State v. Woods
| Decision Date | 16 March 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 9129SC988,9129SC988 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Vernon Junior WOODS. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Lacy H. Thornburg by Asst. Atty. Gen. Julia F. Renfrow, Raleigh, for the State.
Dameron and Burgin by Anthony Lynch, Marion, for defendant-appellant.
The defendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment on 21 October 1989, among other crimes, with wantonly and willfully burning "an uninhabited storage building located at 607 Old Highway 10, Marion, North Carolina" in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-62. A trial was held on the charges beginning on 10 June 1991, in McDowell County before the Honorable Herbert O. Phillips, III. At trial the evidence presented tended to show that on 18 October 1989, defendant was an inmate in the North Carolina Department of Correction. While working on a road crew in McDowell County between Marion and Old Fort, the defendant escaped.
On 21 October 1989, around 5:00 a.m. Dennis Butner ("Butner") was driving his car in Marion on Old Highway 10 when he saw a "trail of fire" proceeding from the roadway to a "storage building" located adjacent to a nearby house. Butner testified that when he first saw the fire, the flames had not yet reached the storage building. Upon seeing the fire, Butner called the authorities. When Butner and others returned to the scene of the fire, they found the defendant standing in the middle of the road. To their questions the defendant merely replied that he "lived up the road." He later took Butner's car and fled, only to be recaptured.
The storage building, which was owned by Edith Sowers ("Sowers"), was completely destroyed by the fire. Sowers and her children had used the storage building to store lawn mowers, weed eaters, gasoline, furniture, tools and other items. The building was often referred to as a "garage," even though it did not house an automobile.
Charles Presnell, an engineer and a member of the arson investigation team for the Marion Fire Department conducted an investigation as to the cause and origin of the fire. As a result of his investigation, Presnell concluded that the fire was incendiary in origin.
The defendant testified at trial that he had escaped from the road squad and that he had stolen Butner's car. However, the defendant denied having set fire to the storage building.
Upon hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted the defendant on three counts of assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of traffic violations, one count of felony larceny, one count of felony escape from prison and one count of burning an uninhabited storage building. The only conviction from which defendant appeals is the burning of the uninhabited storage building or "outhouse."
As his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that N.C.G.S. § 14-62 "does not prohibit the burning of the structure that is alleged to have been burned in this case." We disagree. Defendant was charged pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-62 (1986) which provides:
If any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn or cause to be burned, or aid, counsel or procure the burning of, any uninhabited house, any church, chapel, or meetinghouse, or any stable, coach house, outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, barn or granary, or any building, structure, or erection used or intended to be used in carrying on any trade or manufacture, or any branch thereof, whether the same or any of them respectively shall then be in the possession of the offender, or in the possession of any other person, he shall be punished as a Class E felon.
The verdict sheet shows that the jury found the defendant guilty of burning an "outhouse." It is the defendant's contention that the building which was burned does not come within the purview of N.C.G.S. § 14-62, and that he should have been charged with violating N.C.G.S. § 14-67.1 (1986) which provides:
If any person shall wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn ... any building or other structure of any type not otherwise covered by the provisions of this Article, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.
The defendant and the State agree that the building which was burned was a storage building. However, the defendant and the State disagree as to whether such a storage building is an "outhouse" within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-62. Defendant argues that an "outhouse" is an outdoor toilet or privy and not a storage building. The State contends that the definition of "outhouse" is not limited to outdoor toilets and that it also encompasses any "outbuilding." We hold that all privies are outhouses but not all outhouses are privies.
In interpreting statutes, where the words of a statute have not gained a technical meaning, they must be given their common and ordinary meaning unless a different meaning is apparent or required by the context. Pelham Realty Corp. v. Board of Transp., 303 N.C. 424, 279 S.E.2d 826 (1981). In Black's Law Dictionary an "outhouse" is defined as follows:
A building subservient to, yet distinct from, the principal dwelling, located either within or without the curtilage. A smaller or subordinate building connected with a dwelling, usually detached from it and standing at a little distance from it, not intended for persons to live in, but to serve some purpose of convenience or necessity; as a barn, outside privy, a dairy, a toolhouse, and the like.
Black's Law Dictionary 993 (5th ed. 1979). Similarly, Webster's defines an "outhouse" as any "outbuilding." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1602 (1968). There is little doubt that the storage building at issue falls within the modern definition of an outhouse.
However, the predecessor to the current version of N.C.G.S. § 14-62 was first ratified 22 March 1875 and the term "out-house" has since been a part of N.C.G.S. § 14-62. 1874-75 N.C.Sess.Laws Chap. 228. Therefore, we feel that the intent of the legislature in 1875 is illuminating in interpreting the meaning that should be attached to the word "outhouse." See State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978) (). In a case decided less than ten years after the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 14-62, our Supreme Court held that the term "out-house" has a technical meaning: "An out-house is one that belongs to a dwelling-house, and is in some respect parcel of such dwelling-house and situated within the curtilage." State v. Roper, 88 N.C. 656, 658 (1883). This definition shows that the term "out-house" in 1883 was not limited to an outdoor toilet. In fact, the defendant in Roper was charged with burning an "out-house used as a store-house." When the Roper definition of "out-house" is applied to the present case, it is clear that the storage house which the defendant burned falls within the statutory definition of "outhouse."
We are also guided by other uses of the term "outhouse" during this same period of time. Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 1853, defines "outhouse" as: "Small house or building at a little distance from the main house." "Privy" is defined as: "secret," "a necessary house;" "necessary" is defined as "a privy."
On 15 October 1880 a fire of unknown...
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