State v. Wright
| Decision Date | 16 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16CA3 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 8702 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, and Kristopher A. Haines, Assistant Ohio State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Jocelyn K. Lowe, Special Assistant Prosecutor, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
{¶1} Dennis Wright appeals the Order on Sentencing entered May 23, 2016 in the Jackson County Court of Common Pleas. Wright was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, gross sexual imposition, and rape. On appeal, Wright asserts: (1) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court allowed the State to present overly prejudicial evidence of prior bad acts through a non-victim witness; and (2) he was rendered the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to move to sever certain counts of the indictment for purposes of trial. However, having reviewed the record herein, as well as the pertinent Ohio law, we find no merit to Wright's assignments of error. Accordingly, we overrule both assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} In February 2016, Appellant was indicted by the Jackson County Grand Jury as follows:
{¶3} At the time of the indictment, Appellant pastored a church in rural Jackson County. Appellant was married and had two adult sons. The complaining witnesses in the indictment were two of Appellant's congregants at the church, one a teenage female, and one a mentally challenged adult female. The third complaining witness was one of Appellant's sons, dating back to the complainant's childhood.
{¶4} The indictment also contained sexually violent predator specifications as to Counts 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Appellant was appointed counsel and entered not guilty pleas. The case eventually proceeded to jury trial which took place May 9 through May 16, 2016. Prior to trial, Appellant waived his right to trial on the sexually violent predator specifications.
{¶5} The State's theory of the case was Appellant abused his familiar relationship with the victims and his authority as their pastor, and father, to perpetrate his criminal sexual activity. The defense strategy was to portray Appellant as a victim of lies and innuendo by complainants with ulterior motives of their own. Local media sources followed the case during the pretrial and trial phases.
{¶6} At trial, the State presented testimony from M.S., a complaining witness; Marjorie Norman, an eyewitness to one of the instances of abuse; M.S.'s twin sister; Deputy Urias Hall, an investigator for the Jackson County Sheriff's Office; T.R., another complaining witness; J.W., Appellant's son and a complaining witness; Dr. Amy Luckeydoo, a pediatrician employed by the Child Protection Center in Ross County, Ohio; Ashley Muse, a forensic interviewer with the Child Protection Center; T.S., M.S.'s older sister; and, Agent Latisha Schuler of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. The State also offered two exhibits: a DVD of Ashley Muse's forensic interview with M.S. and a recorded conversation between Agent Schuler and Appellant.
{¶7} When the State rested, defense counsel made a Crim.R. 29 motion to dismiss the charges due to insufficient evidence. The trial court overruled the motion. Appellant then presented testimony from his wife, Diana Wright. Appellant also testified on his own behalf. After the defense rested, both sides gave closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, and the jury retired to deliberate.
{¶8} Appellant was subsequently convicted of all counts except count five, illegal use of a minor in sexually oriented material. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences for all counts, and life imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. Where pertinent, additional facts will be set forth below.
{¶9} The admission of other acts evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's decision in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Ruble, 4th Dist. Washington No. 16CA20, 2017-Ohio-7259, at ¶ 27; State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14. " 'A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.' " State v. Keenan, 143 Ohio St.3d 397, 2015-Ohio-2484, 38 N.E.3d 870, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. An abuse of discretion includes a situation in which a trial court did not engage in a "sound reasoning process"; this review is deferential and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Darmond at ¶ 34. We are mindful, however, that 2-J Supply Inc. v. Garrett & Parker, LLC, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA29, 2015-Ohio-2757, ¶ 9, quoting Safest Neighborhood Assn. v. Athens Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2013-Ohio-5610, 5 N.E.3d 694, ¶ 16.
{¶10} In general, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith." Evid.R. 404(B). "It may, however, be admissible * * * [to prove] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Id. But evidence of other crimes and acts of wrongdoing are strictly construed against admissibility. See also Ruble, supra, at ¶ 25; State v. Marshall, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 06CA23, 2007-Ohio-6298, ¶ 46.
{¶11} In determining the admissibility of other acts evidence, trial courts should determine: (1) whether the other acts evidence is relevant to establishing any fact that is of consequence, i.e. the other acts make the existence of a material fact more or less probable than it would be without that evidence; (2) whether the other acts evidence is presented to prove the character of the accused in order to show the accused acted in conformity with that character, or whether the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as those stated in Evid.R. 404(B); and (3) whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Evid.R. 403. Ruble, at ¶ 26; State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20; State v. Adams, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010868, 2017-Ohio-1178, ¶ 10; State v. Fowler, 2017-Ohio-438, — N.E.3d —, ¶ 17, 2017 WL 495595 (10th Dist.).
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court prejudiced him when it admitted testimony of M.S.'s sister, T.S. Appellant argues this testimony essentially added another unindicted accuser to bolster the State's case with improper propensity evidence. The State filed a motion to use Evid.R. 404(B) evidence to show Appellant's motive, preparation, plan, and modus operandi.
{¶13} The State's motion indicated T.S.'s testimony would be that between 2010 and 2011, when T.S. was 14 and 15 years old, Appellant taught T.S. to drive a truck and used this opportunity to touch her breasts. The State argued in doing so, Appellant used his role as T.S.'s pastor and trusted family friend to gain access to her and sexually assault her. The State argued that Appellant used the same relationship with the victims as their pastor and trusted family friend to gain access to M.S., whom he also taught to drive and also sexually assaulted by touching her breasts during the "lesson." M.S. was almost the exact same age as T.S. when Appellant molested her. The State concluded that in using the same relationship, the same location, the same scheme, and the same sexual contact, the evidence adduced from T.S.'s testimony was admissible and relevant in the current case pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) to show motive, preparation, plan, and modus operandi in committing the sexual abuse against M.S.
{¶14} At a hearing to resolve pretrial motions, Appellant argued it was highly prejudicial to allow T.S.'s testimony when she was not named as a victim in any count of the indictment. However, by written decision, the trial court announced it would be allowing T.S. to testify. The trial court relied on the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, and the Eight District Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Herrington, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101322, 2015-Ohio-1820, finding that the factual scenario in Appella...
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