State v. Wright

• Decision Date: 14 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 56644,56644
• Citation: 515 S.W.2d 421
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy Lee WRIGHT, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 421

515 S.W.2d 421

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy Lee WRIGHT, Appellant.

No. 56644.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Oct. 14, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1974.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O'Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Carroll J. Donohue, Husch, Eppenberger, Donohue, Elson & Cornfeld, St. Louis, for appellant.

FINCH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment following conviction of defendant of murder in the first degree. We retain jurisdiction to decide this case on the basis of this Court's order entered April 9, 1973, following our decision in Parks v. State, 492 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. banc 1973). We affirm.

On December 4, 1968, during the course of a robbery of a restaurant in St. Louis, Mike Lograsso, the proprietor, was shot and killed. Defendant was arrested at about 10:00 a.m. on December 8, 1968, after other suspects previously arrested had said that defendant was involved. ¹ He was taken by the arresting officers to the homicide office at central police headquarters where Sgt. Troupe, the officer in charge of the investigation of this homicide, was interrogating Leroy Fair, another suspect.

Without giving defendant a Miranda warning or otherwise advising him of his constitutional rights, Sgt. Troupe said to defendant, 'What did you do with the shotgun?' or 'Where is the shotgun?' Defendant answered, 'Leroy, you know I gave you the shotgun. I don't know where it is at.' Troupe then advised defendant not to make any further statements. Shortly thereafter defendant was taken by the police to the juvenile court building and turned over to the custody of the juvenile court. ² Officers testified for the state that defendant was not questioned about the robbery or homicide at the time he was taken into custody or while he was being taken to police headquarters and that he was not interrogated at headquarters about the events other than the foregoing question directed to him by Sgt. Troupe.

After defendant had been delivered to the juvenile building, the police asked that they be allowed to interrogate him about the robbery and homicide. Permission was granted and at about 1:00 p.m., on December 9, 1968, defendant was questioned at the juvenile center. Present were Sgt. Troupe, Detective Dowd (who had arrested defendant), Richard Christman, the deputy juvenile officer, defendant's mother, and the defendant himself. ³

At the outset of the interrogation on December 9, juvenile officer Christman told defendant that the officers present were members of the St. Louis police force. Christman then told the defendant that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement he made could be used against him; that he had the right to an attorney, including an appointed attorney if he could not afford one; that he probably would be certified for trial as an adult due to his past record; ⁴ and that in adult court there was the possibility of a death sentence for the crime of which he was accused. After each part of that warning, the juvenile officer asked the defendant if he understood. The defendant replied that he did, that he did not want an attorney (the officer testified that the defendant's mother left this decision up to the defendant) and that he would make a statement. In the interrogation by the police which followed (in the presence of the juvenile officer and defendant's mother), defendant confessed participation in the planning and commission of the robbery, saying he stood by the door holding a shotgun while the others entered the restaurant.

Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing before the court on defendant's motion to suppress both the statement he made to Sgt. Troupe at police headquarters following his arrest on December 8 and the confession he made the following day during the interrogation at the juvenile building. Some additional evidence was heard before the trial started. The court ruled that the December 8 statement about the shotgun was not admissible because defendant had not been given his Miranda warning at that time. As a result, this statement was not admitted in evidence at the trial. However, the court held that the December 9 confession given at the juvenile center was voluntary and was admissible in evidence. The court refused to quash that confession, and testimony with reference thereto was received in evidence at the trial of defendant.

An opinion was written and adopted in Division One reversing and remanding this case on the basis that admission of defendant's confession violated the principles established in Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ⁵ As a result of a dissent in Division, the case was transferred to the Court En Banc, where after reargument, the divisional opinion was not adopted and the case was reassigned for preparation of a new opinion. In writing this opinion, portions of the prior opinion are utilized without the use of quotation marks.

We first consider the proposition, strongly urged by defendant and the basis of which this case was ruled in Division, that the decision in Westover v. United States, supra, dictates a reversal in this case.

In Westover the petitioner was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies. In addition, a report was received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. He was arrested during the evening and after being placed in a lineup he was booked. The Kansas City police then interrogated him that night and again throughout the following morning. Shortly before noon they notified the FBI that they were through interrogating Westover and the FBI could question him. Three FBI agents then continued the interrogation at the Kansas City police headquarters and after about 2 1/2 hours, Westover signed separate confessions to each of two robberies about which he had been questioned. The Kansas City police had never advised Westover as to his constitutional rights but one of the federal agents testified at the trial (and a paragraph on each of Westover's confessions so recited) that the FBI agents had advised Westover that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement he made could be used against him; and that he had the right to see an attorney.

The Supreme Court reversed Westover's conviction, stating as follows:

'On the facts of this case we cannot find that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning. There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that the defendant did in fact confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed.

'We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station--in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from Westover the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.' 384 U.S. l.c. 495, 86 S.Ct. 1639.

It is to be noted from the above that the Supreme Court concluded that Westover did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and that the confession, coming as it did during what the court concluded was simply an extension by the FBI of the police interrogation, resulted from the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. That is not the situation in this case. Instead of 14 hours of interrogation by the local police which occurred in Westover, we have only a single question asked by the local police officer when the defendant was brought into the room where the officer was interrogating Leroy Fair. That constituted the complete police interrogation of this defendant. He was then taken to the juvenile headquarters and turned over to juvenile authorities. His confession came the following day while he was in the juvenile building in the presence of the juvenile officer and his mother after he had been fully advised as to his constitutional rights by the juvenile officer. There was no evidence of any interrogation preceding this interview in the juvenile building other than the single question asked by Sgt. Troupe about what defendant had done with the shotgun.

We hold that what occurred comes within the exception recognized in the Supreme Court's opinion in Westover when they stated that they did not suggest...