State v. Wright

Decision Date04 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. ED 97219.,ED 97219.
Citation376 S.W.3d 696
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ronald WRIGHT, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Craig A. Johnston, Assistant Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for appellant.

Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

PATRICIA L. COHEN, Judge.

Introduction

Ronald Wright (Defendant) appeals the judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree burglary. Defendant claims the trial court erred in prohibiting: (1) Defendant's expert witness from testifying that Defendantsuffered from a drug-induced psychosis that rendered him incapable of coolly reflecting or premeditating upon his actions; (2) Defendant from testifying about his mental health history; and (3) Defendant's mother from testifying that she observed Defendant exhibiting anxious and strange behavior two days prior to the charged offenses. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In October 2008, Defendant was on both probation and parole. The conditions of Defendant's probation and parole included obeying all laws and maintaining employment. On October 15, 2008, Defendant's employer terminated Defendant and called the police after Defendant pushed a construction-site foreman off a ladder.

On October 16, 2008, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Lewis Helton, Defendant's supervising probation and parole officer, telephoned Defendant and directed him to report to Helton's office at 1:00 p.m. regarding alleged violations of his probation and parole conditions.

Around 1:00 p.m. that day, Joyce Hayes, a resident of a subdivision in Farmington, observed Defendant sitting in his truck while parked across the street from John and Jean Shaw's house. Hayes watched Defendant drive around the subdivision, stopping outside various houses and at a construction site. Eventually, Defendant drove through a field and backed his truck into the Shaws' driveway.

The Shaws, a couple in their seventies, were at home watching television when Defendant knocked on their door. Mr. Shaw, who was in frail health and walked with a cane, answered the door. Defendant told Mr. Shaw that he was looking for someone else and returned to his truck but did not leave the Shaws' driveway. Feeling increasingly nervous about Defendant's continued presence, Mrs. Shaw gathered some tools, including a short-handled sledgehammer, and placed them on a stool by the front door.

Defendant suddenly broke into the Shaws' home, threw Mr. Shaw to the floor, and began punching him. Mrs. Shaw threw an ashtray at Defendant, hitting him in the arm. When Defendant started moving toward Mrs. Shaw, she ran out the back door with a cordless phone, called the police, and hid in some brush.

When the police arrived, they found Mr. Shaw's body in the living room. His head appeared to be “smashed in” and there was blood on the floor and ceiling. Mr. Shaw's autopsy revealed that the cause of death was “blunt trauma from some instrument to the head.” The pathologist counted at least eight blows to Mr. Shaw's head, which were “completely consistent” with a sledgehammer as the cause of the blunt trauma.

At about 3:00 p.m. on October 16, 2008, Jerald Wells was at his home in Valley Mines when he heard his garage door close. Wells entered the garage and found Defendant standing beside Defendant's truck, which he had parked in Wells's garage. After Wells ordered Defendant to leave, Defendant returned to his truck and backed it out of the garage, but the truck stalled in the driveway. Wells watched Defendant walk down the street, steal a truck belonging to Wells's neighbor, and drive the truck down a dead-end street. Wells drove his own truck after Defendant and blocked in Defendant until the police arrived and arrested Defendant.

Crime scene investigators seized from the Shaws' house a sledgehammer and an electric hand massager, which was located near Mr. Shaw's body. Latent fingerprint testing revealed Defendant's fingerprint on the massager, and DNA testing showed that the bloodstains on the sledgehammer and on the pants and shoes Defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest were consistent with Mr. Shaw's blood.

The State charged Defendant with first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree burglary.1 Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to preclude testimony regarding mental disease or defect or diminished capacity. The prosecutor alleged that Defendant had retained Dr. Richard Scott, a psychologist, who performed a forensic psychological evaluation of Defendant and concluded that Defendant suffered from an “amphetamine-induced psychotic disorder” that rendered him incapable of premeditation at the time he killed Mr. Shaw. The prosecutor argued that drug-induced psychosis is not a mental disease or defect but rather “intoxication or a drugged condition resulting from the ingestion of amphetamine” and Dr. Scott's testimony was therefore inadmissible. After hearing arguments, the trial court sustained the State's motion to preclude testimony.

The prosecutor also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of Defendant's drugged condition. The prosecutor argued that Section 562.076 prohibits the admission of evidence of a drugged condition “for the purpose of negating a mental state which is an element of the offense.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 562.076.3.2 At the pretrial hearing on the State's motion, defense counsel responded that he planned to elicit testimony that Defendant was hearing voices, but he did not intend to present evidence of Defendant's voluntary drug use.

At the jury trial, Defendant and Defendant's mother, Bernice Wright, testified for the defense. Defendant testified that, on the morning of October 16, 2008, he awoke hearing voices in his head and had “a real bad feeling ... that there was bad things going on.” 3 Defendant began driving to the home of his friend Mark Sitzes because he heard Sitzes's voice telling him to do so. As he was driving, Sitzes's voice directed Defendant to turn into the Shaws' subdivision in Farmington. Defendant drove around the subdivision looking for signs. Eventually, he returned to the Shaws' house because he believed an American flag was pointing toward the house to signal that he should go there.

Defendant testified that, after he knocked on the Shaws' door and spoke briefly to Mr. Shaw, he returned to his truck and heard Sitzes ask, “Where are you going?,” as if Defendant was not supposed to leave. Defendant sat in his truck “quite a while” until Mr. Shaw came outside and asked him to leave. Defendant heard Sitzes's daughter say, “I'd hit him,” and Defendant hit Mr. Shaw with a framing hammer from Defendant's tool belt.

The “next thing” Defendant remembered was being inside the Shaw residence and seeing Mrs. Shaw run away. Defendant remembered hitting Mr. Shaw with the sledgehammer, but Defendant did not recall how many times because he “blanked out.” On cross-examination, Defendant testified that he did not remember deciding to kill Mr. Shaw.

Defendant's mother, Bernice Wright, testified that she saw Defendant on the evening of October 14, 2008. When defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony about Defendant's demeanor on that date, the prosecutor objected on the grounds of relevance and defense counsel made an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel stated that he anticipated that Mrs. Wright would testify that on October 14, 2008,

[Defendant] was extremely depressed, very distressed, having all sorts of problems with anxiety. That he had shaved his head, which I anticipate she will testify that this is something that he had never done before. And she was extremely worried about his mental health at that time.

In response, the prosecutor argued that evidence of Defendant's behavior two days prior to the crimes charged was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court ruled that the proffered testimony was inadmissible.

Defense counsel then called Defendant to the stand to make an offer of proof regarding his history of drug abuse and mental health issues. Defendant testified that he had been using methamphetamines “off and on” since 1999, was a “heavy user,” and had used methamphetamines on October 15, 2008. Defendant testified that he experienced auditory hallucinations five or six times prior to October 16, 2008, and he had been committed to the “state hospital” four times. Defendant stated that he did not use methamphetamines on October 16, 2008. On cross-examination, Defendant acknowledged that his use of methamphetamines on October 15, 2008 was voluntary.4

Finally, defense counsel called Dr. Scott, a psychologist and certified forensic examiner, to make an offer of proof. Dr. Scott testified that, after performing a forensic evaluation of Defendant, he concluded that, at the time Defendant committed the charged offenses, Defendant “was suffering a methamphetamine induced psychosis.” Dr. Scott further found that, “as a result of that methamphetamine induced psychosis, [Defendant] was not capable of coolly reflecting or premeditating on his actions.”

Dr. Scott testified that, in reaching the conclusion that Defendant had diminished capacity, he relied upon Defendant's hospital records:

The historical information included evidence from four psychiatric hospitalizations—three in 2003, and another in 2006. Each of these hospitalizations was at Southeast Missouri Medical Center. Three of them were involuntary commitments, 96 hour holds.

And in each case it was found that he had been using methamphetamine for a sustained period of time and had become psychotic or psychotic and depressed. And during those hospitalizations, they documented auditory hallucinations, delusional beliefs of various types, disorganized and confused behavior.

And in all of the hospitalizations as he was treated with anti-psychotic and anti-depressant...

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2 cases
  • State v. Martin
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 23, 2015
    ...a pattern of getting others to commit crimes for him. There was no objection. No claim of error is preserved. State v. Wright, 376 S.W.3d 696, 705 n. 8 (Mo.App. 2012). “Plain error relief as to closing argument should rarely be granted and is generally denied without explanation.” State v. ......
  • Wright v. State, ED 99798.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 11, 2014
    ...and first-degree burglary, Section 569.120. This Court affirmed Wright's convictions and sentences on direct appeal in State v. Wright, 376 S.W.3d 696 (Mo.App.E.D.2012). Thereafter, Wright filed his amended motion for post-conviction relief and request for an evidentiary hearing asserting t......

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