State v. Wright

• Decision Date: 04 June 1894
• Citation: 9 Wash. 96,37 P. 313
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. WRIGHT.

37 P. 313

9 Wash. 96

STATE v. WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 4, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Thurston county; M. J. Gordon, Judge.

Harry Wright was acquitted of the crime of forgery, and the state appeals. Reversed.

Milo A Root, for the State.

John R Mitchell, for respondent.

DUNBAR C.J.

This was an action by the state against the defendant for forgery. The information was as follows: "Comes now Milo A. Root county attorney and prosecuting attorney for Thurston county state of Washington, and, the court being in session and the grand jury not being in session, gives the court to understand and be informed that one Harry Wright is guilty of the crime of forgery, committed as follows, to wit: He, the said Harry Wright, at the city of Olympia, in Thurston county, state of Washington, on the 17th day of October, 1893, did falsely and fraudulently forge and counterfeit the indorsement of O. L. Branson & Co. (a firm and partnership of business men in said city of Olympia) to and upon a certain order for money (said order being of the class commonly called 'checks'), which said order was signed with the name of S. S. Brooke as drawer, and had thereon the name James Morgan as payee, and drawn on and directed to the Bank of British Columbia, of Tacoma, state of Washington, and was so drawn for the sum of thirty- seven and fifty one-hundredths dollars, and had indorsed on the back thereof the name 'James Morgan'; said forgery and counterfeiting of the indorsement of said O. L. Branson & Co. by said Harry Wright being then and there falsely and fraudulently done, for the purpose and with the intent of said Harry Wright to then and there cheat and defraud one G. Kaufman, then and there being." The defendant entered a plea of "not guilty." A jury was impaneled, and the cause tried. After the evidence was in, the judge, upon his own motion, held that the information was fatally defective, for the reason that it did not contain a copy of the instrument alleged to have been forged. The judge then directed the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, which was done, and the prisoner, by order of the judge, discharged.

It will be seen that there is but one question involved in this case, namely, whether it is essential to an indictment for forgery that a copy of the instrument alleged to have been forged be set forth in the indictment. The citation of authorities from courts which consider themselves bound to follow the common-law rule of practice in criminal cases furnishes no guide to this court, in consideration of the fact that our statute is a wide departure from the rules of the common law governing courts in criminal proceedings, Section 1202 of the Code of Procedure provides especially that all the forms of pleading in criminal actions heretofore existing are abolished, and that hereafter the forms of pleading, and the rules by which the sufficiency of pleadings is to be determined, are those prescribed herein. So that the one question to determine is, is the requirement claimed by the respondent prescribed by our statute? The requirements are specified in section 1234, and they are: (1) That it must contain the title of the action, specifying the name of the court to which the indictment or information is presented, and the names of the parties; (2) a statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Thus it will be seen that it is the statement of the acts constituting the offense which is required, and, if the statement of the acts constituting forgery can be made without setting forth a copy of the instrument forged, the requirements of the statute are met without such recitation; and we see no reason why the acts which constitute forgery cannot be as specifically designated and set forth in the indictment as the acts constituting any other crime.

The test of the validity of this indictment is, does it enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended? We think there can be no question but that it does. The acts constituting the crime are set forth with clearness and precision. The date when the crime was committed is specified. If he is a man of common understanding, he knows what it means to "counterfeit the indorsement of O. L Branson & Co. upon a certain order commonly called a 'check,' which was signed with the name of S. S. Brooke as drawer, and had thereon the name of James Morgan as payee, and drawn on and directed to the Bank of British Columbia, and for the sum of $37.50, and had indorsed on the back thereof the name 'James Morgan,' and that he committed said act falsely and fraudulently to cheat and defraud one G. Kaufman;" and it can scarcely be contended, we think, in view of the plain language used, that the respondent was not made aware by this indictment of exactly the crime with which he was charged. This indictment, we think, is in conformity with the form prescribed in section 1235, Code Proc., which provides that the act charged as a crime be set forth. The acts charged as a crime have been set forth in this information. Again, to accentuate the intention of the legislature to emancipate criminal prosecutions in this state from the enthralling technicalities of the common law, section 1244 provides that the indictment or information is...