. 276; State v. Massey, 86 ... N.C. 658, 41 Am. Rep. 478; State v. Adams, 138 N.C ... 688, 50 S.E. 765; State v. McLeod, 198 N.C. 649, 152 ... S.E. 895; State v. Spivey, 198 N.C. 655, 153 S.E ... 255; State v. Hardy, 189 N.C. 799, 128 S.E. 152; ... State v. Sigmon, 190 N.C. 684, 130 ... ...
-
State v. Herring
...Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481. We have examined the above cases, and also the following North Carolina cases cited by defendant: State v. Woodly, 47 N. C. 276; State v. Massey, 86" N. C. 658, 41 Am. Rep. 478; State v. Adams, 138 N. C. 688, 50 S. E. 765; State v. McLeod, 198 N. C. 649, 152 S. E. 89......