State v. Work
| Decision Date | 09 January 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 39661,39661 |
| Citation | 75 Wn.2d 204,449 P.2d 806 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Christine WORK, Appellant. |
Rutherford, Kargianis & Austin, Seattle, for appellant.
Charles O. Carroll, Prosecuting Atty., Herbert L. Onstad, Deputy, Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
Defendant appeals her conviction of 'the crime of unlawful habitation of a mobile home' in violation of the King County Zoning Code, Resolution No. 18801, as amended.
The court sustained the criminal and constitutional validity of the particular portions of the zoning ordinance under attack; found defendant guilty; and fined her $1,250, with $1,000 suspended if she removed her mobile home within 60 days from date of judgment and sentence. 1
In 1963, defendant purchased a lot, zoned 'R-9.6 Residential Single Family District,' generally the same as the zoning restrictions of 'R-6,' with the exception of a small deviation not here involved.
Defendant placed a 'mobile' home, 8 46 feet, on the lot. The tongue, axles, and wheels were removed, thus eliminating all characteristics of mobility; it was placed upon a permanent concrete-block foundation; the building was attached to water and electric service and connected to a septic tank--newly installed and accepted under permit from Seattle-King County Department of Public Health. The essential facts are that it was built for human habitation, has all the attributes of a dwelling, has been so used, has lost the possibility of potential mobility, and has become fixed to the realty by its foundation and utility connections. No argument is advanced that it does not contain the essential living space of many one-family dwellings, as defined by the zoning ordinance, infra. Its sole curse seems to be that it was Moved to its present location and not Built there.
Defendant makes two contentions: (1) the zoning code does not prohibit the maintenance of the present structure upon the real property owned by her; or (2) if it does, the prohibitory portions of the zoning code allegedly applicable to her are unconstitutional. It is not necessary for us to reach the second question; our answer to the first is dispositive. We reverse defendant's conviction and remand the case, with instructions to dismiss the charges against her.
We examine the zoning code mindful that criminal statutes should be clear and unambiguous so that men of ordinary reason and intelligence need not guess at their meaning. See City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash.2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967). We also point out that in the instant case, as in State ex rel. Edward Meany Hotel, Inc., v. City of Seattle, 66 Wash.2d 329, 331, 402 P.2d 486, 488, (1965):
Each party enters the legalistic maze of the zoning ordinance at different places, follows different routes, and arrives at a different enclosure.
With this background, we examine the zoning code.
1. Single family dwelling unit.
(The remainder of the section is not relevant.)
It is apparent that defendant's place of habitation is a single family dwelling unit. Is it a Building as defined by the zoning code?
Building means any structure having a roof But excluding all forms of vehicles even though immobilized. Where this resolution requires, or where special authority granted pursuant to this resolution requires that a use shall be entirely enclosed within a building, this definition shall be qualified by adding 'and enclosed on all sides.' (Italics ours.)
Again, it is apparent that defendant's place of habitation is a single family dwelling Building, which is permitted upon the lot in question by the code. Is it an 'immobilized vehicle' Prohibited by the code?
The state contends that defendant lives in a prohibited Immobilized vehicle and not in a single family dwelling unit. We do not agree.
The zoning code does not define 'vehicle' so it must be given its common and accepted meaning. Generally, a vehicle is defined as any device on wheels or runners used to convey persons or objects. A more legalistic definition is found in 91 C.J.S. Vehicle p....
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...restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks. Douglass Twp. v. Badman, 206 Pa.Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965); State v. Work, 75 Wash.2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969). But see: Duckworth v. Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).Of course, theories advanced by mobile home owners concern......
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