State v. Wright
| Decision Date | 02 February 1921 |
| Docket Number | 21228 |
| Citation | 181 N.W. 539,105 Neb. 617 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLANT, v. BURRET W. WRIGHT, APPELLEE. STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLANT, v. WALTER A. HUNTER, APPELLEE |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Wayne county: WILLIAM V. ALLEN JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
H. E Simon, for appellant.
A. R Davis, contra.
Condemnation proceedings brought to acquire additional ground for the state normal at Wayne, Nebraska. The properties of one Burret W. Wright and Walter A. Hunter were taken under condemnation. The two proceedings were tried together on the appeal in the district court and are presented here, on the appeal of the state, as consolidated cases.
The property condemned consisted of town lots. The appraisers fixed the value of defendant Wright's property at $ 850, and the value of Hunter's property at $ 2,150. The verdict of the jury on the appeal in the district court, in the Wright case, was $ 2,000, and, in the Hunter case, $ 4,200. The court ordered a remittitur of $ 200 in the Hunter case, which order has been complied with.
One contention made in behalf of the state is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. In regard to the Wright property, four witnesses testified on the question of value. The average of the estimates of value of these four witnesses was $ 2,525. Five witnesses testified in regard to the Hunter property, and the average of their estimates of value was $ 4,267. The state's witnesses, as to the Wright property, placed the value at varying amounts from $ 700 to $ 1,200, and, as to the Hunter property, from $ 1,000 to $ 2,500. The worth of the opinions of these various witnesses was passed upon by the jury. The question of the value of this property is peculiarly of local nature. Though the testimony is conflicting, the verdict is amply supported by competent testimony in behalf of the defendants, and, since we cannot say that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, nor manifestly wrong, we would not be warranted in disturbing it. Mohler v. Board of Regents of University of Nebraska, 102 Neb. 12, 165 N.W. 954; Grimm v. Elkhorn Valley Drainage District, 98 Neb. 260, 152 N.W. 374; Northeastern N. R. Co. v. Frazier, 25 Neb. 42, 40 N.W. 604; Omaha B. R. Co. v. Johnson, 24 Neb. 707, 40 N.W. 134; Clarke v. Chicago, K. & N. R. Co., 23 Neb. 613, 37 N.W. 484.
It is further insisted that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the state to introduce in evidence certain deeds of property, made to the state, covering lots similarly situated and of like character to those in question, and which the state had recently bought from property owners as a part of the tract sought to be acquired. In a proceeding of this kind, where the parties to the deeds are not the same as those involved in the pending proceeding, and where the statement of consideration cannot therefore be considered in the nature of an admission or declaration of a party, which, under certain circumstances, might be admissible, we cannot see how the recitals of considerations in these deeds would have been of any probative force upon the question of what the actual considerations were.
The statute (Laws 1917, ch. 224), it is true, requires, under penalty, that the parties to a deed set out the true consideration in the body of the deed, but the statute does not say that such statements, of the consideration paid, shall be considered as evidence in all cases. By virtue of this statute, such a statement has become no more a sworn statement than before. The right of cross-examination has not been preserved, and such expressions, as we view it, are nothing more than unsworn statements by third persons and of no evidential value. City of New Orleans v. Manfre, 111 La. 927, 35 So. 981; Rose v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 99; Spaulding v. Knight, 116 Mass. 148; Esch v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 72 Wis. 229, 39 N.W. 129; Abbott, Proof of Facts (3d. ed.) p. 876.
It would have been, in our opinion, improper, in any event, to show the sale price of other lots, which the state had then acquired by purchase, and which were a part of the tract which the state was openly intending to condemn in case purchases could not be made.
Upon the general proposition of whether or not sales of similar land may be shown as evidence of the value of the particular land in controversy, the courts are not in accord. 16 Cyc 1138. Our court has, however, become committed to the doctrine that such sales cannot be shown. Union P. R. Co. v. Stanwood, 71 Neb. 158, 98 N.W. 656. Proof of sales of other lands would give to the...
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