State v. Wynne

• Decision Date: 08 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. C2-94-2147,C2-94-2147
• Citation: 552 N.W.2d 218
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andrea Lynn WYNNE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 218

552 N.W.2d 218

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Andrea Lynn WYNNE, Appellant.

No. C2-94-2147.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 8, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

Purse separated from defendant upon defendant's arrival in an automobile on premises where a search warrant is being executed and brought into defendant's home by law enforcement officers could not be constitutionally searched under the premises search warrant, as incident to lawful arrest, or as part of a Terry-type stop-and-frisk.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, State Atty. General, St. Paul, Jeffrey Edblad, Cambridge, for Appellant.

John M. Stuart, Minnesota Public Defender, Scott G. Swanson, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.

On October 18, 1993, at about 3:30 p.m., a search warrant was executed at the home of appellant Andrea Wynne's mother, Joy Wynne, in Isanti, Minnesota. The warrant authorized the search of, among other things: the person of Joy Pamela Wynne or any other persons located at her residence at the time of the search, the cottage-type house in the process of being painted, the three or four out-buildings, the entire premises encompassed by the legal description of the property, the motor vehicle registered to Andrea Lynn Wynne and all other motor vehicles located on the premises. The property and things sought by the search included various controlled substances, measuring devices, and weapons capable of use in distributing or protecting controlled substances. The warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the person of Andrea Wynne.

After securing the premises, the officers proceeded with the search and seized, among other things: LSD, Darvon, two small bags of amphetamine, a silver pitcher containing amphetamine, marijuana from the kitchen windowsill, prescription Motrin found in the bathroom, and pill boxes, pipes, baggies and scales found under a bed.

At about 4:40 p.m., Andrea Wynne arrived home in a car driven by Micheal Klapak to discover the search in progress. As Wynne got out of the car, officers on the scene questioned her, learning that she was Joy Wynne's daughter and that she resided in the house being searched. The officers then took Wynne's purse and escorted her into the house. Once inside officers searched the purse without Wynne's consent. They discovered a white powdery substance which proved to be amphetamine, a small amount of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia including three marijuana pipes, razor blades, and snorting tubes. Wynne was then arrested.

Wynne was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (1992); possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.092 (1994); and possession of a small amount of marijuana in violation of Minn.Stat. § 152.027, subd. 4(a) (1994). Wynne filed a motion to dismiss the charges and a motion to suppress the evidence. The district court found the search valid as similar to a Terry search, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and denied both motions. The parties submitted the matter for trial on stipulated facts and the court determined that Andrea Wynne was guilty of all the charges.

Wynne appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. It held that the search of Wynne's purse did not exceed the scope of the warrant to search Joy Wynne's premises. We granted review and now reverse.

The court of appeals found that the search of Wynne's purse was justified as coming within the scope of the warrant. The court cited to United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-71, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) to support its conclusion. In Ross the Supreme Court explained in dicta that any container within a residence that is the subject of a valid search warrant may be searched if it is reasonable to believe that the container could conceal items of the kind described in the warrant. Id.

Ross, however, involved the warrantless search of packages contained in the trunk of an automobile. Id. at 801, 102 S.Ct. at 2160. Further, Wynne's purse was not found in Joy Wynne's home but brought into the home by officers from an automobile that was driven onto the premises after the search was commenced. Thus, we find Ross inapplicable to the present situation.

The court of appeals also cited to United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir.1973) to support its conclusion. In Micheli, police obtained a search warrant for a business office. Id. at 430. During the search, police found a briefcase that belonged to a co-owner of the business tucked under a desk. Id. The police searched the briefcase and discovered counterfeit currency. Id. The issue in Micheli was whether the search of a "personal effect not currently worn, but apparently temporarily put down, such as a briefcase, falls outside the scope of a warrant to search the premises." Id. at 431. The First Circuit held that as co-owner of the business premises searched, the owner of the briefcase:

had a special relation to the place, which meant that it could reasonably be expected that some of his personal belongings would be there. Thus, the showing of probable cause and necessity which was required prior to the initial intrusion into his office reasonably comprehended within its scope those personal articles, such as his briefcase, which might be lying about the office.

Id. at 432. The court concluded that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.

We, however, find Micheli distinguishable from the present circumstances. In this case, the purse was not "lying about" Joy Wynne's home. Rather, it was physically taken from Andrea Wynne. Further, Micheli itself states that "a search of clothing currently worn is plainly within the ambit of a personal search and outside the scope of a warrant to search the premises." Id. at 431. It has been held that, with respect to a police search, a shoulder purse is "so closely associated with the person that [it is] identified with and included within the concept of one's person." United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 1748, 68 L.Ed.2d 231 (1981). Thus, we conclude that the search of Wynne's purse constituted a search of her person and did not fall within the ambit of the premises search warrant.

The state next argues that the search of Wynne's purse was valid under the warrant because the officers had probable cause at the time of the search to believe appellant had the objects described in the warrant on her person. In general, "[a] search warrant authorizing the search of a particular building or premises does not give the officers the right to search all persons who may be found in it." State v. Fox, 283 Minn. 176, 179, 168 N.W.2d 260, 262 (1969). However, the warrant in question in this case was a so called "all persons" warrant. That is, it allowed the search of "any other persons located at the residence at the time of the search."

A similar situation arose in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). In Ybarra, police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of an Illinois tavern and the person of the bartender at the tavern for " 'evidence of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.' " Id. at 88, 100 S.Ct. at 341. An Illinois state statute authorized "law enforcement officers to detain and search any person found on premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant, to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of anything described in the warrant." Id. at 87, 100 S.Ct. at 340. While executing the warrant, officers searched Ybarra, a patron in the bar, and found packets of heroin. Id. at 88-89, 100 S.Ct. at 340-41. The Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional stating:

Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.

Id. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342.

This court addressed the constitutionality of an "all persons" warrant in State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 (Minn.1985). In Hinkel, an all person warrant was constitutionally permissible in the search of all persons on the premises of an "after hours joint," where liquor was sold after the legal closing hours of bars. We stated that in order to find such a warrant constitutional:

There must be a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the place of the activity, and the persons in the place to show probable cause. This nexus has been described as * * * "whether the information supplied the magistrate supports the conclusion that it is probable anyone in the described place when the warrant is executed is involved in the criminal activity in such a way as to have evidence thereof on his person."

Id. at 776 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5, at 92 (1978)).

We conclude that a sufficient nexus does not exist in the current situation. By the terms of the search warrant, it was to be executed only during daytime hours. During the day, relatives, guests or hired workpeople could have been present on the residential premises to be searched. Indeed, on the day of the search a house painter was apparently at Joy Wynne's home. A review of the record revealed no information presented to the magistrate which would give rise to probable cause that any person who might be present during execution of the warrant would be "involved in the criminal activity in such a way as to have evidence thereof on his person." LaFave, supra, § 4.5 at 92. We therefore conclude that the portion of the...