State v. Worthington

Decision Date07 December 1999
Citation8 S.W.3d 83
Parties(Mo.banc 1999) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael Shane Worthington, Appellant. Case Number: SC81356 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date:
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Hon. Grace M. Nichols

Counsel for Appellant: Janet M. Thompson

Counsel for Respondent: Linda Lemke

Opinion Summary:

Michael Worthington raped and killed his neighbor in St. Louis. He pleaded guilty to first degree murder, first degree burglary, and forcible rape. He was sentenced to death, 30 years, and life. His appeal concerns only the death penalty.

AFFIRMED.

Court en banc holds:

(1) The judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances. Only one is required to affirm the death sentence. The statutory aggravating circumstances narrow the class of persons to whom the death penalty may be applied, in that the aggravating circumstance does not apply to all who commit murder, since not all murderers kill for money or while committing rape.

(2) The record does not support Worthington's contention that the trial judge did not consider the mitigating factors. The trial court did consider all of the evidence in imposing the death penalty.

(3) Victim impact evidence is simply another form of informing the court about the harm caused by the crime. No manifest injustice occurred in allowing the judge to hear the evidence.

(4) The parties can introduce evidence of any aspect of a defendant's character to aid in sentencing, but evidence of non-conviction misconduct is inadmissible where the state does not provide notice of the evidence. The state's failure to provide notice is error, but the prejudice that would arise under State v. Debler does not exist in this case. Worthington pleaded guilty; the judge sentenced him; and defense counsel stipulated to most evidence and could cross-examine a non-stipulated witness.

(5) A psychologist evaluated Worthington to determine if he was competent to stand trial and assist his attorney and to determine if he suffered from a mental disease or defect. The psychologist's testimony was used to prove statutory aggravating circumstances. Because Worthington requested the evaluation of the psychologist and put his mental condition in controversy, he was not compelled to testify against himself, nor was his right to counsel violated.

(6) If Worthington chose to testify, he would be subject to full cross-examination. A defendant, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject then invoke a privilege against self-incrimination when questioned on the details.

(7) The record does not support Worthington's contention that he was uninformed or that his plea was involuntary. Worthington told the court he understood the charges and elements thereof.

(8) Although not constitutionally required, section 565.035.3 requires this Court to conduct an independent review of a defendant's death sentence for proportionality. The sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. Considering the crime, the strength of the evidence, and the defendant, the facts of this case are consistent with death sentences affirmed wherein victims were murdered in the course of a robbery and rape.

Opinion Author: Michael A. Wolff, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.

Opinion:

Michael S. Worthington pleaded guilty on August 28, 1998, to one count of first degree murder, one count of first degree burglary, and one count of forcible rape. After finding him to be a prior and persistent offender, the court sentenced Worthington to death for the murder charge, 30 years on the burglary charge, and life imprisonment on the forcible rape charge, to be served consecutively. Because the trial court imposed the death penalty, this Court has jurisdiction of his appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3. Ordinarily, appellate review of guilty pleas is extremely narrow. However, Sec. 565.035.21. requires this Court in death penalty cases to consider the punishment and "any errors enumerated by way of appeal."

We affirm.

Facts

On September 29, 1995, appellant, Worthington, and a friend from work, Jill Morehead, were at his condominium in Lake St. Louis, watching television. At about 4:00 p.m., they left to pick up their paychecks from their employer, a local supermarket. They returned to the condo and had dinner and drinks. They then went to a nightclub where each had three drinks. After about two hours, Worthington and Morehead drove to Jennings where Worthington told Morehead he had to pick up money owed to him by a friend. Worthington testified he actually went to pick up drugs. Morehead stayed in her vehicle, while Worthington was in the house for about 15 minutes. They drove back to his condo where he left Morehead. Morehead left the condo when Worthington did not return after about 45 minutes.

Later that night, Worthington saw that the kitchen window was open in the condominium of his neighbor, Melinda Griffin. Worthington had seen Ms. Griffin around the condominium complex. He got a razor blade and gloves, and when he returned to her condo, he saw that a bathroom light had been turned on. Worthington cut through the screen. He confronted Ms. Griffin in the bedroom. He covered her mouth to stop her screams and strangled her until she became unconscious. Worthington began to rape her and she regained consciousness. Worthington raped Ms. Griffin with such force that he bruised the inside of her vagina, tore both labia minora, and made a large, deep tear between her vagina and anus. Ms. Griffin fought Worthington, and he beat her and strangled her to death. The wounds on her neck showed that Worthington used a rope or cord in addition to his hands to strangle her. He stole her jewelry, credit cards, mobile phone, keys, and her car.

The next morning, September 30, 1995, a police officer pulled Worthington over. Worthington was driving Ms. Griffin's car. The officer noticed a woman's items in the car such as make-up and shoes, but the car had not been reported stolen.

The next day, October 1, a neighbor discovered Ms. Griffin's body. When police arrived, they found the screen in the kitchen window had been cut to gain entry. They found Ms. Griffin's body lying bruised, bloody, and naked at the foot of the bed, with a lace stocking draped across it. All the bedroom drawers had been pulled open. DNA testing later established that semen found on Ms. Griffin's body came from Worthington.

Police officers found Worthington that evening, but when he saw the police, he pulled out a knife, held it to his throat, and threatened to commit suicide. Police officers convinced him to put the knife down and brought him into custody. Worthington was wearing a fanny pack containing jewelry and keys belonging to Ms. Griffin.

At the police station, Worthington relayed his story of four days of drinking and getting high. After being presented with the evidence against him, Worthington confessed to the killing but could not remember the details since, he said, he was prone to blackouts when using alcohol and cocaine. At the time the offenses occurred, Worthington said he was extremely high on Prozac, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Worthington also said that two friends, Darick and Anthony, helped him with the burglary. However, this story was inconsistent with the physical evidence and with subsequent statements made by Worthington. Worthington pleaded guilty to the crimes charged. The judge imposed the death penalty for the murder conviction, as well as the prison terms for the other offenses. Worthington does not challenge the plea and sentences on the other offenses; his appeal here concerns only the death penalty.

Was the Death Sentence Disproportionate?

Worthington contends that the trial court erred in that:

(1) the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were unconstitutional because they were duplicative and did not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty,

(2) the trial court did not consider evidence that supported statutory mitigating circumstances, and

(3) the victim impact evidence was improper.Worthington also contends that his sentence is disproportionate to similar cases.

(1) Are the Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Unconstitutional?

a. Are Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Duplicative?

Defense counsel did not attack the constitutionality of the statutory aggravating circumstances; therefore, the issue is not subject to review except for plain error. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 769-70 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 933 (1996). In this appeal, Worthington requests plain error review on numerous points. Under the plain error rule, "Appellant must make a demonstration that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will occur if the error is not corrected." Id.

Worthington contends that the state submitted "in the course of a felony" aggravating circumstance as two circumstances and as such it is duplicative. This allowed the judge to count the same conduct twice and, therefore, the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances was skewed toward death.

Under section 565.032, in cases where the death penalty is imposed, the jury, or in this case where the jury is waived, the judge must determine whether a statutory aggravating circumstance is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is a finding of one valid aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the death sentence. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171,185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.886 (1999); State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 921 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 377 (1997). Here, the judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the record supports these findings: (1) Worthington committed the offense of murder...

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