State v. Woody, 167

• Citation: 157 S.E.2d 108,271 N.C. 544
• Decision Date: 11 October 1967
• Docket Number: No. 167,167
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Franklin D. WOODY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 108

157 S.E.2d 108

271 N.C. 544

STATE of North Carolina v. Franklin D. WOODY.

No. 167.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 11, 1967.

Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton, Asst. Attys. Gen. George A. Goodwyn and Millard R. Rich, Jr., for the State.

J. A. West, Shelby, for defendant appellant.

PARKER, Chief Justice.

Defendant through his counsel pleaded guilty to a less degree of the same crimes charged in the indictment against him, which plea was accepted by the State. This is authorized by G.S. § 15--170 and cases cited thereunder.

Defendant insisted that his case be appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon his request the same counsel was appointed by the court to represent him on the appeal, and the record in the case and his brief were mimeographed in the same fashion as if he were the richest man in the State, at the expense of the taxpayers.

The record states that evidence was offered by both the State and the defendant, but it was not taken down by the court reporter. The defendant on appeal assigns that as error. This assignment of error is overruled.

Defendant did not ask that the evidence be taken down. In State v. Perry, 265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E.2d 591, the Court said:

'This is said in 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 495, p. 484: 'By a plea of guilty a defendant waives the right to trial and the incidents thereof, and the constitutional guaranties with respect to the conduct of criminal prosecutions.' To the same effect, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 424(6). In State v. Wilson, supra (251 N.C. 174, 110 S.E.2d 813) it is said: 'Defendant's plea of guilty was equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged, and no other proof of guilt was required.' State v. Smith, 265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293, quotes State v. Warren, 113 N.C. 683, 684, 18 S.E. 498, as follows: 'The defendant having pleaded guilty, his appeal could not call in question the facts charged, nor the regularity and correctness in from of the warrant. * * * The appeal could only bring up for review the question whether the facts charged, and of which the defendant admitted himself to have been guilty, constitute an offense punishable under the laws and constitution.' To the same effect, 5 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson Ed. 1957), § 2247, p. 498.'

See also State v. Caldwell, 269 N.C. 521, 153 S.E.2d 34.

In addition, if hereafter it should become necessary for the evidence to be reproduced, it can be made up from the testimony of the witnesses who testified in the trial. See State v. Roux, 263 N.C. 149, 139 S.E.2d 189; Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1956).

Defendant's first assignment of error is: 'The act of the State in accepting the defendant's guilty plea offered by his Court-appointed attorney without allowing sufficient time to prepare a defense, and without ascertaining whether or not the defendant personally wished to enter such a plea.'

The record shows the following facts: On 26 December 1966 K. Wilbur Costner, a justice of the peace in Cleveland County, issued a warrant for the arrest of the defendant charging him with the same offenses set forth in the indictment in the case, except that the second count in the warrant charged defendant with the larceny of the goods and chattels of The Stamey Company of the value of less than $100 and did not charge that the larceny was committed after a felonious breaking and entering into the building. The defendant was bound over by the recorder's court of Cleveland County to the Superior Court of Cleveland County on said warrant. At the 8 May 1967 Special Criminal Session of Cleveland, an indictment was returned a true bill by the grand jury of Cleveland County. On 8 May 1967 defendant filed with the Superior Court an affidavit that he was an indigent, and on the same day the Honorable Walter E. Brock, judge presiding, appointed J. A. West of the Cleveland County Bar to represent him. On the same day, to wit, 8 May 1967, the defendant entered a plea as set forth above. There is nothing in the record to show or to suggest that defendant's attorney did not have ample time to prepare any defense defendant may have had. The question was not raised at the trial. Neither defendant nor his attorney requested the court to allow him more time to prepare his defense. If either had done so, we are confident that the learned and experienced trial judge would have given them such permission. What is said in State v. Hodge, 267 N.C. 238, 147 S.E.2d 881, is relevant here:

'The four hours during which Messrs. Eudy and Rurke (the defendants' attorneys) had access to their court-appointed clients most probably would not have been sufficient time in which to prepare a contested case for trial. Prima facie, however, it was sufficient time for defendants to decide whether they should enter a plea or contest the charges. They themselves had had two and a half months to consider the matter. The record is devoid of any suggestion that defendants needed more time either to prepare a defense or to present evidence in mitigation of punishment. They did not ask for a continuance, nor do they now contend that one would have profited them. Counsel for a defendant 'caught in the act' or against whom the State has an 'air-tight case' has no duty to advise him against entering a plea of guilty merely to delay the day of judgment. Frequently such advice would be a great disservice to the defendant, for trial judges are often inclined to reward the truth, which they consider the best evidence of repentance. Furthermore, time spent in jail awaiting trial will not be credited on the sentence imposed and need not be considered by the judge in fixing...