State v. Wren
| Decision Date | 02 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | A21-0726,A20-1364 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. James David Wren, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-13690
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
Appellant argues that his conviction and the district court's post-sentence restitution order must be reversed because his right to a speedy trial was violated by COVID-related delays. He also argues that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on a lesser-included offense and by ordering restitution and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because appellant's speedy-trial right was not violated by COVID-related delays, we see no abuse of discretion in the jury instruction or the restitution order, and because appellant's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance, we affirm.
In June 2019, appellant James Wren was identified by a witness, C.F., as the shooter in an incident in downtown Minneapolis that left one man dead and another man paralyzed. Appellant was charged with second-degree intentional murder, with attempted second-degree intentional murder, and with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.
In October 2019, appellant demanded a speedy trial. Both his counsel and the prosecutor said that they could not be prepared for trial until January 2020 and that, if appellant were also indicted on first-degree murder charges, they could not be prepared until March 2020. Trial was continued until January 21, 2020. Later in October, appellant was also indicted on charges of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree assault.
Early in November, appellant's private counsel's motion to withdraw and appellant's motion to discharge his private counsel were both granted, and a public defender (P.D.) was appointed for appellant. The P.D. said he could not be ready for trial by January 21, 2020, and appellant waived his right to a speedy trial until March 16, 2020.
Questionnaires were distributed to potential jurors on March 13, 2020. On that date, the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court responded to the emerging COVID-19 pandemic with an order suspending all district court proceedings until March 30, 2020, except for ongoing jury trials and certain high-priority cases. On March 16, 2020, the state sought a continuance of appellant's trial because of COVID, and a continuance was granted until May 11, 2020.
On March 30, 2020, and again on May 26, 2020, the P.D. moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of appellant's right to a speedy trial; both motions were denied. All jury trials were suspended until June 1, 2020, and it was decided that a shorter, simpler case than appellant's should be tried first, as part of a pilot program. Appellant's case went to trial on June 15, 2020.
The jury heard testimony from C.F., a major witness for the prosecution. He testified that, at about two o'clock in the morning on June 10, 2019, while he was at work driving his tow truck in an alley, he had to stop driving because a group of people was walking towards him, arguing and swearing. A man came up on the driver's side of the truck, hit the mirror, and, while standing six or seven inches from C.F.., started shooting. C.F. saw light flashing from the gun; he heard two "tinks" on the hood of his truck that he believed were casings from the gun. C.F. described the shooter as an African-American male, between 6'2" and 6'5" tall, who was wearing a dark shirt and a necklace with a gold charm; his hair was in a bun or braids, and he had a small backpack on his shoulders. C.F. saw a gunshot hit one person, who fell to the ground, and saw another person on the ground, about three or four feet from C.F.'s truck and from the shooter. C.F. looked the shooter directly in the eyes and pointed him out to the police when they arrived. C.F. also said he did not see or hear anyone else firing a gun. Finally, he identified the shooter as appellant, who was present in court.
The state requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of unintentional second-degree felony murder, there was no objection, and the district court added that instruction. The jury found appellant guilty of unintentional second-degree felony murder and first-degree assault. He was sentenced to 189 months in prison for first-degree assault and to a consecutive 180 months in prison for second-degree murder, a total of 369 months in prison, and he was ordered to pay $8, 557.65 in restitution.
Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and the restitution order in separate appeals, which were consolidated. On appeal, he argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on a lesser-included offense and in ordering restitution, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
"Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question subject to de novo review." State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017). But "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
Barker sets out four factors to be considered in speedy-trial claims: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Minnesota has adopted these factors, noting that they are to be considered in balancing "the sometimes competing interests between the orderly prosecution of crimes that is fair to both sides and the prompt resolution of the case by trial." State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021). The Barker factors are not exclusive; rather, they are considered "together with such other circumstances as may be relevant" in evaluating an alleged violation of the right to a speedy trial. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628. In the final analysis, "whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends on the circumstances." State v. Jackson, 968 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn.App. 2021), (quotation omitted), rev. granted (Minn. Jan. 18, 2022).
The circumstances in Jackson, like those in this case, included the COVID pandemic. Id. at 58. Jackson cited and applied the four Barker factors. Id. at 60.
"On demand of any party after the entry of [a not-guilty] plea, the trial must start within 60 days unless the court finds good cause for a later trial date." Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b). Appellant first demanded a speedy trial on October 3, 2019; he waived his speedy-trial right on March 16, 2020, 165 days after his initial speedy-trial demand; and his trial began on June 15, 2020, which was 91 days after the end of the waiver. Therefore, we must address the three remaining Barker factors. See State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315-16 (Minn. 1999).
In Jackson, the defendant argued that the state was responsible for the delay because the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court had ordered that no trials were to be held until adequate safety precautions were in place. 968 N.W.2d. at 61. This court rejected that argument:
[T]he circumstances of the pandemic in July 2020 rendered a trial unsafe and did not reflect a deliberate attempt by the state to hamper the defense. [The appellant's] 77-day wait after invoking his speedy-trial demand was unavoidable. Accordingly, we hold that neither [the appellant] nor the state are responsible for the delay in commencing the trial when that delay occurred solely because of public-safety concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic and when the district court was prohibited from holding a jury trial by order of the Chief Justice.
Id. Jackson holds that "[i]n the context of a speedy-trial analysis, neither the state nor the defendant is responsible for the delay in bringing a defendant to trial when that delay is solely due to public-safety concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic." Id. at 58. Accordingly, under Jackson, we conclude that neither appellant nor the state was responsible for the 91-day delay from March 16, 2020, to June 15, 2020.
Jackson noted that "a defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant was deprived of the right, . . . [but] the inquiry is necessarily contextual." Id. at 61 (quoting Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252 (quotation omitted)). In Jackson, the state's counsel asked the district court to find good cause to extend the trial date because a trial could not occur without violating the order of the Chief Justice, and the defendant's counsel did not object. Id. at 62. The district court responded, Id.
This court "[did] not question whether [the Jackson defendant's] demand for a speedy trial was serious," but observed...
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