State v. Worsham

• Citation: 283 P. 167,154 Wash. 575
• Decision Date: 16 December 1929
• Docket Number: 22075.
• Parties: STATE v. WORSHAM.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

283 P. 167

154 Wash. 575

STATE v. WORSHAM.

No. 22075.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 16, 1929

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, Judge.

William E. Worsham was convicted of grafting, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Charles H. Miller, of Seattle, for appellant.

Ewing D. Colvin, of Seattle, for the State.

MITCHELL J.

The defendant was charged substantially in the language of the statute with the crime of grafting; that is, with having willfully and unlawfully asked and received from one Frank O'Hara a certain compensation, gratuity, and reward, to wit, the sum of $250, that he could and would directly and indirectly influence certain public officers, to wit, Tom Walsh, a regular police officer of the city of Seattle, and other officers of said city of Seattle, the names of whom are to the prosecuting attorney unknown, in respect to their acts, decisions, and proceedings, so that W. F. Thompson would not receive a jail sentence for driving and operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and that the case against W. F Thompson would not be tried, and he (W. F. Thompson) would not be prosecuted or punished for said offense, and that it was not understood between Worsham and O'Hara that no means or influence should be employed except explanation and argument upon the merits. The defendant was found guilty by a jury, and has appealed from a judgment on the verdict.

The information was shaped under section 2333, Rem. Comp. Stat. which provides:

'Every person who shall ask or receive any compensation, gratuity or reward, or any promise thereof upon the representation that he can, directly or indirectly, or in consideration that he shall, or shall attempt to, directly or indirectly, influence any public officer, whether executive, administrative, judicial or legislative, to refuse, neglect, or defer the performance of any official duty; or who shall ask or receive any compensation, gratuity or reward, or any promise thereof, the right to retain or receive which shall be conditioned that such person shall, directly or indirectly, successfully influence by any means whatever any executive, administrative or legislative officer, in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceeding as such officer; or who shall ask or receive any compensation, gratuity or reward, or any promise thereof, upon the representation that he can, directly or indirectly, or in consideration that he shall, or shall attempt to, directly or indirectly, influence any public officer, whether executive, administrative, judicial or legislative, in respect to any act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceeding, as such officer, unless it be clearly understood and agreed in good faith between the parties thereto, on both sides, that no means or influence shall be employed except explanation and argument upon the merits, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, and, in any prosecution, under the third clause of this section, evidence of the means actually employed to influence such officer shall be admitted as proof of the means originally contemplated by the defendant.'

First, it is claimed that the court erred in denying motions to strike, as irrelevant, all that portion of the information referring to other officers of the city of Seattle, the names of which it was alleged were unknown to the prosecuting attorney, after naming one police officer, or in the alternative to make that portion of the information more definite and certain, by setting out the names of such other officers. The information simply sets out the language claimed to have been used by the appellant while engaged in the alleged act of grafting. He was charged with saying that he could and would unduly influence public officers on behalf of Thompson, who was under arrest. Particular names of the officers were not necessary, the essential thing in this respect being that they were public officers connected with the prosecution of Thompson, and that was alleged in the information, while the allegation that the names were unknown to the prosecuting attorney could in no way have prejudiced the rights of the appellant.

Further under this assignment it is claimed the court erred in overruling a demurrer to the information. The argument is that a policeman is not a public officer under the provisions of the statute against grafting. Admitting for the sake of the argument that the sufficiency of the information should be determined by that test, we are of the opinion that the demurrer was properly overruled. Under essentially the same class of statute (section 2320, Rem. Comp. Stat., formerly section 2320, Rem. & Bal. Code), we have held that a police officer is a public officer. State v. Nick, 66 Wash. 134, 119 P. 15.

During the trial appellant in his direct examination testified that he had been convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). On cross-examination he was shown a certified copy of the verdict and judgment in that case, which he admitted to be correct, and that he was the person referred to and named therein. The documents were admitted in evidence without objection, whereupon the prosecuting attorney at that time read them to the jury over the objection of the appellant. This the appellant claims was error. In our opinion the argument is without merit. The instruments being in evidence, it was clearly within the right of the prosecution to read them to the jury at that time.

The third assignment is that the court erred in denying appellant's motion for a dismissal at the close of the state's case, because of the insufficiency of the evidence to warrant a conviction. This involves the facts in the case, which were...