State v. Woody

Decision Date04 May 1972
Docket NumberNo. 2218,2218
Citation108 Ariz. 284,496 P.2d 584
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James WOODY, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Albert M. Coury, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Richard J. Rubin, Phoenix, for appellant.

HOLOHAN, Justice.

Appellant, James W. Woody, was found guilty of selling narcotics in violation of A.R.S. § 36--1002.02 after trial by jury. He was sentenced to confinement in the state prison for a term of nine to ten years.

Appellant raises essentially three questions in this appeal: (1) Was the evidence sufficient to convict him of illegal sale of narcotics? (2) Was there misconduct by the prosecution in the cross-examination of the defendant? (3) Should the court have instructed the jury that the defendant might be guilty of a lesser offense as an accessory?

According to evidence most favorable to the state, Woody, James Trent (Lance) Wood and Charles Goldsmith, all residents of the same house and all addicted to heroin, went to a Phoenix bar on June 8, 1970 where undercover agent Hugh Hawley had arranged to buy a quantity of heroin. Woody was introduced to Hawley, then Wood and Hawley sat at a booth while Woody sat at a nearby table, and Goldsmith and a person named Nolan played pool. Woody, Wood and Goldsmith left together after Wood and Hawley had talked for a few minutes, returning about an hour later. Wood and Hawley again sat in the booth with Woody sitting at the adjacent table and Nolan and Goldsmith playing pool. Hawley gave Wood $60.00 for 2.56 grams of heroin. The agent, Hawley, asked how many times the heroin could be cut, and it was Woody who answered that it could be cut only once or Hawley would have dissatisfied customers. Woody also told Hawley how to cut the heroin by using a razor blade and a piece of glass.

Nolan, Woody and Goldsmith met with Hawley and another undercover agent several days later in a restaurant. Woody testified that he did not take part in arrangements to hold the meeting and that he remembered little of what was said there. On cross-examination Woody denied having a business relationship with Wood and Goldsmith.

Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted the motion by the defense for a directed verdict which was made after the state rested its case and renewed after all parties had rested. Appellant asserts that the evidence fails to show that he had any connection with the crime charged in the information. We cannot agree with this contention. From the evidence the jury could have found that appellant Woody was an active participant with Wood in accomplishing the sale of the narcotics. The agent, Hawley, testified that it was Woody who said how the heroin could only be cut once. This supports the conclusion that Woody had knowledge of the percentage of heroin in the mixture being sold--something which could be known only to one who was part of the scheme. Woody was present when the sale was made, and always remained close to the table where his associate of many years was transacting the sale. Both Wood and Woody together with Goldsmith lived in Woody's house and all three were addicts.

A principal in the commission of a crime is defined in A.R.S. § 13--139 as follows:

'All persons concerned in the commission of a crime whether it is a felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, * * * are principals in any crime so committed.'

This Court has previously held that:

'Aiding and abetting means simply to assist in the commission of an act, either by active participation in it or in some manner advising or encouraging it. State v. Roberts, 85 Ariz. 252, 254, 336 P.2d 151. Aiding and abetting contemplates some positive act in aid of the commission of the offense; an active force physical or moral joined with that of the perpetrator in producing it. The aider or abettor must stand in the same relation to the crime as the criminal, approach it from the same angle, touch it at the same point and possess criminal intent. Dodd v. Boies, 88 Ariz. 401, 403, 357 P.2d 144.' State v. Bearden, 99 Ariz. 1, 3, 405 P.2d 885, 886 (1965).

From a total consideration of the evidence, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury that the defendant, Woody, was a principal in the commission of the offense charged by reason of his participation in it.

The second issue concerns the prosecution's cross-examination of the defendant concerning a business association among Wood, Goldsmith and Woody. It is complained that the 'prosecution neither offered to nor did it substantiate the fact that the appellant was part of a common plan, scheme, association or partnership with the alleged seller.'

The portion questioned by appellant is as follows (R.T. 103, 104):

'Q Before I asked (sic) you about this matter at the Valle Del Sol, isn't it true that you had an agreement, a working arrangement with Vernon Trent Wood and Charlie Goldsmith?

'A No, it is not.

'Q You never participated with them in any way in a business arrangement involving heroin?

'A No.

'Q Were you living with either of them?

'A They were staying at my house.'

Appellant says that there was no attempt by the prosecution to rebut this denial of a prior deal, and that the questioning was 'wholly irrelevant and incompetent for any purpose and it was engaged in (in) order to prejudice the appellant before the jury.' Appellant contends that the cross-examination of Woody presented evidence of an attempted sale at the Valle Del Sol meeting and failure to rebut the defendant's denial is grounds for reversal.

We do not, however, have a situation where the prosecution has asked questions about crimes other than the one charged in the information. The deputy county attorney asked no questions on cross-examination which dealt with elements of criminal acts at...

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16 cases
  • State v. West
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 13 d5 Novembro d5 2015
    ...which requires different evidence or elements than the principal charge is a separate offense....’ "), quoting State v. Woody, 108 Ariz. 284, 287, 496 P.2d 584, 587 (1972) (first alteration in Sustaita ). Indeed, the connection between the means is a unique feature of alternative-means stat......
  • State v. Sustaita
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • 23 d5 Junho d5 1978
    ...different evidence or elements than the principal charge is a separate offense and not a lesser included offense." State v. Woody, 108 Ariz. 284, 287, 496 P.2d 584, 587 (1972). "The test for determining whether one offense is included in another offense was Sodomy can be committed with the ......
  • State v. Freeney
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • 4 d5 Dezembro d5 2009
    ...which requires different evidence or elements than the principal charge is a separate offense ....'") (quoting State v. Woody, 108 Ariz. 284, 287, 496 P.2d 584, 587 (1972)). ¶ 17 Here, the elements required to prove a violation of § 13-1203(A)(2) differ from those required to prove a violat......
  • Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-75755, In re
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 25 d4 Abril d4 1974
    ...lesser offense, even though such lesser offense would not always form a consitutent part of the major offense charged. State v. Woody, 108 Ariz. 284, 496 P.2d 584 (1972); 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Information § 272, p. Since the petition for delinquency in this case did not present factual ......
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